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The 2007-2009 financial crisis has shed light on the importance of contagion and
systemic risk, and revealed the lack of adequate indicators for measuring and mon-
itoring them. This dissertation addresses these issues and leads to several rec-
ommendations for the design of an improved assessment of systemic importance,
improved rating methods for structured finance securities, and their use by investors
and risk managers.
Using a complete data set of all mutual exposures and capital levels of financial
institutions in Brazil in 2007 and 2008, we explore in chapter 2 the structure and
dynamics of the Brazilian financial system. We show that the Brazilian financial
system exhibits a complex network structure characterized by a strong degree of
heterogeneity in connectivity and exposure sizes across institutions, which is qual-
itatively and quantitatively similar to the statistical features observed in other
financial systems. We find that the Brazilian financial network is well represented
by a directed scale-free network, rather than a small world network. Based on these
observations, we propose a stochastic model for the structure of banking networks,
representing them as a directed weighted scale free network with power law distri-
butions for in-degree and out-degree of nodes, Pareto distribution for exposures.
This model may then be used for simulation studies of contagion and systemic risk
in networks.
We propose in chapter 3 a quantitative methodology for assessing contagion and
systemic risk in a network of interlinked institutions. We introduce the Conta-
gion Index as a metric of the systemic importance of a single institution or a set
of institutions, that combines the effects of both common market shocks to port-
folios and contagion through counterparty exposures. Using a directed scale-free
graph simulation of the financial system, we study the sensitivity of contagion to a
change in aggregate network parameters: connectivity, concentration of exposures,
heterogeneity in degree distribution and network size. More concentrated and more
heterogeneous networks are found to be more resilient to contagion. The impact
of connectivity is more controversial: in well-capitalized networks, increasing con-
nectivity improves the resilience to contagion when the initial level of connectivity
is high, but increases contagion when the initial level of connectivity is low. In
undercapitalized networks, increasing connectivity tends to increase the severity of
contagion. We also study the sensitivity of contagion to local measures of connec-
tivity and concentration across counterparties –the counterparty susceptibility and
local network frailty– that are found to have a monotonically increasing relationship
with the systemic risk of an institution. Requiring a minimum (aggregate) capital
ratio is shown to reduce the systemic impact of defaults of large institutions; we
show that the same effect may be achieved with less capital by imposing such cap-
ital requirements only on systemically important institutions and those exposed to
them.
In chapter 4, we apply this methodology to the study of the Brazilian financial
system. Using the Contagion Index, we study the potential for default contagion
and systemic risk in the Brazilian system and analyze the contribution of bal-
ance sheet size and network structure to systemic risk. Our study reveals that,
aside from balance sheet size, the network-based local measures of connectivity
and concentration of exposures across counterparties introduced in chapter 3, the
counterparty susceptibility and local network frailty, contribute significantly to the
systemic importance of an institution in the Brazilian network. Thus, imposing an
upper bound on these variables could help reducing contagion. We examine the
impact of various capital requirements on the extent of contagion in the Brazilian
financial system, and show that targeted capital requirements achieve the same re-
duction in systemic risk with lower requirements in capital for financial institutions.
The methodology we proposed in chapter 3 for estimating contagion and systemic
risk requires visibility on the entire network structure. Reconstructing bilateral ex-
posures from balance sheets data is then a question of interest in a financial system
where bilateral exposures are not disclosed. We propose in chapter 5 two methods
to derive a distribution of bilateral exposures matrices. The first method attempts
to recover the balance sheet assets and liabilities “sample by sample”. Each sample
of the bilateral exposures matrix is solution of a relative entropy minimization prob-
lem subject to the balance sheet constraints. However, a solution to this problem
does not always exist when dealing with sparse sample matrices. Thus, we propose
a second method that attempts to recover the assets and liabilities “in the mean”.
This approach is the analogue of the Weighted Monte Carlo method introduced by
Avellaneda et al. (2001). We first simulate independent samples of the bilateral ex-
posures matrix from a relevant prior distribution on the network structure, then we
compute posterior probabilities by maximizing the entropy under the constraints
that the balance sheet assets and liabilities are recovered in the mean. We discuss
the pros and cons of each approach and explain how it could be used to detect
systemically important institutions in the financial system.
The recent crisis has also raised many questions regarding the meaning of struc-
tured finance credit ratings issued by rating agencies and the methodology behind
them. Chapter 6 aims at clarifying some misconceptions related to structured
finance ratings and how they are commonly interpreted: we discuss the compara-
bility of structured finance ratings with bond ratings, the interaction between the
rating procedure and the tranching procedure and its consequences for the stabil-
ity of structured finance ratings in time. These insights are illustrated in a factor
model by simulating rating transitions for CDO tranches using a nested Monte
Carlo method. In particular, we show that the downgrade risk of a CDO tranche
can be quite different from a bond with same initial rating. Structured finance
ratings follow path-dependent dynamics that cannot be adequately described, as
usually done, by a matrix of transition probabilities. Therefore, a simple label-
ing via default probability or expected loss does not discriminate sufficiently their
downgrade risk. We propose to supplement ratings with indicators of downgrade
risk. To overcome some of the drawbacks of existing rating methods, we suggest a
risk-based rating procedure for structured products. Finally, we formulate a series
of recommendations regarding the use of credit ratings for CDOs and other struc-
tured credit instruments.
Keywords: bilateral exposures, collateralized debt obligation, contagion, copula,
credit derivatives, credit rating, default clustering, default risk, domino effects,
macro-prudential regulation, random graph, relative entropy, scale-free, small-world,
systemic risk, structured finance, transition probabilities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“The greatest tragedy would be to accept the refrain that no one could have seen
this coming and thus nothing could have been done. If we accept this notion, it will
happen again.”
Phil Angelides, Chairman of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.
1.1 Contagion, systemic risk and financial regu-
lation
Failures of financial institutions are mainly due to two forms of financial distress:
illiquidity and insolvency. Default occurs when an institution fails to fulfill an
obligation such as a scheduled debt payment of interest or principal or the inability
to service a loan. This typically happens when the reserves in short term (liquid)
assets do not suffice to cover short term liabilities. Insolvency happens when the
capital of an institution is reduced to zero while illiquidity occurs when reserves
in liquid assets, such as cash and cash equivalents, are insufficient to cover short
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term liabilities. Illiquidity leads to default while, in principle, insolvency may not
necessarily entail default as long as the institution is able to obtain financing to
meet payment obligations. Nevertheless, in the current structure of the financial
system where institutions are primarily funded through short-term debt, which
must be constantly renewed, insolvent institutions would have great difficulties in
raising liquidity as their assets lose in value. Indeed, renewal of short term funding
is subject to the solvency and credit worthiness of the institution. Thus, in practice,
insolvency leads to illiquidity which in turn leads to default.
Bank failures have led in the recent years to a systemic crisis and shed light on
the importance of systemic risk. Systemic risk is a macro-level risk which can
impair the stability of the entire financial system, as opposed to the risk of failure
of an individual entity in the system. Systemic risk could occur as a consequence
of an aggregate negative shock affecting all institutions in the system, such as a
common exposure to a macroeconomic factor: economic output, unemployment,
inflation; or a common exposure to fluctuations in interest rates, foreign exchange
rates, drop in market prices, etc. Another source of systemic risk is the contagion
of financial distress in the system. A failure of a financial institution may spread
in a domino fashion throughout the financial system. In a period of financial
distress, a bank may fail to pay all of its creditors in full and on time. These losses
are written down from the creditor’s balance sheet. If the losses were sufficiently
large to exceed the creditor’s capital, it would cause the creditor to default on its
short term debt obligations. This, in turn, will reduce the capital of the creditor’s
creditors triggering a cascade of losses and defaults. This cascade may lead to a
disruption of the entire network and a spillover of financial distress to the larger
economy.
To design public policies that can efficiently prevent the fragility of institutions to
be translated into a systemic failure, it is necessary to understand the potential
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causes of both individual failures and systemic risk.
Banking regulation has imposed requirements on the amount of capital a bank
should hold to withstand potential losses. The most important requirement is
to maintain a capital ratio, defined as the ratio of a bank’s capital to its risk-
weighted assets. Basel 2 accords (BIS, 2001) propose guidelines to calculate the
risk weights in such a way that banks hold enough capital to sustain the three main
sources of risk they are faced to: credit, market and operational. For regulatory
purposes, capital has been divided in three tiers. Tier 1 capital is mainly composed
of shareholder’s equity and represents the main cushion for a bank to absorb losses.
The risk-based capital guidelines are supplemented by requirements on these tiers
of capital. For example, in the U.S. banks must have a Tier 1 capital ratio of at
least 4%, and a combined Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital ratio of at least 8% (FDIC,
2009).
The traditional regulatory framework for determining systemically important insti-
tutions has been to rank the institutions in the system in terms of the size of their
balance sheet. Institutions with the largest balance sheet size are declared “too
big to fail”. This traces back to Continental Illinois Bank in 1984 when regulators
feared that the failure of the bank might trigger a systemic crisis. Continental suf-
fered from several defaults in its energy loans portfolio, and losses from other non
performing loans. As a result, Moody’s downgraded Continental from the Aaa rat-
ing category. This has led to a massive withdrawal of funds, triggering a liquidity
crisis. Bank regulators were concerned that the financial distress of Continental,
which held $45 billion in assets, might spread to more than 1000 other banks which
might also default if Continental defaults. As a result, Continental and ten other
of the U.S. largest banks were considered too big to fail (Gup, 2004).
Nevertheless, the recent financial crises have showed that institutions with a rela-
tively small balance sheet size can pose a significant risk of contagion to the system.
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In 1998, the Federal Reserve of New York organized a rescue plan for Long Term
Capital Management (LTCM) fearing that a liquidation of the hedge fund assets to
cover its debts might trigger a contagion of financial distress to its many counter-
parties. LTCM’s on balance sheet assets totalled around $125 billion, with a capital
of $4 billion. However, it held off balance sheet assets on a notional of more than
$1 trillion (Parkinson, 1999; Lowenstein, 2000). LTCM’s major counterparties had
closely monitored their bilateral positions but were not aware of LTCM’s total off
balance sheet leverage. The example of LTCM has underlined the importance of
interconnectedness when assessing the systemic risk of financial institutions. Size
alone, as measured by the balance sheet assets, is not a good indicator of systemic
risk.
The interconnectedness of the financial system was also a major factor in the 2007-
2009 financial crisis. The crisis was triggered by the collapse of the housing bubble
in the U.S. in 2007 and the rise in interest rates that led several home owners to
default on their mortgages and enter foreclosures. As a result, asset backed secu-
rities written on a collateral of residential mortgages, such as residential mortgage
backed securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), incurred
severe losses that destabilized the financial strength of the banking institutions
that issued them and impaired their ability to provide short-term interbank and
commercial lending. Several major institutions either failed, were acquired by other
institutions, or were subject to government bailout. These included Lehman Broth-
ers, Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, and
AIG. The shortage of liquidity and the stock market crash contributed to a rapid
spread of financial distress from one institution to another in a domino effect. Be-
tween January 2008 and March 2011, 348 banks had failed in the U.S. and were
taken over by the FDIC with 25 failures occurring in 2008, 140 in 2009 and 157 in
2010 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2011).
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Regulators have had great difficulties anticipating the impact of defaults partly
due to a lack of visibility on the structure of the financial system as well as a lack
of a methodology for monitoring systemic risk. The complexity of the contem-
porary financial systems has made it a challenge to define adequate indicators of
systemic risk that could help in an objective assessment of the systemic importance
of financial institutions and an objective framework for assessing the efficiency of
macro-prudential policies.
During the past two years, macro-prudential regulation has attracted the attention
of regulators. The Federal Reserve (Bernanke, 2009) has examined the possibility of
creation of a systemic risk authority whose responsibility is to (1) monitor large or
rapidly increasing exposures across institutions and markets, rather than only at the
level of individual institutions, (2) assess the potential changes in the markets and
products that could increase systemic risk, (3) assess the risk of contagion between
financial institutions within and across markets, such as the mutual exposures of
highly interconnected institutions, and (4) identify possible regulatory gaps.
Another important aspect of the recent crisis has been the misleading role of credit
ratings in representing the credit worthiness of financial instruments. Credit ratings
failed to reflect the credit worthiness of asset backed securities, such as RMBS and
CDOs. Several tranches in the AAA rating category, which is designed to reflect
a very good credit worthiness, were downgraded of several notches. Between 2000
and 2007, Moody’s rated $4.7 trillion in RMBS and $736 billion in CDOs. By
the end of 2008, more than 90% of both Aaa and Baa CDO tranches had been
downgraded (FCIC, 2010). As of July 2008, Standard & Poor’s had downgraded
902 tranches of RMBS and CDOs of asset-backed securities that had been originally
rated AAA out of a total of 4,083 tranches originally rated AAA, 466 of those were
downgraded to the junk category (Standard & Poor’s, 2008).
These misconceptions of the risk profile of CDO tranches come from a common
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confusion between CDOs and corporate bonds. CDOs have gained in popularity as
attractive low risk products that offer much higher returns than corporate bonds
with same ratings. However, the complex structure of CDOs cautions against any
simple interpretation of their ratings.
Rating downgrades have dramatically increased the cost of raising capital and debt
for the institutions that issued these securities, and simultaneously increased their
capital requirement. The current regulatory framework (Basel 2) leaves financial
institutions a certain freedom in choosing the right methodology for assessing their
market risk, operational risk etc. However, in the case of credit risk assessment the
regulators have endorsed credit ratings as the sole criterion for judging whether a
given instrument is investment-grade: current regulation restricts holdings of some
asset managers to investment grade as certified by ratings. Such restrictions can
trigger instabilities in event of downgrades, forcing massive sales of downgraded
assets. This has been especially visible in the cases of downgrades of bond insurers
or monolines such as AIG which triggered massive downgrades of all instruments
insured by them.
All these issues have pointed to the necessity of implementing measures that would
allow to accurately assess the systemic importance of financial institutions and the
credit worthiness of financial instruments, and to design effective macro-prudential
policies to limit the extent of contagion and systemic risk in the financial system.
This has motivated five research questions which this thesis attempts to answer.
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1.2 Motivation and outline of the thesis
1.2.1 Research objectives
This dissertation attempts to tackle some of the major issues raised by of the recent
financial crises, by introducing a quantitative methodology to address the questions
listed below.
(a) Studying the structure and empirical features of interbank networks, which
could help understanding how institutions are interconnected.
(b) Defining adequate measures of systemic importance that account for the com-
plex and interconnected structure of the financial system.
(c) Re-examining the impact of macro-prudential policies on contagion and sys-
temic risk, in the light of network models.
(d) Developing methods for exploring the structure of counterpart networks in ab-
sence of complete information on exposures. This is especially relevant since in
practice only balance sheet data -total assets and liabilities- may be disclosed.
(e) Understand the reasons behind the volatility of structured finance ratings, their
shortcomings and propose a rating methodology for structured products which
better reflects their downgrade risk.
1.2.2 Outline
In chapter 2, we analyze the network structure of the Brazilian financial system
using a complete data set of interbank exposures and capital levels provided by
the Brazilian Central Bank. The Brazilian financial system exhibits a complex
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heterogeneous network structure, with power law distributions (Zipf’s law) for the
in-degree and out-degree and Pareto distribution for the exposures. These prop-
erties are found to be stable across time, and with parameters similar to the ones
observed in the study of the Austrian network (Boss et al., 2004). We find that
the Brazilian financial network is well represented by a directed scale-free network,
rather than a small world network. Based on these observations, we propose a
stochastic model for the structure of banking networks, representing them as a di-
rected weighted scale free network with power law distributions for in-degree and
out-degree of nodes, Pareto distribution for exposures. This model may then be
used for simulation studies of contagion and systemic risk in networks.
In chapter 3, we introduce a new methodology for assessing contagion and systemic
risk in a network of interlinked institutions. We present a metric for the systemic
importance of a set of financial institutions, the Contagion Index, defined as the ex-
pected loss to the network triggered by the default of this set of institutions when
the system is subject to a market shock. The definition of this indicator takes
into account both common market shocks to portfolios (correlation) and conta-
gion through counterparty exposures (network effects). Using the Contagion Index
and a simulated scale-free network, we study the sensitivity of contagion to sev-
eral network parameters: the aggregate level of connectivity and concentration of
exposures, the heterogeneity in degree distribution, the network size, and the in-
fluence of local measures of connectivity and concentration across counterparties,
the counterparty susceptibility and local network frailty. Our choice of a scale-free
graph is motivated by the observations in chapter 2 on the structure of the Brazilian
financial system and the empirical study of Boss et al. (2004) of the Austrian in-
terbank network. Based on analogies with epidemiology and peer-to-peer networks
(Cohen et al., 2003; Madar et al., 2004; Huang et al., 2007), we study the impact
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of capital requirements on reducing contagion and systemic risk in the system, and
discuss the efficiency of targeted capital requirements that consist in imposing more
stringent requirements on the creditors of the most contagious institutions.
Chapter 4 applies this methodology to the study of the magnitude of contagion
risk in the Brazilian financial system. Our study reveals that the risk of default
contagion is significant in the Brazilian financial system. The Contagion Index
of a financial institution in Brazil is found to have a strong positive relationship
with the total size of its interbank liabilities, meaning that balance sheet size does
matter when assessing systemic risk. However, size alone is not a good indica-
tor for the systemic importance of financial institutions: the network-based local
measures of connectivity and concentration of exposures across counterparties in-
troduced in chapter 3 –the counterparty susceptibility and local network frailty–
are shown to contribute significantly to the systemic importance of an institution
in the Brazilian network. In line with the simulation study of chapter 3, targeted
capital requirements are found to achieve the same reduction in systemic risk with
lower requirements in capital for financial institutions.
The methodology we proposed in chapter 3 for estimating contagion and systemic
risk requires visibility on the entire structure of the financial network. Nevertheless,
in practice, bilateral exposures are most often not disclosed, and regulators should
rely essentially on the aggregate financial information provided by balance sheets,
such as the capital, total assets and total liabilities of each institution, to assess
systemic importance. Estimating bilateral exposures from balance sheet data has
attracted then a significant attention from regulators and researchers on systemic
risk in the past few years. Several studies have proposed a Maximum Entropy
based method for deriving an estimator of the bilateral exposures matrix (Sheldon
and Maurer, 1998; Upper and Worms, 2004; Wells, 2004; Elsinger et al., 2006a,b;
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Mistrulli, 2007; Toivanen, 2009), but the estimated network failed to reproduce the
heterogeneity of real-world interbank networks. Instead of finding a point estimator
of the bilateral exposures matrix, we propose in chapter 5 two methods to derive
a distribution of sample bilateral exposures matrices, assuming a prior distribution
on the network structure as for example the power-law in-degree and out-degree
distributions and Pareto exposures distribution observed in the empirical studies
of financial networks (chapter 2). The first method attempts to recover the bal-
ance sheet assets and liabilities “sample by sample”. Each sample of the bilateral
exposures matrix is solution of a relative entropy minimization problem subject to
the balance sheet constraints. However, a solution to this problem does not always
exist when dealing with sparse sample matrices. Thus, we propose a second method
that attempts to recover the assets and liabilities “in the mean”. This approach
is the analogue of the Weighted Monte Carlo method introduced by Avellaneda
et al. (2001). We first simulate independent samples of the bilateral exposures
matrix from a relevant prior distribution on the network structure, then we com-
pute posterior probabilities by maximizing the entropy under the constraints that
the balance sheet assets and liabilities are recovered in the mean. The posterior
distribution obtained for the bilateral exposures matrix allows to build a posterior
distribution for the Contagion Index and study the effect of the network structure
on the extent of contagion. Furthermore, this provides regulators with a tool to
detect systemically important institutions when the network structure plays a sig-
nificant role in the propagation of financial distress, the latter being not accounted
for by a ranking which segregates institutions solely in terms of their balance sheet
size.
Finally, chapter 6 aims at clarifying some misconceptions related to CDO ratings,
their interpretation and their use. We first describe the rating approaches used
by major agencies for CDOs and other structured credit products. Most rating
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agencies have been using static factor models which are slight variations on the
Gaussian copula model allowing for intersector and intrasector correlations. Using
this framework, we explore several issues related to CDO ratings. Given the lever-
aged nature of CDOs, the downgrade risk of a CDO tranche can be quite different
from a bond with same initial rating. Therefore, a simple labeling via default prob-
ability or expected loss does not discriminate sufficiently their downgrade risk. We
show that migration probabilities for CDO tranches are path-dependent and non-
homogeneous in time, thus one can not derive cumulative transition probabilities
by raising the one-year transition matrix to iterative powers as currently suggested
by rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, 2009). We also show that migration prob-
abilities for tranches with similar rating can vary from structure to structure even
for the same underlying debt portfolio: two tranches with the same rating can have
completely different transition probabilities. Thus, it is not reasonable to compute
ratings migration probabilities by raising the one-year transition matrix to itera-
tive powers. While default probability is an adequate representation of the default
risk of a corporate bond with known recovery rate, we show that the probability
to incur loss fails to account for the risk carried by CDO tranches and can not
differentiate between tranches with different risk profiles. As a solution to some of
the drawbacks of the current rating methodologies, we propose a risk-based rating
system, based on a risk measure applied to the loss distribution of the tranche. We
show that such a risk-based approach can lead to quite different ratings for CDO
tranches. CDO tranche ratings require assumptions on the dependence structure
of the default times and are thus exposed to model risk. We explore this model
risk for CDO and CDO-squared tranches in a multisector factor model. We exam-
ine the effect of using copulae with tail dependence, such as the Cauchy copula,
to incorporate scenarios with default clusters. We find that this allows to define
ratings with a smaller migration volatility. Based on these findings, we present a
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set of recommendations for the design, interpretation and use of credit ratings for
CDOs and other structured products.
1.3 Contribution
Our contribution builds on previous theoretical and empirical studies of contagion
and systemic risk in financial networks, and studies of credit ratings, but also
differs from them both in terms of the methodology used and in terms of the
results obtained. We refer the reader to De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) and Upper
(2011) for a comprehensive review of the literature on systemic risk and contagion
in financial networks.
1.3.1 Network structure of financial systems
Understanding how institutions are connected among each other has attracted the
attention of regulators and researchers in the past few years. A branch of the litera-
ture has studied the network structure of the financial system in specific countries:
Furfine (2003) in the US, Upper and Worms (2004) in Germany, A´gnes Lublo´y
(2006) in Hungary, van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) in the Netherlands, Wells
(2004) and Elsinger et al. (2006a) in Austria, Wells (2004) in the UK, Mistrulli
(2007) in Italy. Chapter 2 complements this literature by studying the network
structure of the Brazilian financial system. While most empirical studies are based
on partial information on bilateral exposures between banks, our analysis is based
on a complete data set of all bilateral exposures and capital levels in the Brazilian
financial system at various dates in 2007 and 2008.
This study reveals several statistical features of the Brazilian financial system that
could be compared to the findings of the empirical studies of other banking sys-
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tems: Pareto distribution for the exposures, and Zipf’s law for the in-degree and
out-degree, with tail exponents comparable to the ones found in the study of the
Austrian interbank network (Boss et al., 2004).
Based on these empirical findings, we propose a stochastic model of the interbank
network: directed weighted scale free network with Pareto weights distribution and
capital levels computed according to the current regulatory framework (Basel 2).
In fact, most previous studies on simulated networks (Allen and Gale, 2000; Freixas
et al., 2000; Nier et al., 2007; Battiston et al., 2009) have assumed a “simplistic”
network structure, such as a complete, regular or Erdo¨s-Renyi graph, that does not
reproduce the empirical features of real-world banking systems. Moreover, they
have assumed “simplistic” capital allocations, that fail to mimic the Basel require-
ments on capital, which nevertheless represents the major concern for regulators
since it constitutes a cushion to sustain potential losses. Chapter 2 contributes to
this branch of simulation studies by suggesting a modeling framework backed by
the empirical study of the network structure of real-world financial systems.
1.3.2 Too interconnected to fail: contagion and systemic
risk in financial networks
In chapter 3, we contribute to the literature on contagion and systemic risk in
three major aspects: First, we propose a new methodology for assessing contagion
and systemic risk in financial networks. Second, we use this methodology to study
the sensitivity of contagion to various network parameters. Third, we study the
efficiency of various macro-prudential policies in limiting the extent of contagion in
the network. We elaborate more on these contributions as follows.
Contrarily to indicators of systemic risk purely based on market data (Acharya
et al., 2010; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2008), our metric of systemic importance
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make use of exposures to simulate stress scenarios, resulting in a forward-looking
measure of systemic risk. The Contagion Index measures the magnitude of loss
conditional to the default of a given institution instead of averaging across all
institutions as in Elsinger et al. (2006a). We argue that these conditional measures
provide a better assessment of risk in a heterogenous system where the sample
average may be a poor statistic. With the exception of Elsinger et al. (2006a,b),
all previous studies examine the sole knock-on effects of the sudden failure of a
single bank by considering an idiosyncratic shock that targets a single institution
in the system. Our study, on the contrary, shows that common market shocks to
balance sheets may exacerbate contagion during a crisis, thus takes into account
common and independent market shocks to balance sheets as well as counterparty
risk through mutual exposures. We use a copula with tail dependence to model
the joint distribution of market shocks, which allows to generate clusters of large-
magnitude market shocks that could not be otherwise generated with the Gaussian
copula which has been the market standard in risk management for the past decade.
The loss contagion mechanism is similar to the one presented in Furfine (2003);
Upper and Worms (2004); Wells (2004); A´gnes Lublo´y (2006); van Lelyveld and
Liedorp (2006); Mistrulli (2007); Nier et al. (2007). When an institution defaults,
the unrecovered portion of the exposures to the defaulted institution (assuming an
exogenous recovery rate) are absorbed by its creditors, that can themselves default
if they do not hold enough capital to sustain their losses. However, this “sequential”
(Upper, 2011) contagion mechanism is very different from the market equilibrium
approach of Eisenberg and Noe (2001); Elsinger et al. (2006a,b) defined by a clearing
payment vector, in which banks can liquidate their assets leading to a proportional
sharing of losses among counterparties (endogenous recovery rate). We argue that,
since bankruptcy procedures are usually slow and settlements may take up several
months to be effective, creditors cannot recover the residual value of the defaulting
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institution according to such a hypothetical clearing mechanism, and write down
their entire exposure in the short-run, leading to a short term recovery rate of zero.
This seems a more reasonable approach in absence of a clearing mechanism.
While studying empirically contagion in real-world networks is a very important
exercise for central banks and regulators, it does not allow to analyze the influence
of key features of the network on the contagion process since these are fixed in
the data. Previous studies on simulated networks (Allen and Gale, 2000; Freixas
et al., 2000; Nier et al., 2007; Battiston et al., 2009) provide a flexible framework
for studying the sensitivity of contagion to a change in various parameters, such as
the level of connectivity, concentration and network structure. However, all these
studies have assumed a “simplistic” network structure, such as a complete, regular
or Erdo¨s-Renyi graph, and “simplistic” capital levels, that do not reproduce the
empirical features of real-world banking systems. Our study is based on a scale-
free simulation of the interbank network with degree and exposures distributions
similar to the ones observed in the Brazilian and Austrian networks, and capital
levels determined according to Basel 2 accords. Thus, it provides a more realistic
framework for analyzing the sensitivity of contagion and systemic risk to network
parameters.
Our study also complements the existing literature by studying the contribution of
network-based local measures of connectivity and concentration to systemic risk.
Previous studies on simulated network structures have examined the contribution
of aggregate measures of connectivity and concentration such as increasing the
probability that two nodes are connected in an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph, or increasing the
number of nodes in the system (Battiston et al., 2009; Nier et al., 2007). However,
they fail to detect the impact of connectivity and concentration locally around a
single institution in the network. We thus introduce the counterparty susceptibility
and local network frailty that measure respectively the susceptibility of the creditors
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of an institution to a potential default of the latter and the fragility of the entire
network in the event of default of this institution. We find that the two measures
can explain significantly default contagion.
We also contribute to the literature by introducing targeted capital requirements as
macro-prudential strategies. We find that they require less capital, to achieve the
same level of contagion and systemic risk, than the classical strategy consisting in
imposing aggregate capital ratios on all institutions in the network.
On the results side, we find that contagion is very sensitive to a change in the
network structure and the level of connectivity and concentration. We compare the
extent of contagion in networks with different degree and exposures distributions,
and find that more heterogeneous networks are more resilient to contagion. We
also observe, in line with Nier et al. (2007) and Battiston et al. (2009), a trade-off
phenomenon when increasing connectivity in the network between increasing the
potential channels for the propagation of financial distress and the stabilizing ben-
efit of risk sharing. The direction of the results is similar to Nier et al. (2007): in
well-capitalized networks, increasing connectivity is found to increase significantly
contagion up to a certain threshold above which a further increase in connectivity
leads to a decrease in the extent of contagion. However, in undercapitalized net-
works, increasing connectivity makes the network more prone to contagion whatever
the initial level of connectivity is. All the above observations point to the need of
using realistic network structures in simulation studies to reduce the bias of the
estimate of contagion and systemic risk.
1.3.3 Systemic risk in banking systems: the case of Brazil
Chapter 4 contributes to the empirical literature on contagion and systemic risk in
banking systems in four main aspects.
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First, it reveals that the Contagion Index of institutions in the Brazilian financial
system exhibits a heavy-tailed distribution, with most institutions presenting a
negligible risk and few of them posing a serious risk of contagion to the network.
This cautions against the use of measures of systemic risk that do not segregate
between different institutions in the network, for example by averaging systemic
risk across all institutions as in Elsinger et al. (2006a).
Second, it reveals the importance of contagion that has been dismissed in the pre-
vious empirical literature (Sheldon and Maurer, 1998; Furfine, 2003; Upper and
Worms, 2004; Wells, 2004; Elsinger et al., 2006a,b; Mistrulli, 2007). Our study
reveals that the risk of default contagion is significant in the Brazilian financial
system. In contrast with Elsinger et al. (2006a), we find that scenarios with con-
tagion are more frequent than those without contagion when grouped by number
of fundamental defaults, precisely when the number of fundamental defaults is at
least 3. In fact, we find that market shocks can play an essential role in propa-
gating default across the network. They are found to increase the proportion of
contagious exposures which are exposures that transmit default in all scenarios of
market shocks.
Most of the previous empirical studies on contagion in interbank networks are based
on partial information on the bilateral exposures, and estimate missing exposures
with a Maximum Entropy method (Sheldon and Maurer, 1998; Upper and Worms,
2004; Wells, 2004; Elsinger et al., 2006a,b; Degryse and Nguyen, 2007). However,
the Maximum Entropy method is found to underestimate the possibility of default
contagion (Mistrulli, 2007; van Lelyveld and Liedorp, 2006). Our study, by making
use of a complete data set avoids this caveat.
Third, this study sheds light on the importance of the interconnectedness of the
financial system. It measures the marginal contribution of balance sheet size to
contagion, and the marginal contribution of the local measures of connectivity and
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concentration introduced in chapter 3, leading to the conclusion that interconnect-
edness or the network structure can have a significant impact on systemic risk. This
highlights the need of visibility on the entire network structure to properly measure
systemic risk.
Finally, we contribute to the literature by studying the impact of the targeted
capital requirements introduced in chapter 3 on the extent of contagion in the
Brazilian financial system. Such macro-prudential policies have been completely
neglected in the literature in favor of micro-prudential policies such as imposing
homogeneous capital requirements regardless of the level of interconnectedness of
the institutions in the system.
1.3.4 Reconstruction of interbank networks
Chapter 5 introduces a new methodology to address the problem of reconstructing
interbank networks when only aggregate balance sheet information is available,
such as the total assets, total liabilities, and capital levels of each institution in the
network.
Previous empirical studies of contagion and systemic risk in interbank networks
(Sheldon and Maurer, 1998; Upper and Worms, 2004; Wells, 2004; Elsinger et al.,
2006a,b; Mistrulli, 2007; Toivanen, 2009) have attempted to solve the problem of
reconstructing bilateral exposures given only aggregate balance sheet data by for-
mulating it as a matrix balancing problem (Schneider and Zenios, 1990) where the
objective is to, given a prior matrix x0, find a matrix x that is as close as possible
to x0 and satisfies a set of linear constraints (balancing constraints) on its rows
and columns. The constraints are set to recover the balance sheets total assets and
labilities. Due to the lack of information on the network structure, these studies
have considered a uniform prior matrix x0 in which the assets of each institution
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in the network are distributed across its counterparties proportionally to their re-
spective liabilities. As a result, the reconstructed network is complete in the sense
that each institution is exposed to all other institutions in the network, which fails
to reproduce the heavy-tailed in-degree, out-degree and exposures distributions of
real-world banking systems, such as the Brazilian system studied in chapter 2.
Instead, the approach we propose, whose goal is to find a distribution of bilateral
exposures matrices x(1), ...,x(M) given a relevant prior distribution on the network
structure, allows to generate sparse matrices x(1), ...,x(M). That is, the networks
represented by these sample bilateral exposures matrices all exhibit a scale-free
degree distribution which is more realistic than the complete network structure
proposed in previous studies.
In fact, any arbitrary choice of a prior matrix x0 would lead to an arbitrary re-
constructed network that might be very different from the real unknown network.
Hence, building a distribution of bilateral exposures matrices instead of estimating
one particular matrix is necessary to avoid “artificially” creating information on
the network structure. This allows to build a posterior distribution of any measure
of systemic importance that requires knowledge of the network, such as the Conta-
gion Index, and examine the impact of the network structure on the magnitude of
contagion in the system.
In networks that are prone to contagion, we find that the posterior mean of the
Contagion Index does not estimate well the Contagion Index of the real network.
The Contagion Index is very sensitive to the network structure. This implies that a
knowledge of aggregate levels of assets, liabilities, and capital levels does not suffice
to accurately estimate the Contagion Index. Therefore, there is a need to disclose
large bilateral exposures in order to have an accurate assessment of contagion and
systemic risk.
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Nevertheless, the posterior mean of the Contagion Index is found to mimic the same
ranking as the Contagion Index of the real network, while the liabilities size does
not mimic this ranking. Thus, the reconstruction methodology we presented could
be used as a tool to detect systemically important institutions instead of a ranking
which is based on a sole knowledge of the the balance sheets assets and liabilities.
1.3.5 A closer look at credit ratings of CDO tranches
Credit ratings assigned by rating agencies to structured credit products have played
an important role in the development of the structured credit market, which has
been cast into the limelight by the recent credit crisis. Several critics of rating
methodologies have focused on the drawbacks of the Gaussian copula used to
model the dependence structure between the assets default times (Donnelly and
Embrechts, 2010). However, very few studies have examined the issues that do
not arise from the use of the Gaussian copula model but are related to the specific
characteristics of structured products.
Chapter 6 studies the particularities of credit rating methodologies when applied to
structured products such as CDO tranches and CDOs of ABS. Using the Gaussian
copula framework, we explore several issues related to ratings of CDO tranches.
Credit ratings have been attributed by major rating agencies to structured credit
products based on the criterion of default probability or expected loss of these
instruments (Standard & Poor’s, 2007). These metrics are very poor indicators of
the credit risk of such complex instruments which leads to situations of “rating
arbitrage” where high ratings can be attributed to “high-yield” instruments which
carry in fact a lot of risk (Cont and Jessen, 2011).
We show that the default probability fails to segregate tranches with different risk
profiles. Since a rating based on default probability depends solely on the subor-
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dination level of the tranche, two tranches with completely different risk profiles
can nevertheless have the same rating. For example, default probability can not
differentiate between a tranche 6% − 7% and a tranche 6% − 100% while the loss
of the latter is always smaller relatively to the initial notional of the tranche. We
propose instead a risk-based rating procedure, based on a risk measure applied to
the loss distribution of the tranche.
We show that the downgrade risk of a CDO tranche can be quite different from a
bond with same initial rating. CDO tranches are levered products, meaning that
a slight deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying obligors can lead to
downgrades of several notches at the level of a CDO tranche. We also show, that
credit ratings of CDO tranches are non Markov processes and non-homogeneous
processes. Nevertheless, rating agencies still assume until today that ratings tran-
sitions are Markov and homogeneous, suggesting to compute transition probabilities
by raising the annual transition matrix to the iterative powers (de Servigny and
Jobst, 2007). Therefore, a simple labeling via default probability or expected loss
does not discriminate sufficiently their downgrade risk. We propose to supplement
ratings with indicators of downgrade risk.
Finally, we also examine the model risk to which credit ratings are exposed. In line
with previous studies on the sensitivity of credit ratings of CDO tranches to mod-
eling assumptions (Fender and Kiff, 2004; Meng and Sengupta, 2009; Wojtowicz,
2011), this study shows that credit ratings of CDO tranches are extremely sensi-
tive to the correlation, recovery, and assets default rates parameters used to model
the joint distribution of default times. The Gaussian copula has been criticized
in the recent crisis for its failure to generate scenarios with default clusters (Don-
nelly and Embrechts, 2010). Several alternatives to the factor Gaussian copula
model have been proposed in the literature, but always the context of pricing CDO
tranches (Donnelly and Embrechts, 2010; Azizpour et al., 2010; Kalemanova et al.,
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2005; Duffie et al., 2009; Peng and Kou, 2009). We examine the effect of using
a copula with tail dependence, such as the Cauchy copula, for tranching and rat-
ing CDO tranches. We find that this leads to much higher credit enhancement
than required by the Gaussian copula, hence a smaller migration volatility of credit
ratings.
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Chapter 2
Network Structure of Financial
Systems
This chapter is based on the paper “Network structure and systemic risk in banking
systems” (Cont et al., 2010), which is a joint work with Professor Rama Cont and
Doctor Edson Bastos e Santos, and the paper “Too Interconnected to Fail: Conta-
gion and Systemic Risk in Financial Networks” (Cont and Moussa, 2010c), which
is a joint work with Professor Rama Cont.
2.1 Introduction
The interconnectedness, or network structure, of the financial system has played
a major role in the recent financial crisis. It has facilitated the propagation of
financial distress from one institution to the rest of the system through bilateral
exposures. Regulators have had great difficulties anticipating the impact of defaults
partly due to a lack of both visibility and relevant indicators on the structure of the
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financial system. As a result, regulators have been concerned in the past few years
in studying the structure and empirical features of interbank networks in order to
better understand how institutions are interconnected.
Several studies have analyzed the empirical features of interbank networks in various
countries: Furfine (2003) in the US, Upper and Worms (2004) in Germany, A´gnes
Lublo´y (2006) in Hungary, van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) in the Netherlands,
Wells (2004) and Elsinger et al. (2006a) in Austria, Wells (2004) in the UK, Mistrulli
(2007) in Italy. We refer the reader to Upper (2011) for a comprehensive survey.
These studies have revealed the heterogeneity of interbank networks (see figure 2.1):
asymmetric in- and out-degree distributions and Pareto distributions for exposures
(Boss et al., 2004), multiple money center structure (A´gnes Lublo´y, 2006; Mu¨ller,
2006) and tiered structures (Upper and Worms, 2004; Toivanen, 2009).
While most these empirical studies are based on partial information on bilateral
exposures between banks, we study in this chapter the network structure of the
Brazilian financial system using a complete data set of all bilateral exposures in the
Brazilian financial system at various dates in 2007 and 2008. Our empirical findings
are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the statistical features observed in
the Austrian financial system (Boss et al., 2004): power law distributions for the
in-degree and the out-degree and Pareto distribution for the exposures, with tail
exponents of the same order of magnitude in the two networks.
Therefore, modeling the financial system using simple network structures, such as
the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model used in Nier et al. (2007), or the network with equal number
of counterparties for all institutions used in Battiston et al. (2009), or the complete
and incomplete structures in Allen and Gale (2000), fails to mimic the heterogeneity
of financial systems.
Based on these observations, we propose a stochastic model for the structure of
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banking networks, representing them as a directed weighted scale free network with
power law distributions for in-degree and out-degree of nodes, Pareto distribution
for exposures. This model may then be used for simulation studies of contagion
and systemic risk in networks.
2.1.1 Summary of main results
• The Brazilian financial system exhibits a complex heterogeneous network
structure: the distribution of in-degrees, out-degrees and mutual exposures
are found to be heavy-tailed, exhibiting power law (Zipf’s law) tails with
exponents between 2 and 3. Furthermore, these statistical regularities are
shown to be stable across time.
• The network structure is qualitatively different from a small-world network.
In particular, we observe many nodes with arbitrary small clustering coeffi-
cient.
• There is a positive association between the size of exposures (assets) and the
number of debtors (in-degree) of an institution in the Brazilian financial sys-
tem, and a positive association between the size of liabilities and the number
of creditors (out-degree) of an institution. More (less) connected financial
institutions have larger (smaller) exposures.
• The ratio of interbank exposures to Tier 1 capital exhibits a heterogenous
distribution: most financial institutions hold much more Tier 1 capital than
their interbank exposures, which means that they have a strong capacity to
absorb losses. However, some institutions have interbank exposures more
than a hundred times their Tier 1 capital. These institutions may present a
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Figure 2.1: Network structures of real-world banking systems. Germany: two-tier structure
(Upper and Worms, 2004), Austria: scale-free structure (Boss et al., 2004), Switzerland: sparse
and centralized structure (Mu¨ller, 2006), Finland: three-tier structure (Toivanen, 2009), Hungry:
multiple money center structure (A´gnes Lublo´y, 2006), Brazil: scale-free structure (see chapter 4).
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Figure 2.2: Graph structures used for modeling interbank networks: complete, incomplete and
disconnected structures (Allen and Gale, 2000), money center structure (Freixas et al., 2000),
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi structure (Nier et al., 2007), scale-free structure (our contribution).
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significant risk of default.
• Based on these empirical observations, we propose a realistic model of inter-
bank networks: directed scale-free random graph with power law distributions
for in-degree and out-degree of nodes, Pareto distribution for exposures and
capital levels computed according to the current regulatory framework (Basel
2).
2.1.2 Outline
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we present the network represen-
tation of the financial system. In section 2.3, we study various statistical features
of the Brazilian financial system at different dates in 2007 and 2008. In section 2.4,
we present a directed weighted scale-free network model of the financial system,
generating power law distributions of the in-degree, out-degree and exposures. We
propose such model as a framework for simulation studies on financial networks.
2.2 Network representation of financial systems
Counterparty relations in a financial system may be represented as a weighted
directed graph, or a network, defined as a triplet I = (V,E, c), consisting of
• a set V of financial institutions, whose number we denote by n,
• a matrix E of bilateral exposures: Eij represents the exposure of node i to
node j defined as the (mark-to-)market value of all liabilities of institution j
to institution i at the date of computation. It is thus the maximal short term
loss of i in case of an immediate default of j.
Chapter 2. Network Structure of Financial Systems 29
• c = (ci, i ∈ V ) where ci is the capital of the institution i, representing its
capacity for absorbing losses.
Such a network may be represented as a graph in which nodes represent institutions
and links represent exposures.
We define the in-degree kin(i) of a node i ∈ V as the number of its debtors and








The degree k(i) of a node i is defined as k(i) = kin(i) + kout(i) and measures its
connectivity.
Although all institutions in the network are not banks, we will refer to the exposures
as “interbank” exposures for simplicity. We denote A(i) the interbank assets of








A stylized balance sheet is presented in table 2.1.
Assets Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity
Interbank Assets Ai Interbank Liabilities Li
Other Assets Other Liabilities
Equity Capital c(i)
Table 2.1: The general structure of a balance sheet.
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2.3 The Brazilian financial system: a complex
network
2.3.1 Data and consolidation procedure
The Brazilian financial system encompasses 2400 financial institutions chartered
by the Brazilian Central Bank and grouped into three types of operation: Type I
are banking institutions that have commercial portfolios, Type III are institutions
that are subject to particular regulations, such as credit unions, and Type II rep-
resent all other banking institutions. Despite their reduced number (see table 2.2),
financial institutions of Type I and II account for the majority (about 98%) of total
assets in the Brazilian financial system (see table 2.3). We therefore consider in the
Brazilian data set only Type I and Type II financial institutions which is a very
good proxy for the Brazilian financial system. Most of the financial institutions
belong to a conglomerate (75% of all financial institutions of Type I and II). Con-
sequently, it is quite meaningful to analyze the financial system from a consolidated
perspective where financial institutions are classified in groups that are held by the
same shareholders. Only banking activities controlled by the holding company are
considered in the consolidation procedure. The accounting standards for consolida-
tion of financial statements were established by Resolutions 2,723 and 2,743, BCB
(2000a,b), and they are very similar to IASB and FASB directives. If we regard
financial institutions as conglomerates, the dimension of the exposures matrices
reduces substantially, see table 2.2 for the number of financial conglomerates in the























Type Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08 Dec-08
Multiple Bank 135 135 135 136 139 139 140
Commercial Bank 20 20 21 20 20 18 18
Development Bank 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Savings Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Investment Bank 17 17 17 18 18 18 17
Consumer Finance Company 51 52 51 56 55 55 55
Security Brokerage Company 113 107 114 107 107 107 107
Exchange Brokerage Company 48 46 48 46 46 45 45
Security Distribution Company 132 135 133 133 136 136 135
Leasing Company 40 38 41 37 36 36 36
Real Estate Credit Company and Savings and Loan Association 18 18 18 18 18 17 16
Mortgage Company 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Development Agency 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Total Banking Institutions of Type I and II 597 591 601 594 598 594 592
Credit Union 1.461 1.465 1.460 1.466 1.460 1.457 1.453
Micro-financing Institution 54 52 54 48 46 45 47
Total Banking Institutions Type III 2.112 2.108 2.115 2.108 2.104 2.096 2.092
Non-Banking Institutions 332 329 333 324 317 318 317
Total Banking and Non-Banking Institutions 2444 2.437 2.448 2.432 2.421 2.414 2.409




































Banking - Type I 1,064.8 87.1 1,267.7 87.8 1,366.9 87.9 1,576.0 87.7 1,433.2 88.0 1,233.6 87.5
Banking - Type II 129.6 10.6 142.7 9.9 152.7 9.8 179.4 10.0 160.1 9.8 148.3 10.5
Banking - Type I and II 1,194.5 97.7 1,410.4 97.7 1,519.6 97.7 1,755.4 97.7 1,593.2 97.8 1,382.0 98.0
Banking - Type III 17.7 1.5 21.5 1.5 23.7 1.5 28.3 1.6 24.1 1.5 19.1 1.4
Non-Banking 10.4 0.9 12.8 0.9 12.5 0.8 14.4 0.8 11.4 0.7 9.3 0.7
Total Financial System 1,222.6 100.0 1,444.8 100.0 1,555.8 100.0 1,798.1 100.0 1,628.8 100.0 1,410.4 100.0













Banking - Type I 102 5.4 101 5.4 101 5.4 101 5.4 103 5.5 101 5.4
Banking - Type II 32 1.7 32 1.7 32 1.7 33 1.8 34 1.8 35 1.9
Banking - Type I and II 134 7.1 133 7.1 133 7.1 134 7.2 137 7.3 136 7.3
Banking - Type III 1,440 76.8 1,440 77.0 1,436 77.0 1,441 77.0 1,442 76.9 1,438 77.0
Non-Banking 302 16.1 298 15.9 297 15.9 296 15.8 296 15.8 294 15.7
Total Financial System 1,876 100.0 1,871 100.0 1,866 100.0 1,871 100.0 1,875 100.0 1,868 100.0
Table 2.3: Representativeness of Brazilian financial institutions in terms of total Assets and number. The total assets were converted
from BRL (Brazilian Reals) to USD (American Dollars) with the following foreign exchange rates (BRL/USD): 1.9262 (Jun-07), 1.7713
(Dec-07), 1.7491 (Mar-08), 1.5919 (Jun-08), 1.9143 (Sep-08), and 2.3370 (Dec-08). Source: Sisbacen.
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These exposures, reported at six dates (June 2007, December 2007, March 2008,
June 2008, September 2008 and November 2008) cover various sources of risk:
1. fixed-income instruments (certificate of deposits and debentures);
2. borrowing and lending (credit risk);
3. derivatives (including OTC instruments such as swaps);
4. foreign exchange and,
5. instruments linked to exchange-traded equity risk.
Derivatives positions were taken into account at their market prices when available,
or at fair value when a model-based valuation was required.
The data set also gives the Tier I and Tier 2 capital of each institution, computed
according to guidelines provided in Resolution 3,444 BCB (2007a) of the Brazilian
Central Bank, in accordance with the Basel 1 and 2 accords. Tier 1 capital is
composed of shareholder equity plus net income (loss), from which the value of
redeemed preferred stocks, capital and revaluation of fixed assets reserves, deferred
taxes, and non-realized gains (losses), such as mark-to-market adjustments from
securities registered as available-for-sale and hedge accounting are deducted. Tier 2
capital is equal to the sum of redeemed preferred stocks, capital, revaluation of
fixed assets reserves, non-realized gains (losses), and complex or hybrid capital
instruments and subordinated debt. We shall focus on Tier 1 capital as a measure
of a bank’s capacity to absorb losses in the short term.
Financial conglomerates in Brazil are subject to minimum capital requirements.
The required capital is a function of the associated risks regarding each financial
institution’s operations, whether registered in their balance sheets (assets and li-
abilities) or not (off-balance sheet transactions), as defined in Resolution 3,490,
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BCB (2007b). The required capital is computed as cr = δ × Risk Base where the
δ = 11% is the so-called Basel Index and the risk base is the sum of credit expo-
sures weighted by their respective risk weights, foreign currency and gold exposures,
interest rate exposures, commodity exposures, equity market exposures, and oper-
ational risk exposures. It is important to highlight that the exposures considered
in the computation of the risk base include not only interbank exposures but also
exposures to all counterparties.
2.3.2 A heterogeneous network
2.3.2.1 Distribution of connectivity
Casual inspection of the Brazilian interbank network reveals the existence of nodes
with widely differing connectivity. Figure 2.3 shows the Brazilian interbank network
in December 2007. It is observed to have a heterogeneous and complex structure,
some highly connected institutions playing the role of “hubs” while others are at
the periphery.
Table 2.4 presents some descriptive statistics of key network variables: the number
of debtors (in-degree), number of creditors (out-degree), exposures, relative expo-
sures (ratio of the exposure of institution i to institution j to the capital of i), and
distance between two institutions (nodes) in the network.
This observation is confirmed by further analyzing the data on in-degrees and
out-degrees of nodes. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show, respectively, the double logarith-
mic plot of the empirical complementary cumulative distribution for the in-degree
Pˆ(Kin > k) and out-degree Pˆ(Kout > k) for k > 1. We notice that the tails of the
distributions exhibit a linear decay in log-scale, suggesting a power law tail. We
refer the reader to appendix B for a brief introduction to power law distributions.
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Figure 2.3: Brazilian interbank network, December 2007. The number of financial conglomerates
is n = 125 and the number of links in this representation at any date does not exceed 1200.
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In-Degree Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08
Mean 8.56 8.58 8.75 8.98 8.99 7.88
Standard Deviation 10.84 10.86 10.61 11.15 11.32 11.02
5% quantile 0 0 0 0 0 0
95% quantile 30.50 29.30 30.45 31 32 30.60
Maximum 54 54 51 57 60 62
Out-Degree Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08
Mean 8.56 8.58 8.75 8.98 8.99 7.88
Standard Deviation 8.71 8.82 9.02 9.43 9.36 8.76
5% quantile 0 0 0 0 0 0
95% quantile 26 26 27.90 29.25 30.20 27.40
Maximum 36 37 39 41 39 44
Exposures (in billions of BRL) Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08
Mean 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08
Standard Deviation 0.77 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.38 0.54
5% quantile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
95% quantile 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.35
Maximum 23.22 9.89 9.90 9.36 12.50 15.90
Relative Exposures (Eij/c(i)) Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08
Mean 0.23 0.20 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05
Standard Deviation 1.81 1.62 0.16 0.17 0.06 0.21
5% quantile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
95% quantile 0.70 0.59 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.18
Maximum 49.16 46.25 4.57 5.17 0.69 6.02
Distance Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08
Mean 2.42 2.42 2.38 2.38 2.33 2.35
Standard Deviation 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.82 0.77 0.78
5% quantile 1 1 1 1 1 1
95% quantile 4 4 4 4 3 4
Maximum (Diameter) 5 6 6 6 5 6
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics of the number of debtors (in-degree), number of creditors (out-
degree), exposures, relative exposures (ratio of the exposure of institution i to institution j to the














































































































































Network in November 2008














































































































































Network in November 2008
Figure 2.5: Brazilian interbank network: distribution of out-degree.
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This observation is confirmed through semiparametric tail estimates. We refer the
reader to appendix B for details on the estimation procedure for the tail exponent
α and tail threshold kmin. The estimates are shown in Table 2.5 for the in-degree,
out-degree and degree distributions. Maximum likelihood estimates for αˆ range
from 2 to 3. The results are similar to the findings of Boss et al. (2004) for the
Austrian network.
In-Degree Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08 Mean
αˆ 2.19 2.70 2.20 3.36 2.16 2.13 2.46
σˆ (αˆ) 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.53 0.47 0.44 0.48
kˆin,min 6 13 7 21 6 5 9.7
Out-Degree Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08 Mean
αˆ 1.98 3.41 3.40 2.91 2.43 2.88 2.83
σˆ (αˆ) 0.63 0.59 0.48 0.43 0.41 0.49 0.51
kˆout,min 5 15 16 12 9 11 11.3
Degree Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08 Mean
αˆ 2.61 3.37 2.29 2.48 2.27 2.23 2.54
σˆ (αˆ) 0.52 0.47 0.48 0.41 0.43 0.35 0.44
kˆmin 17 34 12 15 12 10 16.7
Exposures* Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08 Mean
αˆ 1.97 2.22 2.23 2.37 2.27 2.52 2.27
σˆ (αˆ) 0.02 0.60 0.21 0.69 0.38 0.98 0.48
Eˆmin 39.5 74.0 80.0 101.7 93.4 336.7 120.9
*values in millions of BRL (Brazilian Reals)
Table 2.5: Statistics and maximum likelihood estimates for the distribution of in/out degree: tail
exponent α, tail threshold for in-degree kin,min, out-degree kout,min, degree kmin, and exposures
Emin.
We test the goodness-of-fit of the power law tails for in-degree, out-degree and
degree via the one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with respect to a reference
power law distribution. The results in figures 2.4 and 2.5 provide evidence for the
power law hypothesis at the 1% significance level.
2.3.2.2 Stationarity of degree distributions
The precise pattern of exposure across institutions may vary a priori in time: it is
therefore of interest to examine whether the large scale structure of the graph, as
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characterized by the cross-sectional distributions of in- and out-degrees, is station-
ary, that is, may be considered as time-independent. Comparing quantiles of the
degree distributions at different dates ( figure 2.6) shows that the empirical distri-
bution of the degree, in-degree and out-degree are in fact stable over time, even
though the observations span the turbulent period of 2007-2008. This is confirmed
by a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for consecutive dates, which produces
p-values all greater than 0.6, suggesting that the null hypothesis that the samples
are drawn from the same distribution cannot be rejected.































































































45o line − (i) vs. (j)
Figure 2.6: Scatterplot of the the empirical cumulative distributions at consecutive dates for
the degree, in-degree and out-degree in the Brazilian interbank network.
2.3.2.3 Heterogeneity of exposure sizes
The distribution of interbank exposures is also found to be heavy-tailed, with Pareto
tails. Figure 2.7 shows the existence of a linear decay in the tail of the double
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Network in December 2007




















Network in March 2008
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Network in September 2008



















Network in November 2008
Figure 2.7: Brazilian interbank network: distribution of exposures in BRL.
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The semi-parametric estimates of the tail exponent α and the tail cutoff kmin for
the distribution of exposures are shown in Table 2.5. Note that an interbank asset
for an institution is an interbank liability for its counterparty, thus, the distribution
of interbank liability sizes is the same. The only difference is how these exposures
are allocated among the financial institutions in the network. Figure 2.7 shows
evidence for Pareto tails in the exposure distributions at all dates.
It is interesting to measure the sizes of these exposures in terms of each institutions’
(Tier 1) capital. The linear regression of the interbank assets size against the Tier 1
capital gives a positive slope smaller than 1, indicating that financial institutions in
Brazil have on average sufficient Tier 1 capital to cover their interbank exposures.
Figure 2.8 shows that in June 2007 the ratio of interbank exposures to Tier 1 capital
exhibits a heterogenous distribution: most financial institutions hold much more
Tier 1 capital than their interbank exposures, which means that they have a strong
capacity to absorb losses. However, some institutions have interbank exposures
more than a hundred times their Tier 1 capital. Thus, these ones can be very fragile
to losses and may present a significant risk of default. We will see in chapter 4 that
these fragile nodes are counterparties of the five most systemic institutions in the
network and play a significant role in the propagation of default across the network.
Model: A = β0 + β1c+ 
Coefficients Standard error t-statistic R2
b0 = −0.00 0.07 -0.00 36%
b1 = 0.60 ** 0.07 8.37
* significant at 5% confidence level
** significant at 1% confidence level
Table 2.6: Linear regression of interbank assets to Tier 1 capital in the Brazilian network in
June 2007.
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Interbank assets to Tier 1 capital ratio
Figure 2.8: Distribution of the ratio of interbank assets to Tier 1 capital in the Brazilian network
in June 2007.
2.3.2.4 Relation between exposure size and connectivity
Another interesting observation is that more (less) connected financial institutions
have larger (smaller) exposures. We investigate the relationship between the num-
ber of debtors (in-degree) kin(i) of a node i and its average exposure size A(i)/kin(i)
and also examine the relation between the number of creditors (out-degree) kout(i)
and the average liability size L(i)/kout(i) and between k(i) and A(i)/k(i) by com-
puting the Kendall tau coefficient that measures the statistical dependence (rank
correlation) for each of these pairs. Table 2.7 displays the Kendall tau coefficients
τKendall and their respective p-values. The results show that the in-degree and the
average interbank asset size, as well as the out-degree and the average interbank
liability size, show positive dependence.
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kin vs. A/kin Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08
τKendall 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.26 0.24 0.21
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
kout vs. L/kout Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08
τKendall 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.30
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
k vs. A/k Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08
τKendall 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.23
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Table 2.7: Brazilian interbank network: Kendall τKendall coefficients for in-degree kin vs. average
interbank asset A/kin, out-degree kout vs. average interbank liability L/kout, and degree k vs.
average exposure A/k.
2.3.2.5 Clustering
The clustering coefficient of a node i in the network is defined as the the proportion
of links between its neighbors divided by the number of links that could possibly
exist between them (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).
Definition 1 (Clustering coefficient). We define N (i) the neighborhood of an in-
stitution (node) i in the network as the set of its immediate creditors and debtors,
that is
N (i) = {j ∈ V ;Eij > 0 or Eji > 0} (2.3)
We also define W(i) the set of bilateral exposures between the creditors and debtors
of institution i, that is
W(i) = {Ejk; j ∈ N (i) and k ∈ N (i)} (2.4)
The clustering coefficient of node i is then given by
C(i) =
|W(i)|
|N (i)| (|N (i)| − 1) (2.5)
This ratio, between 0 and 1, tells how connected among themselves the neighbors
of a given node are. In complete graphs, all nodes have a clustering coefficient of 1
while in regular lattices the clustering coefficient shrinks to zero with the degree.
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A property often discussed in various networks is the small world property (Watts
and Strogatz, 1998) which refers to networks where, although the network size is
large and each node has a small number of direct neighbors, the distance between
any two nodes is very small compared to the network size. Boss et al. (2004) report
that in the Austrian interbank network any two nodes are on average 2 links apart,
and suggest that the Austrian interbank network is a small-world. However, a small
graph diameter does not characterize the small world property: indeed, complete
networks are not small worlds and have diameter one. Another signature of the
small world property is that, while the diameter is bounded or slowly increasing with
the number of nodes, the clustering coefficient of nodes remain bounded away from
zero (Cont and Tanimura, 2008). In the Brazilian financial system, we observe nodes
with an arbitrary small clustering coefficient across all time periods (Figure 2.9).
This absence of uniform clustering shows that the Brazilian financial system is not
a small world network.
Figure 2.9 shows the relationship between the local clustering coefficient and num-
ber of degrees for the Brazilian interbank network. The negative slope of the plots
shows that financial institutions with few connections (small degree) have coun-
terparties that are very connected to each other (large clustering) while financial






















































































































































































































































Figure 2.9: Degree vs. clustering coefficient for the Brazilian interbank network. The grey line is the average clustering coefficient.
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2.4 Guidance to modeling financial systems in
simulation studies
Empirical studies of interbank networks show that the in-degree and out-degree
distributions follow power laws instead of the Poisson distributions of the classical
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi like models. That is the fraction of nodes in the network having more
than k incoming links decays as k−xin for large values of k and the fraction of nodes
in the network having more than k outgoing links decays as k−xout for large values
of k. This means that there are very few banks with many creditors (or debtors)
while there are many with just a few creditors (or debtors). The analysis of the
Austrian and Brazilian interbank networks have shown that in both networks the
scaling exponents for the in-degree and out-degree are respectively about 2 and 3,
which appears to be a general characteristic of real world interbank networks. They
also find a power law distribution of the size of exposures with a decaying exponent
about 1.9. Furthermore, these statistical regularities are shown to be stable across
time. Mistrulli (2007) finds that the Italian interbank market is not a complete
market and exhibits the multiple money center structure described in Freixas et al.
(2000), in which some banks trade with a bank the money center while they do not
trade with each other.
Yet, most of the simulation studies on interbank networks have considered simple
network structures. Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000) consider a
complete structure of claims in which every bank has symmetric linkages with all
other banks in the economy, and an incomplete structure where banks have linkages
only to few other neighboring banks. Freixas et al. (2000) also study the case of a
money center structure where small banks are linked to the bank at the center but
not among each others. Their model encompasses only four “regions” representing
consolidations of banks, categories, or geographic regions; which ignores the hetero-
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geneity of banks within the same region. Battiston et al. (2009) consider a regular
graph where each bank has the same number of partners and exposures are equally
distributed among creditors, which conflicts with the strong degree and exposures
heterogeneity observed in real-world banking systems. Nier et al. (2007) first study
the case of an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph in which all banks have the same probability of
being connected to another bank in the network, then extend it to a tiered structure
where banks are grouped in two categories- large and small- and large banks have
higher probability of being connected. Although the tiered structure is a more re-
alistic representation of the financial system, the two-group model fails to generate
scale-free degree distributions. Thus, there is a need of a model which allows a
stronger heterogeneity in the network structure. As far as we know, Amini et al.
(2010, 2011) is the only simulation study that models the financial network as a
scale-free graph.
We propose in this section a model of the financial system that reproduces the sta-
tistical features observed in the empirical study of financial networks. Specifically,
we suggest to model the financial system as a directed scale-free random graph
that grows according to a preferential attachment process, generating power law
distributions in the tails of the in-degree and out-degree. We construct a weighted
version of the graph presented in Bolloba´s et al. (2003), which is a generalization
to directed graphs of the original model developed by Barabasi and Albert (2002).
The preferential attachment model is just one example of simulating scale-free
graphs, other models could be of course used instead of the preferential attach-
ment model, as long as they generate power law distributions for the in-degree and
out-degree of the network.
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2.4.1 Interbank networks as directed scale-free graphs
Barabasi and Albert (2002) propose a preferential attachment mechanism to ex-
plain the appearance of the power-law degree distribution for nondirected scale-
free graphs. Bolloba´s et al. (2003) introduce a model for directed scale-free graphs,
such as the banking network, that grow with preferential attachment depending
on the in- and out- degrees. We implement the directed scale-free graph proposed
by Bolloba´s et al. (2003) where vertices are added at discrete steps according to a
preferential attachment process: a new institution entering the financial system is
more likely to establish financial links with the heavily connected institutions. The
generating algorithm is the following:
Let α, β, γ, δin and δout be non-negative real numbers such that α + β + γ = 1.
Starting from an initial graph G0, we transit from graph Gt at step t to graph Gt+1
at step t+ 1 according to the following procedure:
• With probability α, add a new node v with a link from v to an existing node
ω selected with probability:
P(ω = ωi) =
kin(ωi) + δin
t+ δin|G(t)| (2.6)
• Else, with probability β, select independently an existing node v with prob-
ability:
P(v = vi) =
kout(i) + δout
t+ δout|G(t)| (2.7)
and add a link from v to an existing node ω chosen with probability:
P(ω = ωi) =
kin(ωi) + δin
t+ δin|G(t)| (2.8)
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• Else, with probability γ = 1− α − β, add a new node ω with a link from an
existing node v to ω where v is selected with probability:
P(v = vi) =
kout(vi) + δout
t+ δout|G(t)| (2.9)
Bolloba´s et al. (2003) show that as the size of the network increases to infinity the
preferential attachment procedure described above generates power laws in the in-
degree and out-degree distributions. Their model outerperforms the original scale-
free graph models (Barabasi and Albert, 2002) in the sense that it allows different
exponents for the in-degree and out-degree, which is required to reproduce the
empirical findings of real-world interbank networks.
We specify the parameters δin and δout to match the features of the Austrian and
Brazilian banking networks: a scaling exponent of 2 for the in-degree and 3 for the
out-degree. We specify the parameters α and β to match a target average degree a
of the network.
Proposition 1 (Expected average degree). Let Nj be the number of vertices in the
network at the jth iteration of the preferential attachment procedure described above
and define the stopping time:
τ = inf{j ≥ 1;Nj = n} (2.10)
Then, the expected average degree of the network Gτ with n vertices is equal to
2
α+γ
Proof. {Nj} is a Markov chain with:
P(Nj+1 = Nj + 1) = P(adding a new link at step j + 1) = α + γ (2.11)
and,
P(Nj+1 = Nj) = P(not adding a new link at step j + 1) = 1− α− γ = β (2.12)
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Let Fj be the σ algebra generated by N1, ..., Nj.
E[Nj+1 − (j + 1)(α + γ)|Fj] = E[Nj+1|Nj]− (j + 1)(α + γ)
= NjP(Nj+1 = Nj)
+ (Nj + 1)P(Nj+1 = Nj + 1)− (j + 1)(α + γ)
= Njβ + (Nj + 1)(α + γ)− (j + 1)(α + γ)
= Nj − j(α + γ)
Thus, Nj − j(α + γ) is a martingale.
By Optional Sampling applied to the bounded stopping time τ ∧ t:
E[Nτ∧t] = E[τ ∧ t(α + γ)] (2.13)
Letting t go to infinity, by Monotone Convergence E[Nτ∧t] goes to E[Nτ ] and
E[τ ∧ t(α + γ)] goes to E[τ(α + γ)]. Therefore,
E[Nτ ] = E[τ(α + γ)] = n (2.14)
Since at each iteration, the final number of links is τ . Moreover, since at each
iteration of the preferential attachment procedure a new link is created, the sum of
the degrees of network participants is incremented by 2 at each iteration (one for
the in-degree and one for the out-degree). Then, the sum of the degrees of network
participants after τ iterations is 2τ and the average degree of the network is 2τ
n
.
Thus, the expected average degree of the network with n vertices is equal to 2
α+γ
.
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= a and β = 1− 2α (2.15)
2.4.2 Modeling capital and exposures
Capital
To ensure financial stability, banks are required to hold a cushion for credit, mar-
ket and operational risks, as suggested for example in Basel 2 accords (BIS, 2001;
Duellmann, 2006). Capital constitutes a cushion to sustain potential losses. Never-
theless, most simulation studies have considered a simplistic distribution if capital.
Nier et al. (2007) assume that the capital of an institution - to which they refer
as “net worth”- is a fixed proportion of its total assets. However, this does not
entirely agree with Basel accords that require a cushion of capital to cover credit
risk, calculated as a fixed proportion of the risk weighted assets, and cushions to
cover market and operational risks. We propose a stylized specification of capital
for the institutions in the network following BIS (2001) and Duellmann (2006). We
assign for each node i in the network a capital c(i) that can cover a proportion θ
of its market and credit risks (so we do not require a cushion for operational risk):
c(i) = θ × (RWACrD + 12.5V aRMkR(i)) (2.16)
where RWACrD is the sum of risk-weighted assets for credit risk and V aRMkR is
the value at risk for market risk.
θ varies according to the specific regulation of the country where the banks operate.
For example, in the U.S. banks are required a capital ratio θ = 8%, while in Brazil
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banks are required θ = 11%.
The cushion for market risk is estimated as the 99% 10 days value-at-risk of the
total net exposure:










where σ is the daily volatility of the total net exposure, typically σ is about 1%.
The cushion for credit risk is calculated as the risk-weighted-assets to absorb the





We refer the reader to appendix C, BIS (2001) and Duellmann (2006) for the
computation details of the regulatory capital.
Exposures
Once the graph is constructed we allocate exposures (weights) to each link drawn
from a Pareto distribution with parameter α = 1.9. That is, the exposures have the
same power exponent as the one observed in the Austrian and Brazilian networks.
A simple assumption would be to consider the exposures independent. Neverthe-
less, this might not be very realistic since very connected institutions tend to have
larger exposures. For example, we observed in the Brazilian financial system a
significant positive dependence between the average exposure size and the number
of its debtors, and a positive dependence between the average liability size and
the number of creditors. Thus, a more realistic framework would be to correlate
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exposures sizes and connectivity when modeling interbank networks.
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Chapter 3
Too Interconnected to Fail:
Contagion and Systemic Risk in
Financial Networks
This chapter is based on the paper “Too Interconnected to Fail: Contagion and
Systemic Risk in Financial Networks” (Cont and Moussa, 2010c), which is a joint
work with Professor Rama Cont.
3.1 Introduction
The complexity of the contemporary financial systems has made it a challenge to
define measures of contagion and systemic risk that account for all potential sources
of risk an institution is faced to: credit, market, operational, liquidity, interest rate,
foreign exchange, just to name a few. Network models have provided a practical
framework for studying contagion in financial systems, in which nodes represent
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financial institutions and weighted links represent their bilateral exposures. Several
studies have examined the extent of contagion in real-world interbank networks:
Furfine (2003) in the US, Upper and Worms (2004) in Germany, A´gnes Lublo´y
(2006) in Hungary, van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) in the Netherlands, Wells
(2004) and Elsinger et al. (2006a) in Austria, Wells (2004) in the UK, Mistrulli
(2007) in Italy. We refer the reader to Upper (2011) for a comprehensive survey.
Most of these studies (all with the exception of Elsinger et al. (2006a,b)) have
considered the sole impact of an idiosyncratic shock on a single institution in the
network, thus accounting for only one type of risk: credit risk through counterparty
exposure. Nonetheless, in periods of financial crisis, the correlation of exposures
could lead to a simultaneous shock on a large group of- if not all- institutions in the
network leading to a wider propagation of financial distress in the system. It is then
crucial to include the combined effects of both common market shocks to portfolios
(correlation) and contagion through counterparty exposures (network effects).
We present in this study a metric of the systemic importance of a financial insti-
tution (or a group of institutions), the Contagion Index, defined as the expected
loss to the network triggered by the default of this institution when the system is
subject to a market shock. Contrarily to indicators of systemic risk purely based
on market data (Acharya et al., 2010; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2008), our metric
of systemic importance make use of exposures, which represent potential losses, to
simulate stress scenarios, resulting in a forward-looking measure of systemic risk.
The Contagion Index measures the magnitude of loss conditional to the default
of a given institution instead of averaging across all defaults as in Elsinger et al.
(2006a). We argue that these conditional measures provide a better assessment of
risk in a heterogenous system where the sample average may be a poor statistic.
We consider Default as the event in which an institution’s (Tier 1) capital is wiped
out by losses (insolvency). In fact, the main reason an institution defaults is if
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it is unable to fulfill an obligation when it is due, such as a principal or interest
payment, which typically happens when short term assets cannot cover short term
liabilities, i.e. when the institution is in liquidity distress (illiquidity). We argue
that insolvency leads in general to illiquidity which in turn leads to default.
The recent crisis has emphasized the importance of designing a measure of systemic
risk that is able to capture scenarios with default clusters. We propose a statistical
model of the dependence structure of market shocks that exhibits a tail dependence,
meaning that the occurrence of a shock on the network increases the probability
of possible future shocks. This allows to generate scenarios with default clustering,
which would have not been possible with the market standard Gaussian copula
model (Embrechts et al., 2001).
Using this methodology, we study the sensitivity of contagion and systemic to a
change in various network parameters. We simulate a directed scale-free network
according to the preferential attachment procedure introduced in chapter 2, with
heavy-tailed exposures. This choice of a scale-free degree distribution and heavy-
tailed exposures is motivated by the observations of Boss et al. (2004) on the struc-
ture of the Austrian network and our study of the statistical features of the Brazilian
network. We refer the reader to chapter 2 for an analysis of the Brazilian network.
Using the Contagion Index, we study the impact of several network features: the
aggregate level of connectivity and concentration of exposures, the heterogeneity in
degree distribution, the network size, the influence of local measures of connectivity
and concentration across counterparties such as the counterparty susceptibility and
local network frailty, the impact of capital requirements. We examine the sensitivity
of contagion to the heterogeneity in degree and exposures distributions by compar-
ing the severity of contagion in a scale-free versus an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network and by
varying the distribution of exposures (Exponential, Pareto, etc.). We are thus led
to revisit some of the conclusions in the previous literature (Allen and Gale, 2000;
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Freixas et al., 2000; Nier et al., 2007; Battiston et al., 2009) on the influence of
connectivity, concentration and network structure on the severity of contagion in
other particular network structures.
3.1.1 Summary of main results
• The influence of connectivity on the severity of contagion is controversial: in
well-capitalized networks, increasing connectivity is found to increase signif-
icantly contagion up to a certain threshold above which a further increase
in connectivity leads to a decrease in the extent of contagion. However, in
undercapitalized networks, increasing connectivity makes the network more
prone to contagion whatever the initial level of connectivity is. This allows
us to revisit the trade-off phenomenon described in previous studies between
decreasing individual risk due to risk sharing and increasing systemic risk due
to the propagation of financial distress.
• More heterogeneous network structures, in terms of both degree and exposures
distributions, are found more resilient to contagion. Specifically, the severity
of contagion in an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network is much greater than in a scale-free
network with equal connectivity. Also, the severity of contagion is much
greater in networks with less heterogenous distributions of exposures, such as
an Exponential distribution or simply distributing equally exposures among
creditors, than in a scale-free network with Pareto distribution of exposures.
• Local measures of connectivity and concentration of exposures across coun-
terparties –counterparty susceptibility and local network frailty– are shown to
contribute significantly to the systemic importance of an institution.
• Using the Contagion Index as a metric for systemic impact allows a compara-
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tive analysis of various capital requirement policies in terms of their (reduction
in) systemic impact. While a floor on the aggregate capital ratio is shown to
reduce the systemic impact of defaults of large institutions, imposing more
stringent capital requirements- cap on the susceptibility- on the most systemic
nodes and their counterparties is shown to be a more efficient procedure for
immunizing the network against contagion.
3.1.2 Relation to the literature
Shock simulation and loss contagion
The loss contagion mechanism we introduce is similar to the one presented in Furfine
(2003); Upper and Worms (2004); Wells (2004); A´gnes Lublo´y (2006); van Lelyveld
and Liedorp (2006); Mistrulli (2007); Nier et al. (2007). When an institution de-
faults, the unrecovered portion of the exposures to the defaulted institution (assum-
ing an exogenous recovery rate) are absorbed by its creditors, that can themselves
default if they do not hold enough capital to sustain their losses. However, this
“sequential” (Upper, 2011) contagion mechanism is very different from the market
equilibrium approach of Eisenberg and Noe (2001); Elsinger et al. (2006a,b) defined
by a clearing payment vector, in which banks can liquidate their assets leading to
a proportional sharing of losses among counterparties (endogenous recovery rate).
We argue that, since bankruptcy procedures are usually slow and settlements may
take up several months to be effective, creditors cannot recover the residual value
of the defaulting institution according to such a hypothetical clearing mechanism,
and write down their entire exposure in the short-run, leading to a short term re-
covery rate of zero. This seems a more reasonable approach in absence of a clearing
mechanism.
With the exception of Elsinger et al. (2006a,b), all these studies examine the sole
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knock-on effects of the sudden failure of a single bank by considering an idiosyn-
cratic shock that targets a single institution in the system. Upper and Worms
(2004) estimate the scope of contagion by letting banks go bankrupt one at a time
and measuring the number of banks that fail due their exposure to the failing bank.
Sheldon and Maurer (1998) and Mistrulli (2007) also study the consequences of a
single idiosyncratic shock affecting individual banks in the network. Furfine (2003)
measures the risk that an exogenous failure of one or a small number of institu-
tions will cause contagion. These studies fail to quantify the compounded effect
of correlated defaults and contagion through network externalities. Our study, on
the contrary, shows that common market shocks to balance sheets may exacerbate
contagion during a crisis and ignoring them can lead to an underestimation of the
extent of contagion in the network. We argue that, to measure adequately the sys-
temic impact of the failure of a financial institution, one needs to account for the
combined effect of correlation of market shocks to balance sheets and balance sheet
contagion effects, the former increasing the impact of the latter. Our simulation-
based framework takes into account common and independent market shocks to
balance sheets, as well as counterparty risk through mutual exposures.
Sensitivity of contagion to network parameters
In line with Nier et al. (2007) and Battiston et al. (2009), we observe when in-
creasing connectivity in the network a trade-off phenomenon between increasing
the severity of contagion by increasing potential channels for the propagation of
financial distress and the stabilizing benefit of risk sharing by dissipating losses
among a larger number of counterparties. Specifically, we find similar results as
in Nier et al. (2007): in well-capitalized networks, increasing connectivity is found
to increase significantly contagion up to a certain threshold above which a further
increase in connectivity leads to a decrease in the extent of contagion. However, in
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undercapitalized networks, increasing connectivity makes the network more prone
to contagion whatever the initial level of connectivity is.
While contagion is found to be more likely to occur in incomplete and tiered (money
center) network structures in Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000), we find
that heterogeneity in degrees and exposures improves the resilience of the network
to contagion. The difference in results could be due to the difference in network
structures since we consider a scale-free network instead of a four nodes graph, or
to a difference in the contagion mechanism. In any case, this highlights again that
the possibility and extent of contagion depend considerably on the precise structure
of the network, hence the importance of using realistic models of financial networks
when studying contagion.
Our study also complements the existing literature by studying the contribution of
network-based local measures of connectivity and concentration to systemic risk.
Previous studies on simulated network structures have examined the contribution
of aggregate measures of connectivity and concentration such as increasing the
probability that two nodes are connected in an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph, or increasing the
number of nodes in the system (Battiston et al., 2009; Nier et al., 2007). However,
they fail to detect the impact of connectivity and concentration locally around a
single institution in the network. We thus introduce the counterparty susceptibility
and local network frailty that measure respectively the susceptibility of the creditors
of an institution to a potential default of the latter and the fragility of the entire
network in the event of default of this institution. We find that the two measures
can explain significantly default contagion.
The impact of capital requirements in limiting the extent of systemic risk and
default contagion has not been explored systematically in a network context. Based
on analogies with epidemiology and peer-to-peer networks (Cohen et al., 2003;
Madar et al., 2004; Huang et al., 2007), we discuss targeted capital requirements
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and show that targeting the creditors of the most contagious institutions is a more
effective procedure –in terms of the total capital it requires for the same level of
systemic risk– than increasing capital ratios for all institutions in the network.
3.1.3 Outline
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we introduce a quantitative
methodology for assessing contagion and systemic risk, and present a low-variance
simulation procedure to calculate the Contagion Index. In section 3.3, we explore
the impact of connectivity and concentration on systemic risk, and investigate the
role of different institutional and local network characteristics which contribute
to the systemic importance of financial institutions. In section 3.4, we study the
impact of the size of the network on the level of contagion. In section 3.5, we
examine the impact of the heterogeneity in network structure and exposures sizes.
Finally, in section 3.6, we study the impact of various immunization procedures on
the extent of default contagion and systemic risk.
3.2 Measuring the systemic impact of financial
failures
3.2.1 Default mechanism
Changes in an institution assets value, such as fluctuations in market value or
the failure to collect assets due to a financial distress of the counterparty, can
impute losses to the institution. These losses are written down from the balance
sheet and the capital is reduced by the amount of the loss incurred. A realistic
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valuation of exposures is then a critical factor in evaluating the financial condition
and performance of financial institutions. For banks, loans given are considered as
assets and if the debtor cannot pay back this loan, the new value is placed on the
balance sheet, and the capital is reduced by the amount of the loss.
Default occurs when an institution fails to fulfill an obligation such as a sched-
uled debt payment of interest or principal or the inability to service a loan. This
typically happens when the reserves in short term (liquid) assets do not suffice to
cover short term liabilities. It is then important when modeling default to discuss
the difference between the two major sources of financial distress: illiquidity and
insolvency. Insolvency happens when the net worth of an institution is reduced
to zero, i.e. losses exceed capital, while illiquidity occurs when reserves in liquid
assets, such as cash and cash equivalents, are insufficient to cover short term liabil-
ities. Illiquidity leads to default while, in principle, insolvency may not necessarily
entail default as long as the institution is able to obtain financing to meet payment
obligations. Nevertheless, in the current structure of the financial system where
financial institutions are primarily funded through short-term debt, which must be
constantly renewed, insolvent institutions would have great difficulties in raising
liquidity as their assets lose in value. Indeed, renewal of short term funding is
subject to the solvency and creditworthiness of the institution. Thus, in practice,
insolvency leads to illiquidity which in turn leads to default.
Thus, in line with various previous studies, we define default as the event when the
losses incurred by a financial institution render it insolvent.
3.2.2 Loss contagion
When a set of financial institutions default, they lead to an immediate writedown
in value of all their liabilities to their creditors. These losses are imputed to the
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capital of the creditors, leading to a loss of Eji for each creditor j of each defaulted
institution. If this loss exceeds the creditor’s capital i.e. Eji > cj this leads to
the insolvency of the institution j, which in turn may generate a new round of
losses to the creditors of j. This domino effect may be modeled by defining a loss
cascade, updating at each step the losses to balance sheets resulting from previously
defaulted counterparties:
Definition 2 (Loss cascade). Consider an initial configuration of capital reserves





where Ri is an exogenous recovery rate at the default of institution i. (cn−1(j), j ∈
V ), where n = |V | is the number of nodes in the network, then represents the
remaining capital once all counterparty losses have been accounted for. The set of
insolvent institutions is then given by
D(c, E) = {j ∈ V : cn−1(j) = 0} (3.2)
Remark 1 (Fundamental defaults vs defaults by contagion). The set D(c, E) may
be partitioned into two subsets
D(c, E) = {j ∈ V : c0(j) = 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fundamental defaults
⋃
{j ∈ V : c0(j) > 0, cn−1(j) = 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Defaults by contagion
where the first set represents the initial defaults which trigger the cascade –we will
refer to them as fundamental defaults– and the second set represents the defaults
due to contagion.
The default of the initial set of failing institutions can therefore propagate to other
participants in the network through the contagion mechanism described above. To
measure the systemic importance of a set of institutions (say A) triggering the
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loss cascade, we introduce the Default Impact DI(A) of A that measures the loss
incurred by the network in the default cascade triggered by the default of the set
of institutions A:
Definition 3 (Default Impact). The Default Impact DI(A, c, E) of a set of finan-
cial institutions A ⊂ V is defined as the total loss in capital in the cascade triggered
by the default of A:




where (ck(j), j ∈ V )k>0 is defined by the recurrence relation (3.1), with initial con-
dition is given by
c0(j) = c(j) for j /∈ A and c0(j) = 0 for j ∈ A.
It is important to note that the Default Impact does not include the loss of the
institutions triggering the cascade, but focuses on the loss this initial default inflicts
to the rest of the networks: it thus measures the loss due to contagion.
Definition 4 (Total loss). The total loss L(A) generated along the default cascade
initiated by A is then given by summing the loss of capital of the defaulted firms








where (ck(j), j ∈ V )k>0 is defined by the recurrence relation (3.1), with initial con-
dition is given by
c0(j) = c(j) for j /∈ A and c0(j) = 0 for j ∈ A.
Proposition 2 (Monotonicity of the total loss). The loss function L defines an
increasing function on the subsets of V :
A ⊂ B ⊂ V ⇒ L(A) ≤ L(B). (3.5)
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Proof. Consider A ⊂ B ⊂ V . We denote ck,A(v) the sequence of capital defined by
the recurrence relation (3.1), with initial configuration of capital given by
c0,A(j) = c(j) for j /∈ A and c0,A(j) = 0 for j ∈ A. (3.6)
and we denote ck,B(v) the sequence of capital defined by the recurrence relation
(3.1), with initial configuration of given by
c0,B(j) = c(j) for j /∈ B and c0,B(j) = 0 for j ∈ B. (3.7)
We first prove that for every node v in the network, ck,A(v) ≤ ck,B(v) at each
iteration k of the contagion cascades initiated by A and B:
• At step k=0: sets A and B are in default so for all v ∈ A:
c0,A(v) = c0,B(v) = 0 (3.8)
and for all v /∈ A:
c0,A(v) = c(v) but c0,B(v) ≤ c(v) (3.9)
Thus, c0,A(v) ≥ c0,B(v) for every node v in the network.










Therefore, for k = n − 1, cn−1,A(v) ≥ cn−1,B(v). This implies that L(A) ≤ L(B),
that is the loss function L defines an increasing function on the subsets of V .
The contagion mechanism described above is similar to the one presented in Furfine
(2003); Upper and Worms (2004); Wells (2004); Mistrulli (2007) that also consider a
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deterministic default mechanism with an exogenous recovery rate. Since liquidation
procedures are usually slow and settlements may take up several months to be
effective, creditors cannot recover the residual value of the defaulting institution
according to such a hypothetical clearing mechanism, and write down their entire
exposure in the short-run, leading to a short term recovery rate of zero. In absence of
a clearing mechanism, this approach seems more reasonable than the one proposed
by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) which corresponds to a hypothetical situations where
all portfolios are simultaneously liquidated. Finally, we note that this model does
not capture medium- or long-term contagion: maintaining exposures constant over
longer term horizons, as in (Elsinger et al., 2006a) is unrealistic since exposures and
capital levels fluctuate significantly over such horizons.
3.2.3 Contagion Index of a set of financial institutions
Banking regulation requires banks to conduct stress tests on their minimum capital
requirements in order to ensure adequate capital allocation levels to cover potential
losses incurred during extreme events. Examples of scenarios that could be used
are: economic downturns, market-place events, or decreased liquidity conditions.
The bank must stress test its counterparty exposures including jointly stressing
market and credit risk factors that could have unfavorable effects on the bank’s
ability to face such changes. It would be then interesting to introduce a metric of
systemic importance that considers not only credit risk- such as the Default Impact-
but also systemic events, such as market shocks that could affect the capital of all
institutions at the same time. We propose a measure of the systemic importance
of a financial institution that combines both market and credit risk factors: the
Contagion Index.
We introduce correlated negative market shocks i, i = 1..n that reduce the capital
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of all institutions in the network with a severity that depends on the credit worthi-
ness of each institution: institutions with higher default probabilities will default
more often when faced to market shocks. Each scenario of market shocks leads
an initial set of institutions to default, and the default can propagate across the
network through the loss cascade mechanism described in the previous section. We
introduce the Contagion Index CI(A, c, E) of a set of institutions A as a measure
of the expected loss incurred by the network, conditional on the event that the set
of institutions A has defaulted due to the market shock. Thus, while the Default
Impact is a deterministic measure of the loss generated by an exogenous default of
the set of institutions A, the Contagion Index is a measure of the expected loss gen-
erated by the failure of the set of institutions A in a stressed market, compounding
the effects of both credit and market risks.
The computation of this index involves a model of market shocks  affecting balance
sheets. Different specifications –static or dynamic, factor-based or copula-based–
are possible:
i = fi(S,Zi) (3.13)
where S is a common factor and the Zi’s are IID random variables representing
idiosyncratic shocks.
We refer the reader to appendix A for an overview of copulae.
Given a (statistical) model for the market shocks  generating stress scenarios, we
now define the
Definition 5 (Contagion Index). The Contagion Index CI(A, c, E) of the set of
institutions A ⊂ V is defined as its expected Default Impact in a market stress
scenario:
CI(A, c, E) = E [DI(A, (c+ )+, E)| c(i) + i < 0,∀i ∈ A] (3.14)
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CI(A, c, E) is the expected loss –measured in terms of capital– inflicted to the
network in the default cascade triggered by the initial default of A. The averaging
is done over scenarios where the market shocks trigger the default of A. If the
initial set of institutions defaulting due to the market shock does not trigger other
institutions to fail, then the Contagion Index is zero: a non-zero value of this
indicator therefore indicates that the set of institutions A is indeed a source of
contagion.
3.2.4 Simulation procedure
The Contagion Index of a set A of nodes can be viewed as the expected Default
Impact of the set A when drawing the market shocks from their conditional distri-
bution given that the set A has defaulted, i.e. c(k) + k < 0, ∀k ∈ A:
CI(A, c, E) = E [DI(A, (c+ ˜)+, E)] (3.15)
where ˜ is drawn from the distribution of  conditional on the event c(k) + k <
0, ∀k ∈ A.
Thus, we can compute an estimator of the Contagion Index of the set A by Monte-
Carlo method:
For j = 1..N :
• draw samples ˜i(ωj), i = 1..n from the conditional distribution P(i ∈ .|c(j) +
j < 0, ∀j ∈ A).
• run the default cascades initiated by the market shock triggering the failure
of the set A of nodes and compute the Default Impact DI(A, (c+ ˜(ωj))+, E)
of A with the stressed capital levels (c(i) + ˜i(ωj))+, i = 1..n.
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The Monte-Carlo estimator of the Contagion Index ĈI is then given by:





DI(A, (c+ ˜(ωj))+, E) (3.16)
Example: one factor α-stable copula model






ρ1/αS + (1− ρ)1/αZi
)
(3.17)
where S,Z1, ..., Zn are independent and identically distributed random variables
with marginal cumulative density function Gα, and marginal probability density
function gα.
Fα is the marginal cumulative distribution of the 
′
is, which we choose to be the





Gα(x)1x<0 + 1x>0. (3.18)
σi is a scaling factor that allows to calibrate the magnitude of the market shock on
institution i to its marginal default probability pi:
σi = − c(i)
F−1α (pi)
(3.19)
The loss incurred by the network is a function of the correlated market shocks
i, i = 1..n, so it is a function of the common factor S and the specific factors
Zi, i = 1..n. Therefore, the computation of the Contagion Index of an institution k
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requires the knowledge of the joint distribution of S and Zi, i = 1..n conditional on
the event c(k) + k < 0. Since the variables S and Zi, i = 1..n are independent, the
Zi’s for i 6= k are independent of the event c(k)+k < 0. In this case, the Contagion
Index of all nodes k = 1..n in the network can be calculated simultaneously using
the same draws of idiosyncratic factors and just re-drawing the common factor S
conditional on the event c(k)+k < 0. Hence, we only need to know the conditional
distribution of S given c(k) + k < 0, that has a density function


















































Hence, the conditional probability density function of S given c(i) + zi < 0 is:











The algorithm to estimate the Contagion Index of all nodes k = 1..n in the network
is:
For j = 1..N :
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• draw Zi(ωj), i = 1..n a copy of the idiosyncratic factors from their α-stable
distribution Gα.
• For k = 1..n:
– draw S(ωj) from the conditional distribution P(S(ωj) ∈ .|c(k)+k(ωj) <
0).





ρ1/αS(ωj) + (1− ρ)1/αZi(ωj)
)
(3.22)
– run the default cascades initiated by the market shock triggering the
failure of node k and compute the Default Impact DI(k, c+ (ωj), E) of
k with the stressed capital levels (c(i) + i(ωj))+, i = 1..n.
Both the gaussian and the cauchy copulae belong to the family of α-stable copulae:
the gaussian corresponds to α = 2 and the Cauchy to α = 1.
Unless otherwise specified, the results presented in the below sections correspond
to a scale-free network, simulated according to the preferential atachment proce-
dure presented in chapter 2, with 400 nodes, average degree 10, in-exponent 2 and
out-exponent 3. Exposures are iid and follow a Pareto distribution with parameter
α = 1.9. Market shocks are simulated from a Cauchy copula model with depen-
dence parameter ρ = 10%. We favor the Cauchy copula to the commonly used
Gaussian copula in order to generate scenarios with clusters of shocks with large
magnitude, that is possible only in the presence of tail dependence as in the Cauchy
copula (Embrechts et al., 2001). The nodes are ranked in descending order of their
interbank liability. The first 12% are assigned a default probability of 6 basis points,
the second 13% are assigned a default probability of 33 basis points and the re-
maining ones are assigned a default probability of 79 basis points. In other words,
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we assume that institutions are willing to lend money to other institutions with a
good credit rating, that is institutions with a small default probability. Thus, an
institution with a high interbank liability should be assigned a small default prob-
ability. The Contagion Index is computed according to the simulation procedure
described in section 3.2.4 with 1000 independent draws of the correlated market
shocks.
3.2.5 Importance of correlated market shocks
Both the Default Impact and the Contagion Index exhibit heavy tailed distributions
(see figure 3.1) indicating the existence of few institutions that present a high
contagion risk to the financial system (up to 25% of the total capital in the network)
while most institutions exhibit a small risk. Figure 3.2 shows the cross-sectional
distribution of the ratio of the Contagion Index to the Default Impact. We observe
that the Contagion Index may, for some nodes, significantly exceed (up to four
times) the Default Impact. Thus correlated shocks to balance sheets seem to amplify
contagion. This comes from the fact that market shocks reduce the capital available
to financial institutions and render them more susceptible to default.
Exposures that are not covered by an adequate amount of capital to sustain their
loss in the event of default constitute channels of contagion across the system. We
will call such exposures contagious exposures.
Definition 6 (Contagious Exposure). An exposure of institution i to j is called
contagious if it exceeds the capital of i, that is ,if Eij > c(i).
If the link i → j represents a contagious exposure, the default of j leads to the
default of i in all stress scenarios. Thus, the subgraph constituted of contagious
exposures will be a primary support for the propagation of default cascades: the
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larger this subgraph, the larger the extent of contagion. In a stress scenario in which
balance sheets are subjected to negative market shocks, new contagious exposures
may appear, leading to a higher degree of contagion. In fact we find that the pro-
portion of contagious exposures before applying market shocks is about 15% of the
total number of bilateral exposures in the network, and their expected proportion
when the common factor of the market shocks equals its 5% quantile is about 50%
of the total number of bilateral exposures in the network (see figure 3.2). Hence,
in periods of crisis (as simulated by the stress test) the proportion of contagious
exposures increases considerably leading to a wider propagation of default. Thus,
ignoring market shocks can lead to a serious underestimation of the extent of de-
fault contagion in the system. This motivates the use of the Contagion Index to
assess the systemic risk of financial failures. The role of contagious exposures is
further explored in Amini et al. (2010) from a theoretical point of view.










































Figure 3.1: Distribution of the Default Impact and the Contagion Index: most institutions have
a small Default Impact and Contagion Index, however, some can have an impact up to 25% of
the total capital in the network.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of the ratio of Contagion Index to Default Impact: the Contagion Index
can exceed the Default Impact up to four times for some nodes. The proportion of contagious
exposures before applying market shocks is about 15% of the total number of bilateral exposures
in the network, and their expected proportion when the common factor of the market shocks
equals its 5% quantile is about 50% of the total number of bilateral exposures in the network.
3.3 The impact of connectivity and concentration
3.3.1 Connectivity
Previous studies of default contagion in particular network structures have sug-
gested that network connectivity as measured by the number of counterparty links,
has an influence on the degree of contagion observed in the network. Allen and
Gale (2000) show that the possibility of contagion depends strongly on the com-
pleteness of the structure of interregional claims and find that complete markets-
in which banks are connected to all other banks in the network, which represents
the maximum level of connectivity- are more resilient to contagion than incomplete
markets. Babus (2006) investigate whether banks form networks in order to in-
sure against the risk of contagion. They show that better connected networks are
more resilient to contagion and find a connectivity threshold above which conta-
gion does not occur. Nevertheless, other studies (Nier et al., 2007; Battiston et al.,
2009) have identified two competing effects of increasing connectivity; on one hand
interbank linkages can play the role of channels for the propagation of financial
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distress leading to an increase in the extent of contagion, while on the other hand
they can dissipate losses among counterparties, thus reducing the marginal effect
of losses on individual counterparties through risk sharing. Nier et al. (2007) show
that the potential for knock-on defaults depends on the level of connectivity in the
system: when the initial connectivity is low an increase in connectivity increases
the risk of contagion, but when connectivity is already high, a further increase in
connectivity tends to help dissipate losses across the system which renders it more
resilient to contagion. They also find that in undercapitalized networks, increasing
connectivity increases the risk of contagion whatever the initial level of connectivity
is. Battiston et al. (2009) also investigate the effect of the network connectivity on
the probability of individual defaults of financial institutions and find a converse
result: when the initial connectivity is low an increase in connectivity improves
the resilience of the network to contagion, but when connectivity is already high, a
further increase in connectivity increases the risk of contagion.
While it is clear that the degree of connectivity in the network can have a significant
effect on the occurrence and severity of contagion, the nature of this effect may
depend strongly on the specific structure of the network. The studies we mentioned
above consider simple network structures: network of four regions in Allen and
Gale (2000), network of two regions in Babus (2006), Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph with 25
nodes in Nier et al. (2007) and a regular graph in Battiston et al. (2009). An
interesting analysis would be to check whether the results hold in more complex
network structures, such as the scale-free network described in chapter 2, that
reproduce the heterogeneity in degree and exposures observed in real-world banking
systems.
We consider a scale-free graph with 400 nodes and average degree 10, and we extend
it, along multiple steps, by adding exposures between unconnected nodes randomly
selected to achieve first an extended graph with an average degree of 15, then of 22
Chapter 3. Too Interconnected to Fail: Contagion and Systemic Risk in Financial
Networks 77
and 33. The “new” exposures are IID draws from a Pareto distribution with param-
eter α = 1.9. We change the capital allocations to satisfy the minimal capital ratio
θ, and update the default probabilities according to the new size of exposures. We
first examine the case of a “well-capitalized” network in which banks are required
a capital ratio of (at least) 8%. We then study the case of an “undercapitalized”
network in which banks are required a capital ratio of only 4%. Similarly to Nier
et al. (2007), we find (see figure 3.3) that in the well-capitalized network, the re-
lationship between connectivity and the average Contagion Index follows a hump
shaped pattern: when the initial connectivity is low, an increase in connectivity
increases contagion, however when the initial connectivity is high, increasing con-
nectivity reduces contagion. We also observe that in the undercapitalized network,
the average Contagion Index is monotonically increasing with connectivity. We can
also see this in the tail distribution of the Contagion Index.
Thus, linkages in well-capitalized networks play the role of “shock transmitters” or
“shock-absorbers” (following the terminology of Nier et al. (2007)) depending on
the initial level of connectivity in the network. When connectivity is low, creating
new linkages increases the channels though which financial distress can propagate
from one institution to another. In fact, since connectivity is low, the loss incurred
per counterparty can still be significant relatively to its capital which may trigger
default. However, when connectivity is high, creating new linkages help dissipating
losses among a larger number of counterparties leading to a smaller loss per coun-
terparty. This is the so-called benefit from risk sharing discussed in Battiston et al.
(2009). There is no benefit from risk sharing in undercapitalized networks since
even a small loss can exceed the capital of the counterparty leading it to default.
In summary, our study on a simulated scale-free network reveals that increasing
the connectivity of already well-connected and well-capitalized interbank networks
tends to improve their resilience to contagion. However, if the network is not well-
Chapter 3. Too Interconnected to Fail: Contagion and Systemic Risk in Financial
Networks 78






























































































































































Figure 3.3: Relationship between connectivity and contagion in well-capitalized (capital ratio
of 8%) and undercapitalized (capital ratio of 4%) systems. The figure shows the tail distributions
of the Contagion Index and the cascade size at different levels of connectivity.
3.3.2 Concentration of exposures
Given that insolvency risk is related to the ratio of potential losses, resulting from
exposures, to capital, the concentration of exposures across counterparties is a
key factor in determining the extent of contagion. In a homogeneous network
setting where assets are uniformly distributed across counterparties, concentration
is related to connectivity: this is the setting used in previous simulation studies
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Nier et al. (2007). However, in the context of heterogeneous exposures, a network
with a higher level of connectivity may present a higher level of concentration
in exposures if exposures are unevenly distributed across counterparties. In fact,
empirical studies on the distribution of exposures show that exposures have a heavy-
tailed empirical distribution which suggests a high degree of concentration.
Nier et al. (2007) find in the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi framework that more concentrated sys-
tems are more prone to contagion. We also study the impact of concentration on
the extent of contagion but in the scale-free framework. We compare the Contagion
Index and the size of default cascades in a scale-free graph simulated by preferential
attachment as described in chapter 2 with 400 nodes, in- and out-degree exponents
respectively of 2 and 3 end exposures as follows:
• Pareto exposures: IID realizations of a Pareto distribution with parameter
α = 1.9.
• Exponential exposures: IID Exponential with intensity λ = α−1
α
, thus guar-
anteeing equal exposures mean as the graph with Pareto exposures.
• Equal liability towards each creditor: the interbank liability of each institution
in the graph with Pareto exposures is divided equally among its creditors,
leading to a graph where each institution has the same interbank liability as
in the graph with Pareto exposures but this liability is divided equally among
all creditors.
Capital and default probabilities are updated in each of these networks according
to the size of exposures. We note that the ratio of total capital to total expo-
sures is about the same in the three networks (see table 3.1). We find that the
probability of observing an institution with a large Contagion Index or triggering
a large default cascade is smaller in the graph with Pareto exposures, followed by
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the graph with equal liability, then the graph with Exponential exposures. The
same ranking is observed when measuring the average Contagion Index and aver-
age size of default cascades across the network. Therefore, contrarily to Nier et al.














































































Figure 3.4: Relationship between exposures distribution and contagion. The figure shows the
tail distributions of the Contagion Index and the cascade size in scale-free networks with Pareto,
Exponential and equally distributed exposures.
Pareto exposures Exponential exposures Equal exposures
0.2584 0.2603 0.2537
Table 3.1: Ratio of total capital to total exposures in the networks with Pareto, Exponential
and equally distributed exposures.
3.3.3 Local measures of connectivity and concentration: coun-
terparty susceptibility and local network frailty
We have examined above the influence of connectivity and concentration on sys-
temic risk and contagion at an aggregate level of the network. Having at our disposal
the Contagion Index which measures the systemic impact of each institution in the
network, we are able to identify the local characteristic of the counterparty network
of institutions which pose a high systemic risk.
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The analysis of contagion in the Brazilian interbank network reveals that size effects
alone do not explain the magnitude of systemic impact and points to the possible
contribution of interconnectedness, or network structure. We examine this in our
simulated scale-free network. As shown in figure 3.5, the fifteen most systemic nodes
are connected to each other, and many of their exposures are contagious exposures
that propagate automatically default when it occurs. Thus, default might snowball
among these very systemic nodes leading to a large extent of default contagion.
Figure 3.5: Subgraph of the 15 most systemic institutions in the network, contagious exposures
are in red.
This motivates to define indicators which go beyond simple measures of connectivity
such as the degree (or weighted degree). We define the following indicators which
attempt to quantify the sensitivity of the counterparties of these nodes to their
default:
Definition 7 (Susceptibility coefficient). The susceptibility coefficient of a node is
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A node with χ(i) > 100% may become insolvent due to the default of a single coun-
terparty. Counterparty risk management in financial institutions typically imposes
an upper limit on this quantity.
Definition 8 (Counterparty susceptibility). The counterparty susceptibility CS(i)





CS(i) is thus a measure of the maximal vulnerability of creditors of i to the default
of i.
Definition 9 (Local network frailty). The local network frailty f(i) at node i is
defined as the maximum, taken over counterparties exposed to i, of their exposure






Thus, local network frailty combines two risk components: the risk that the coun-
terparty incurs due to its exposure to node i, and the risk that the (rest of the)
network incurs if this counterparty fails. A large value f(i) indicates that i is a
node whose counterparties have large liabilities and are highly exposed to i.
For simplicity, we label the nodes in the network by their decreasing ranking in
Contagion Index. A closer look at the creditors of the five most systemic institutions
in the network shows that they are all counterparties to a common creditor, node
12, which is the twelfth most systemic node in the network. Table 3.2 shows that
node 12 has much more creditors than most institutions in the network, and also a
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much greater interbank liability size, counterparty susceptibility and local network
frailty. Moreover, 6 of the exposures to node 12 are contagious, meaning that they
trigger default cascades in any shock scenario. Node 12 seems then to be a hub
that diffuses default in the entire network. We also observe (see table 3.3) that the
five most systemic nodes exhibit in general a high counterparty susceptibility and
local network frailty.
kout L χ CS f
25 79.58 2.55 15.95 67.74
Network median 3 5.46 2.06 4.92 6.55
90% quantile 13 30.06 5.53 1.33 35.76
Table 3.2: Analysis of node 12 (6 of its exposures are contagious).
Ranking maxj,Eji>0 kout(j) maxj,Eji>0 L(j) CSi fi
1 25 79.58 3.46 97.96
2 25 79.58 2.55 203.62
3 25 79.58 10.49 189.37
4 25 79.58 2.20 20.78
5 25 79.58 3.42 29.37
Network median 21 58.29 1.33 6.55
90% quantile 25 79.58 4.92 35.76
Table 3.3: Analysis of the creditors of the five most contagious nodes.
We are thus led to investigate whether we could segregate systemically important
institutions based on the measures of connectivity and centrality defined above. We
classify institutions into those with a “high” Contagion Index (higher than 1% of
the total network capital) and those with a “small” Contagion Index (smaller than
1% of the total network capital), according to their interbank liability, counter-
party susceptibility and local network frailty. This can be achieved by conducting
a logistic regression of the indicator of the Contagion Index being higher than 1%
of the total network capital once on the the interbank liability and counterparty
susceptibility, and once on the interbank liability and counterparty frailty. Figure
3.6 displays the decision boundaries at the probabilities 10% and 50% when observ-
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ing once the interbank liability size and the counterparty susceptibility and once
the interbank liability size and the local network frailty: a node outside the 10%
decision boundary has an estimated probability of 10% to have a Contagion Index
higher than 1% of the network capital; a node outside the 50% decision boundary
has an estimated probability of 50% to have a Contagion Index higher than 1% of
the network capital. We note that institutions with a high Contagion Index tend to
have a large interbank liability, local network frailty and counterparty susceptibility.
Figure 3.6: Counterparty susceptibility (left figure) and local network frailty (right figure) of
the most systemic nodes (with a Contagion Index higher than 1% of the network capital) and
the less systemic nodes (with a Contagion Index smaller than 1% of the network capital). Nodes
above the 10% decision boundary have with 10% probability a Contagion Index higher than 1%
of the network capital. The ones above the 50% decision boundary have with 50% probability a
Contagion Index higher than 1% of the capital in the system.
The outputs of the logistic regression are summarized in table 3.4. We observe that
the counterparty susceptibility and the local network frailty contribute significantly
to the variability of the probability of observing a large Contagion Index: positive
coefficients at the 1% significance level and a high adjusted pseudo-R2 1. This
indicates that not only the size of interbank liabilities matter in explaining a high
1The Adjusted Pseudo-R2 in a logistic regression is defined as 1 − logL(M)/logL(0)((n −
1)/(n− k− 1)) where logL(M) and logL(0) are the maximized log likelihood for the fitted model
and the null model, n is the sample size and k is the number of regressors (Shtatland et al., 2002).
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Contagion Index, but also the local network frailty and counterparty susceptibility.
We also test for the differences in median between the counterparty susceptibility of
the institutions with a Contagion Index higher than 1% of the total network capital
and the counterparty susceptibility of those with a Contagion Index smaller than 1%
of the total network capital. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test rejects the hypothesis
of equal medians at the 1% level of significance. The median of the counterparty
susceptibility of the institutions with a high Contagion Index (2.48) is significantly
higher than the median of the counterparty susceptibility of the institutions with
a small Contagion Index (0.35). Similarly, the median of the local network frailty
of the institutions with a high contagion index (19.53) is significantly higher than
the median of the local network frailty of the institutions with a small contagion
index (2.66).
3.4 The impact of the network size
Another variable that could have an impact on the level of contagion is the size of
the network. To illustrate this, we consider various scale-free networks, simulated
according to the preferential attachment procedure presented in chapter 2 with
respective exponents for the in- and out-degree of 2 and 3, with different sizes
(n = 50, 100, 200, 300, 400) but maintaining equal their average degree (k = 10)
and total assets (
∑
i∈V A(i) = 1). We find that larger networks are more resilient
to contagion (see figure 3.7).
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β̂0 = -4.41** 0.53 84.55%
β̂1 = 2.13** 0.25
β̂2 = 0.57** 0.15




β̂0 = -4.69** 0.51 84.39%
β̂1 = 2.32** 0.24




β̂0 = -0.40** 0.12 26.36%
β̂1 = 0.94** 0.10




β̂0 = -6.99** 0.79 91.69%
β̂1 = 1.75** 0.25
β̂2 = 1.57** 0.26




β̂0 = -4.78** 0.51 83.26%
β̂1 = 2.16** 0.22
* significant at 5% confidence level
** significant at 1% confidence level
Table 3.4: Marginal contribution to the Contagion Index.
3.5 The impact of degree heterogeneity
Very few studies on systemic risk in interbank networks have explored the role of
the network heterogeneity (or tiering) in the propagation of financial distress. In








































































Figure 3.7: Relationship between network size and contagion in scale-free networks. The figure
shows the tail distributions of the Contagion Index and the cascade size at different network sizes
(n=50, 100, 200, 300, 400).
fact, most of the previous studies have mainly considered simple network structures
such as the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi like models used in Nier et al. (2007), or the regular graph
with constant degree used in Battiston et al. (2009), or even simpler the four-
regions and two-regions models used in Allen and Gale (2000) and Babus (2006).
Nier et al. (2007) have explored simple tiered structure by separating the network
into two groups- large banks and small banks- allowing a constant probability of
being connected for large banks that is higher than the one for small banks. Their
model is a generalization to tiered structures of the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi but it does not
reproduce the power law distributions of the in-degree and out-degree observed
in real-world networks. We compare in this section the extent of systemic risk
and default cascades in a scale-free graph and an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph with equal
connectivity (average degree) and same distribution of exposures. More precisely,
we consider a scale-free network of n = 400 institutions and average degree k = 10
and simulate an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network with 400 institutions, and probability of
being connected p = k
2(n−1) , thus guaranteeing the same average degree k as in
the scale-free graph. Capital and default probabilities are assigned according to
the size of exposures in each network. We first note that the ratio of total capital
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to total exposures is about the same in the two networks (see table 3.5) which
means that any difference in the extent of contagion is not due to a difference in
the capital available in the system but to a difference in network structure. We
find (see figure 3.8) that the probability of observing an institution with a large
Contagion Index or triggering a large default cascade is much higher in the Erdo¨s-
Re´nyi network. Also, the average Contagion Index and average size of default
cascades is higher in the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network. Thus tiering seems to increase the







































































Figure 3.8: Relationship between network structure and contagion. The figure shows the tail
distributions of the Contagion Index and the cascade size in a scale-free and Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks
with equal connectivity (average degree).
Scale-free Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
0.2584 0.2443
Table 3.5: Ratio of total capital to total exposures in the scale-free and Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks.
3.6 The impact of targeted capital requirements
Capital requirements are a key ingredient of bank regulation: in the Basel Accords,
a lower limit is imposed on the ratio of capital to (risk-weighted) assets. It is
clear that globally increasing the capital cushion of banks will decrease the risk
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of contagion in the network, but given the heterogeneity of systemic importance,
as measured by the Contagion index, it is not clear whether a uniform capital
ratio for all institutions is the most efficient way of reducing systemic risk. Indeed,
recent debate has considered the option of more stringent capital requirements on
systemically important institutions. One idea, which we explore here, is to impose
higher capital requirements on institutions whose position in the network plays a
key role in the network’s resilience to contagion.
Studies in epidemiology or the spread of viruses in peer-to-peer networks (Co-
hen et al., 2003; Madar et al., 2004; Huang et al., 2007) have explored similar
problems in the context of immunization of heterogeneous networks to contagion.
Madar et al. (2004) study various immunization strategies in the context of epi-
demic modeling. They show that in random immunization schemes, where nodes
are randomly chosen and vaccinated, the whole population must get vaccinated to
effectively control epidemic propagation. They propose instead a targeted immu-
nization strategy that consists in vaccinating first the nodes with largest degrees. A
third approach, called acquaintance immunization (Cohen et al., 2003; Madar et al.,
2004), which consists in immunizing randomly selecting individuals as well as their
acquaintances, is shown to perform better than random immunization, especially
in scale-free networks.
Based on these analogies, we consider targeted capital requirement policy which
consists in imposing capital requirements on the the 5% most systemic institutions
in the network and their creditors: this aims at reducing the number of contagious
links (see Definition 6) emanating from the most systemic institutions, since these
links play a major role in contagion of default in the network Amini et al. (2010).
We consider two different policies for setting capital requirements:
• Minimum capital-to-exposure ratio: in this case, we require institutions to
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hold a capital larger than c that could cover at least a portion θ of their
interbank exposures:
c(i) = max(c(i), θA(i)) (3.23)
• Cap on susceptibility: Counterparty susceptibility (Definition 13) and local
network frailty (Definition 14) are a significant source of systemic risk. Thus,
preventing large values of counterparty susceptibility or network frailty from
occuring can decrease systemic risk. This could be achieved by requiring that
no exposure should represent more than a fraction γ of capital. In this case,





We compare the situations in which (i) these policies are applied to all financial
institutions in the network (non-targeted capital requirements), (ii) they are ap-
plied only to the creditors of the 5% most systemic institutions (targeted capital
requirements), by computing, in each case, the average of 5% largest Contagion
Indexes (i.e. the 5% tail conditional expectation of the cross sectional distribution
of Contagion Index) in the network.
The targeted acquaintance immunization is observed to be the most efficient strat-
egy in reducing contagion in the network. Figure 3.9 shows that the targeted
acquaintance immunization can achieve the same reduction in the contagion index
and the size of default cascade while requiring less capital. Specifically, we observe
that imposing a cap on the susceptibility of the creditors of the 5% most systemic
institutions is the most efficient strategy, followed by the strategy consisting in
imposing a floor on the capital ratio of the creditors of the 5% most systemic in-
stitutions. It is interesting also to note that imposing capital requirements on the
institutions with the largest size is not optimal. This leads again to the conclusion
that size is not the sole source of systemic risk, other factors also matter.
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Figure 3.9: Impact of capital requirements: (a) imposing a floor on the capital ratio for all insti-
tutions in the network, (b) imposing a cap on the susceptibility for all institutions in the network,
(c) imposing a floor on the capital ratio of the creditors of the 5% most systemic institutions,
(d) imposing a cap on the susceptibility of the creditors of the 5% most systemic institutions, (e)
imposing a floor on the capital ratio of the 5% institutions with the highest interbank liabilities,
(f) imposing a cap on the susceptibility of the 5% institutions with the highest interbank liabil-
ities, (g) imposing a floor on the capital ratio of the 5% institutions with the highest number of
creditors, (h) imposing a cap on the susceptibility of the 5% institutions with the highest number
of creditors.
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Chapter 4
Systemic Risk in Banking
Systems: the Case of Brazil
This chapter is based on the paper “Network structure and systemic risk in banking
systems” (Cont et al., 2010), which is a joint work with Professor Rama Cont and
Doctor Edson Bastos e Santos.
4.1 Introduction
We apply in this chapter the methodology introduced in chapter 3 to the study of
the Brazilian financial system. Using a complete data set of interbank exposures and
capital levels provided by the Brazilian Central Bank, we analyze the magnitude of
contagion risk in the Brazilian financial system.
Chapter 4. Systemic Risk in Banking Systems: the Case of Brazil 93
4.1.1 Summary of main results
Our study reveals several interesting features on the nature of systemic risk and
default contagion in the Brazilian financial system:
• The systemic importance of institutions is quite heterogeneous: the cross-
sectional distribution of the Contagion Index is found to be heavy-tailed.
This implies that, while most financial institutions present only a negligible
risk of contagion, a few of them may pose a significant risk of contagion.
• Ignoring the compounded effect of correlated market shocks and contagion
via counterparty exposures can lead to a serious underestimation of conta-
gion risk. Specifically, market shocks are found to increase the proportion
of contagious exposures in the network, i.e. exposures that transmit default
in all shock scenarios. We are thus led to question the conclusions of previ-
ous studies which dismissed the importance of contagion by looking at pure
balance sheet contagion in absence of market shocks.
• Fundamental defaults due to market shocks are found to be the major source
of aggregate losses for most periods. Nevertheless, contrarily to observations
made in some previous studies, contagion is observed to be significant during
periods of stress. This is explained by the fact that we measure the effect
of contagion using conditional risk measures, whereas most previous stud-
ies examined cross-sectional averages, which underestimate the magnitude of
contagion in a heterogeneous network.
• Balance sheet size matters when assessing systemic importance: the Conta-
gion Index of a financial institution has a strong positive relationship with
the total size of its interbank liabilities. However, size alone is not a good
indicator for the systemic importance of financial institutions: network struc-
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ture does matter when assessing systemic importance. Network-based local
measures of connectivity and concentration of exposures across counterparties
–counterparty susceptibility and local network frailty– are shown to contribute
significantly to the systemic importance of an institution.
• Targeted capital requirements are found to be more efficient strategies to
limit the extent of contagion in the Brazilian financial system than aggregate
capital requirements.
4.1.2 Relation to the literature
While most of the empirical studies on systemic risk and default contagion in inter-
bank networks have dismissed the importance of contagion (Sheldon and Maurer,
1998; Furfine, 2003; Upper and Worms, 2004; Wells, 2004; Elsinger et al., 2006a,b;
Mistrulli, 2007), our study reveals that the risk of default contagion is significant
in the Brazilian financial system. We show examples in which the expected loss
resulting from the default of an institution can exceed up to forty times the size
of its interbank liabilities and some defaults combined with common shocks can
initiate up to four additional defaults. In contrast with Elsinger et al. (2006a), we
find that scenarios with contagion are more frequent than those without contagion
when grouped by number of fundamental defaults, when the number of fundamental
defaults is at least 3. In fact, we find that market shocks can play an essential role
in propagating default across the network. Specifically, we observe that the pro-
portion of contagious exposures increases considerably when the system is subject
to a market shock scenario, thus creating additional channels of contagion in the
system. The Contagion Index, by compounding the effects of both market events
and counterparty exposure, accounts for this phenomenon.
Our results do not necessarily contradict the findings of the previous empirical
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literature but present them in a different light. Most of the aforementioned studies
use indicators averaged across institutions: we argue that, given the heterogeneity
of the systemic importance across institutions, the sample average gives a poor
representation of the degree of contagion and conditional measures of risk should be
used. Also, most of these studies are based on a generous recovery rate assumptions
whereby all assets of a defaulting bank are recovered at pre-default value, which
is far from reality especially in the short term where recovery rates are close to
zero in practice. With the exception of Elsinger et al. (2006a,b), all these studies
measure the impact of the idiosyncratic default of a single bank, whereas we use
the more realistic setting where balance sheets are subjected to correlated market
shocks in default scenarios. Finally, we use a heavy-tailed model for generating the
correlated shocks to balance sheets: we argue that this heavy-tailed model is more
realistic than Gaussian factor models used in many simulation studies.
Another important aspect is the fact that most of the empirical studies are based on
partial information on the bilateral exposures in the network, and estimate missing
exposures with a maximum entropy method (Sheldon and Maurer, 1998; Upper
and Worms, 2004; Wells, 2004; Elsinger et al., 2006a,b; Degryse and Nguyen, 2007).
However, the maximum entropy method is found to underestimate the possibility
of default contagion (Mistrulli, 2007; van Lelyveld and Liedorp, 2006). Our study,
by making use of empirical data on all bilateral exposures, avoids this caveat.
Our study also complements the existing literature by studying the contribution of
network-based local measures of connectivity and concentration to systemic risk.
We find that the counterparty susceptibility and local network frailty introduced in
chapter 3 can explain significantly default contagion.
We discuss the impact of targeted capital requirements such as the strategies intro-
duced in chapter 3 and show that targeting the creditors of the most contagious
institutions is a more effective strategy in terms of the total capital it requires to
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limit the extent of contagion in the Brazilian financial system.
4.1.3 Outline
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 applies the methodology intro-
duced in chapter 3 to the Brazilian financial system. Section 4.3 investigates the
role of different institutional and network characteristics which contribute to the
systemic importance of Brazilian financial institutions. Section 4.4 analyzes the
impact of capital requirements on these indicators of systemic risk and uses the
insights obtained from the network model to examine the impact of targeted capital
requirements which focus on the most systemic institutions and their counterpar-
ties.
4.2 Is default contagion a significant source of
systemic risk?
Most empirical studies of interbank networks have pointed to the limited extent
of default contagion (Sheldon and Maurer, 1998; Furfine, 2003; Upper and Worms,
2004; Wells, 2004; Elsinger et al., 2006a,b; Mistrulli, 2007). However, almost all
these studies (with the exception Elsinger et al. (2006a,b)) examine the sole knock-
on effects of the sudden failure of a single bank by an idiosyncratic shock, thus
ignoring the compounded effect of both correlated market events and default con-
tagion. A correlated market shock affecting the capital of all institutions in the
network can considerably reduce the capital of the network, which makes it more
vulnerable to potential losses and increases the likelihood of large default cascades.
We explore in this section the extent of default contagion in the Brazilian financial
system (section 4.2.1), and study the role market shocks have in generating channels
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of contagion across the network (section 4.2.2). We also analyze the contribution of
fundamental defaults and defaults by contagion to the systemic risk of the network
as whole (section 4.2.3). We compare the latter to the results obtained in Elsinger
et al. (2006a) for the Austrian banking system.
4.2.1 Evidence for contagion
When studying the contagion risk an institution i may pose to the financial system,
two interesting questions arise:
• How much would the financial system suffer if institution i fails?
• How many institutions in the system would become insolvent if institution i
fails?
The Contagion Index provides an answer to the first question by measuring the
contagion loss induced by the failure of institution i in a stressed market. The
second question relates to the number of institutions that default by contagion in
the cascade triggered by a default of institution i.
Definition 10 (Size of the default cascade). We define the size κ(i, c, E) of the
default cascade initiated by the default of institution i as the expected number of
defaults by contagion generated when the system is subject to correlated market
shocks given that the shock triggers the default of i.




1c(j)+j>0,cn−1(j)=0|c(i) + i < 0
]
(4.1)
We find that the size of default cascades varies across the institutions that trig-
ger the cascade: most institutions do not seem to generate other defaults due to
contagion in the system (see figure 4.1), however some institutions can trigger up
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to 4 defaults which represents about 3% of the financial system. This means that
domino effects should not be measure by averaging across the entire network: one
should condition on the event of default of each individual institution in the system.
This presence of contagion is confirmed by comparing the Contagion Index of each
institution to its interbank liabilities: a Contagion Index which exceeds the insti-
tution’s interbank liabilities is a signature of contagion. As shown in figure 4.2 the
Contagion Index can significantly exceed (up to forty times) the interbank liabilities
for the most systemic nodes. This indicates that default contagion is a significant
component of systemic risk for these systemically important institutions.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of the size of default cascade.
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Figure 4.2: Ratio of the Contagion Index to the interbank liabilities: the Contagion Index can
be up to forty times the size of interbank liabilities.
4.2.2 The role of correlated market shocks
The Default Impact and the Contagion Index exhibit heavy tailed distributions
(see figures 4.4, 4.5) indicating the existence of few institutions that present a high
contagion risk to the Brazilian financial system (up to 10% of the total capital of the
network) while most institutions exhibit a small risk. We note that the probability
of observing a large Default Impact and a large Contagion Index is the highest
during June 2007 (see figure 4.3). This period corresponds to the appearance of
the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States.
The cross-sectional distribution of the ratio of the Contagion Index to the Default
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Impact (see figure 4.6) shows that the Contagion Index may, for some nodes, sig-
nificantly exceed the Default Impact. Correlated shocks to balance sheets seem
to amplify contagion in the Brazilian banking system. This confirms the findings
of the study on a simulated network of chapter 3 on the role of market shocks in
amplifying contagion.
We also find, similarly to the study on a simulated network presented in chapter 3,
that market shocks tend to increase the proportion of contagious exposures, that
are exposures not covered by an adequate amount of capital to sustain their loss
in the event of default, thus they transmit default in all shock scenarios. We recall
below the definition of such exposures.
Definition 11 (Contagious Exposure). An exposure of institution i to j is called
contagious if its size exceeds the capital of i: Eij > c(i).
Figure 4.7 shows the graph of contagious exposures (black) in the Brazilian net-
work in June 2007, with, in red, the exposures that become contagious once a
(particular) set of correlated market shocks is applied to balance sheets. Figure
4.8 presents the proportion of contagious exposures in the Brazilian system, their
expected proportion under stress test scenarios, and their expected proportion in
scenarios where the level of common downward shocks to balance sheets exceeds its
5% quantile. We clearly observe that market shocks may significantly increase the
proportion of contagious exposures that play the role of channels for the transmis-
sion of financial distress across the network. Therefore, ignoring market risk when
assessing contagion effects can lead to a serious underestimation of the extent of
default contagion.
4.2.3 Fundamental losses vs losses by contagion
Elsinger et al. (2006a) distinguish fundamental defaults -due to exogenous market





































Figure 4.3: Brazilian interbank network: distribution of the default impact and the Contagion
Index on the logarithmic scale. The highest probabilities of having a large Default Impact and a
large Contagion Index are observed in June 2007.
shocks- from defaults by contagion and perform a simulation study of the respective
contributions to systemic risk of fundamental defaults and contagion effects. In
their study on the Austrian banking network, fundamental defaults are found to be
more frequent than contagion effects, which leads them to conclude that the main
source of systemic risk is the correlation among risk factors influencing balance
sheets.
We conduct a similar analysis to study the contribution of default contagion to
systemic risk, albeit with a different metric, the Contagion Index. We classify all
simulated default events into those resulting from large market shocks and those
resulting from contagion. We define the expected loss (EL) incurred by the institu-
tions at the end of the default cascade when the system is subject to market shocks
given that the common factor of the market shocks falls below its 5%-quantile level.
We decompose the (expected) losses into losses resulting from fundamental market




E [c(v)− cn−1(v)|S < S0.05] LF =
n∑
v=1
E [c(v)− c0(v)|S < S0.05](4.2)
where c0(v) = (c(v) + v)+ and S0.05 is the 5%-quantile of S. Figure 4.9 shows that
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of the Default Impact. Most institutions have a small Default Impact,
however, some can have an impact up to 10% of the total network capital in June 2007.
the losses due to fundamental defaults are significantly larger (by a factor of 10) than
the loss due to contagion. However, the number of defaults by contagion (Figure
4.9, below) is comparable to the number of fundamental defaults especially in June
2007. Thus, although fundamental defaults seem to be a major source of systemic
risk, one cannot neglect the impact of contagion. As in Elsinger et al. (2006a), we
also compute the probabilities of occurrence of contagion and the expected number
of defaults due to contagion grouped by the number of fundamental defaults. We
find much more scenarios with contagion than in Elsinger et al. (2006a): for more
than two fundamental defaults, the scenarios with contagion are more frequent than
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of the Contagion Index. Most institutions have a small Contagion
Index, however, some can have an impact up to 10% of the total network capital in June 2007.









0 47.67 0.00 0.00
1 25.52 10.11 0.78
2 6.81 6.23 1.49
3 1.18 1.90 2.00
4 0.13 0.28 2.79
5 0.02 0.10 5.44
6 and more 0.00 0.05 10.52
Total 81.34 18.66
Table 4.1: Probabilities of occurrence of contagion and expected number of defaults due to
contagion, grouped by the number of fundamental defaults.
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Figure 4.6: Default impact vs Contagion Index: the Contagion Index can be four times the
Default Impact for some nodes.
4.3 What makes an institution systemically im-
portant?
Previous studies on contagion in financial networks (Allen and Gale, 2000; Battiston
et al., 2009; Elsinger et al., 2006a; Nier et al., 2007) have examined how the network
structure may affect the global level of systemic risk but do not provide metrics or
indicators for localizing the source of systemic risk within the network. The ability
to compute a Contagion Index for measuring the systemic impact of each institution
in the network, enables us to locate the institutions which have the largest systemic
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Figure 4.7: Network of contagious exposures before (dashed lines) and after (dashed and red
lines) market shocks, June 2007.
impact and investigate their characteristics.
We first investigate (section 4.3.1) the effect of the size, measured in terms of inter-
bank liabilities or assets on the Contagion Index. Then we examine (section 4.3.2)
the effect of network structure on the Contagion Index and define, following chap-
ter 3, network-based indicators of connectivity counterparty susceptibility and local
network frailty, which are then shown to be significant factors for contagion.
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Figure 4.8: Proportion of contagious exposures (a) in the initial network, (b) averaged across
market shock scenarios, (c) averaged across scenarios where common factor falls below 5% quantile
level.
Figure 4.9: Fundamental loss vs loss by contagion when the system is subject to correlated
market shocks, given that the common factor in the market shocks falls below its 5%-quantile.
Left: fundamental loss vs loss by contagion in BRL. Right: expected number of fundamental vs
contagious defaults.
4.3.1 The role of balance sheet size
Size is generally considered a factor of systemic importance. In our modeling ap-
proach, where losses flow in through the asset side and flow out through the liability
side of the balance sheet, it is intuitive that, at least at the first iteration of the
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loss cascade, firms with large liabilities to other nodes will be a large source of
losses for their creditors in case of default. Accordingly, interbank liabilities are
highly correlated with any measure of systemic importance. A simple plot on the
logarithmic scale of the Contagion Index against the interbank liability size reveals
a strong positive relationship between the interbank liabilities of an institution in
the Brazilian financial system and its Contagion Index (see figure 4.10). A linear
regression of the logarithm of the Contagion Index on the logarithm of the inter-
bank liability size supports this observation: interbank liabilities explains 96% of
the cross-sectional variability of the Contagion Index.
Therefore, balance sheet size does matter, not surprisingly. However, the size of
interbank liabilities does not entirely explain the variations in the Contagion In-
dex across institutions: the interbank liability size does exhibit a strong positive
relationship with the Contagion Index, but the ranking of institutions according to
liability size does not correspond to their ranking in terms of systemic impact (see
figure 4.10).
Model: log(CI) = β0 + β1log(L) + 
Coefficients Standard error t-statistic R2
b0 = -0.58 0.36 -1.41 96%
b1 = 1.04** 0.02 51.75
* significant at 5% confidence level
** significant at 1% confidence level
Table 4.2: Log-log cross-sectional regression of the Contagion Index (expressed in percentage of
the total network capital) on the interbank liability in June 2007.
Table 4.3, where nodes are labeled according to their decreasing ranking in terms of
the Contagion Index, shows that Node 5 has interbank liabilities less than the 90%
quantile of the cross sectional interbank liability sizes. This suggests that factors
other than size contribute to their systemic importance.
Plotting the Contagion Index against the interbank asset size (figure 4.11) shows













































Figure 4.10: Scatterplot on the logarithmic scale of the Contagion Index versus the interbank







1 20.77 8 23.27
2 4.95 32 1.57
3 4.58 13 2.96
4 3.85 14 1.95
5 3.40 21 0.97
Network median 0.10 5 0.07
90%-quantile 2.45 21 1.11
Table 4.3: Analysis of the five most contagious nodes in June 2007.
that the contribution of the size of interbank assets to the Contagion Index is
less significant. Note that interbank liabilities are not balanced with respect to
interbank assets, due to deposits and other types of liabilities which are excluded
from interbank liabilities.













































Figure 4.11: Scatterplot on the logarithmic scale of the Contagion Index versus the interbank
assets size in June 2007.
Model: log(CI) = β0 + β1 log(A) + 
Coefficients Standard error t-statistic Adjusted R2
b0 = 8.00 ** 1.99 4.02 22%
b1 = 0.58 ** 0.11 5.20
* significant at 5% confidence level
** significant at 1% confidence level
Table 4.4: Log-log cross-sectional regression of the Contagion Index on the size of interbank
assets in June 2007: R2 = 22%.
4.3.2 The role of network structure
Table 4.3 shows that, while the sheer size of liabilities of the node with the highest
Contagion Index can explain its ranking, the four other most systemic nodes have
liability sizes roughly in line with the network average, so size effects alone do not
explain the magnitude of their systemic impact. This points to the possible contri-
bution of interconnectedness, or network structure, in explaining the magnitude of
their Contagion Index. As shown in figure 4.12 the five most systemic nodes are not
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very connected and just have few contagious exposures (in red) but, as shown in
figure 4.13, their creditors are heavily connected and many of their cross-exposures
are contagious exposures.
Figure 4.12: Subgraph of the five institutions with highest Contagion Index and their creditors
in the network in June 2007. Non contagious exposures are dashed lines. Contagious exposures
are full red lines.
This motivates to define indicators which go beyond simple measures of connectivity
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Figure 4.13: Subgraph of the five institutions with highest Contagion Index and their first and
second-order neighbors in the network in June 2007. Non contagious exposures are dashed lines.
Contagious exposures are full red lines.
such as the degree or the balance sheet size. Following chapter 3, we define the
following indicators which attempt to quantify the sensitivity of the counterparties
of these nodes to their default:
Definition 12 (Susceptibility coefficient). The susceptibility coefficient of a node
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Definition 13 (Counterparty susceptibility). The counterparty susceptibility CS(i)





Definition 14 (Local network frailty). The local network frailty f(i) at node i is
defined as the maximum, taken over counterparties exposed to i, of their exposure






We refer the reader to chapter 3 for a detailed description of these indicators.
The analysis of the creditors of the five most systemic institutions in the Brazilian
network in June 2007 (see table 4.5) indicates that the number of creditors and
the size of interbank liabilities of the counterparties, as well as the counterparty
susceptibility and local network frailty, can explain a high Contagion Index of a
financial institution when the size of its interbank liabilities fails to explain. We
observe that the five most systemic nodes have each at least one very connected
counterparty with a large interbank liability size. They exhibit in general a high
counterparty susceptibility and local network frailty.
Similarly to the study on a simulated network of chapter 3, we investigate in the
Brazilian network in June 2007 whether we could rank systemically important in-
stitutions based on the measures of connectivity and centrality defined above. We
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Ranking maxj,Eji>0 kout(j) maxj,Eji>0 L(j) CS(i) f(i)
1 36 1.10 0.85 0.95
2 36 2.91 3.83 3.25
3 34 11.23 23.42 263.15
4 34 11.23 5.60 62.97
5 34 23.27 1.65 3.15
Network median 34 2.01 1.25 2.05
90%-quantile 36 11.23 3.04 6.89
Table 4.5: Analysis of the counterparties of the five most contagious nodes in June 2007. The
counterparty interbank liability and local network frailty are expressed in billion BRL.
classify institutions into those with a high Contagion Index (higher than 1% of the
total network capital) and those with a small Contagion Index (smaller than 1% of
the total network capital), according to their interbank liability, counterparty sus-
ceptibility and local network frailty. This can be achieved by conducting a logistic
regression of the indicator of the Contagion Index being higher than 1% of the to-
tal network capital once on the interbank liability and counterparty susceptibility,
and once on the interbank liability and local network frailty. Figure 4.14 displays
the decision boundaries at the probabilities 10% and 50% when observing once the
interbank liability size and the counterparty susceptibility and once the interbank
liability size and the local network frailty: a node outside the 10% decision bound-
ary has an estimated probability of 10% to have a Contagion Index higher than 1%
of the network capital; a node outside the 50% decision boundary has an estimated
probability of 50% to have a Contagion Index higher than 1% of the network cap-
ital. We note that institutions with a high Contagion Index tend to have a large
interbank liability, local network frailty and counterparty susceptibility.
The outputs of the logistic regression are summarized in table 4.6. We observe that
the counterparty susceptibility and the local network frailty contribute significantly
to the variability of the probability of observing a large Contagion Index: positive
coefficients at the 1% significance level and a very high pseudo-R2 1.
1The Adjusted Pseudo-R2 in a logistic regression is defined as 1 − logL(M)/logL(0)((n −















































































































Figure 4.14: Counterparty susceptibility (left figure) and local network frailty (right figure) of
the most systemic nodes (with a Contagion Index higher than 1% of the network capital) and
the less systemic nodes (with a Contagion Index smaller than 1% of the network capital). Nodes
above the 10% decision boundary have with 10% probability a Contagion Index higher than 1%
of the network capital. The ones above the 50% decision boundary have with 50% probability a
Contagion Index higher than 1% of the capital in the Brazilian system.
We also test for the differences in median between the counterparty susceptibility
of the institutions with a Contagion Index higher than 1% of the total network
capital and the counterparty susceptibility of those with a Contagion Index smaller
than 1% of the total network capital. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test rejects the
hypothesis of equal medians at the 1% level of significance. The median of the
counterparty susceptibility of the institutions with a high Contagion Index (2.29)
is significantly higher than the median of the counterparty susceptibility of the
institutions with a small Contagion Index (0.06). Similarly, the median of the local
network frailty of the institutions with a high Contagion Index (18.79 billion BRL)
is significantly higher than the median of the local network frailty of the institutions
with a small Contagion Index (0.02 billion BRL).
1)/(n− k− 1)) where logL(M) and logL(0) are the maximized log likelihood for the fitted model
and the null model, n is the sample size and k is the number of regressors.
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β̂0 = -20.85** 7.96 93.46%
β̂1 = 0.96* 0.39
β̂2 = 0.98* 0.40





β̂0 = -29.24** 7.11 94.54%
β̂1 = 1.39** 0.34





β̂0 = -1.46** 0.37 43.36%
β̂1 = 1.31** 0.33





β̂0 = -43.20** 11.06 97.76%
β̂1 = 1.05** 0.39
β̂2 = 0.97** 0.29





β̂0 = -21.32** 4.75 93.79%
β̂1 = 0.95** 0.22
* significant at 5% confidence level
** significant at 1% confidence level
Table 4.6: Marginal contribution of the interbank liabilities, counterparty susceptibility and
local network frailty to the Contagion Index.
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4.4 Does one size fit all? The case for targeted
capital requirements
Controlling the risk of failures of financial institutions has been a major concern
for financial regulation. Specifically, imposing a lower limit on the capital ratio has
been the classical way to immunize institutions against contagion. Nonetheless, the
observations made in the previous section highlight the fact that size alone does
not explain contagion and point to the significant contribution of the counterparty
susceptibility and local network frailty. Thus, imposing an upper bound on these
variables could also help reducing systemic risk. We compare in this section the
effects of two different policies for setting capital requirements:
• Minimum capital-to-exposure ratio: in this case, we require institutions to
hold a capital larger than c that could cover at least a portion θ of their
interbank exposures:
c(i) = max(c(i), θA(i)) (4.3)
• Cap on susceptibility: Counterparty susceptibility (Definition 13) and local
network frailty (Definition 14) are a significant source of systemic risk. Thus,
preventing large values of counterparty susceptibility or network frailty from
occuring can decrease systemic risk. This could be achieved by requiring that
no exposure should represent more than a fraction γ of capital. In this case,





The study on a simulated network of chapter 3 have showed that targeted capital
requirements, that consist in imposing higher capital requirements on institutions
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whose position in the network plays a key role in the network’s resilience to conta-
gion, can be a more efficient strategy to control the extent of contagion and systemic
risk in a financial system. We check whether these findings hold in the Brazilian
financial system.
We adopt the same approach as in chapter 3. We consider targeted capital require-
ment policy which consists in imposing capital requirements on the the 5% most
systemic institutions in the network and their creditors.
We compare the situations in which capital requirements (i) are applied to all finan-
cial institutions in the network (non-targeted immunization), (ii) they are applied
only to the creditors of the 5% most systemic institutions (targeted acquaintance
immunization), (iii) they are applied only to the 5% most connected (out-degree)
institutions (targeted immunization), (iv) they are applied only to the 5% institu-
tions with the largest size (targeted immunization); by computing, in each case, the
average of 5% largest Contagion Indexes i.e. the 5% tail conditional expectation of
the cross sectional distribution of Contagion Index in the network.
Targeted capital requirements are observed to be more efficient in the sense that one
can achieve the same reduction in systemic risk -in terms of the cross-sectional tail of
the Contagion Index- with the same amount of capital, differently distributed across
the network. Figure 4.15 shows that targeted capital requirements can achieve the
same reduction in the size of default cascades while requiring less capital.
While it is clear that raising capital requirements reduces the number of defaults by
contagion, the impact on the Contagion Index is the result of two competing effects.
One has to bear in mind that increasing capital requirements will mainly increase
the capital of the most fragile institutions, since those already well-capitalized sat-
isfy the requirements without any additional capital. Thus, the proportion of total
capital invested in fragile institutions increases, and consequently the Contagion
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Index expressed in percentage of the total capital in the system may increase. In
fact, we observe that the Contagion Index is decreasing when imposing these re-
strictions on the creditors of the 5% most systemic institutions (see figure 4.15),
and globally decreasing when imposing these restrictions on all the institutions in
the system. We also find that targeting the creditors of the most systemic nodes is
a more efficient procedure to reduce the Contagion Index: for a same level of total
capital the Contagion Index is smaller.
Chapter 4. Systemic Risk in Banking Systems: the Case of Brazil 119
Figure 4.15: Comparison of various capital requirement policies: (a) imposing a floor on the
capital ratio for all institutions in the network, (b) imposing a cap on the susceptibility for all
institutions in the network, (c) imposing a floor on the capital ratio only for the creditors of the
5% most systemic institutions, (d) imposing a cap on the susceptibility only for the creditors of
the 5% most systemic institutions.




This chapter is based on the paper “Reconstruction of interbank networks” (Cont
and Moussa, 2010b), which is a joint work with Professor Rama Cont.
5.1 Introduction
In the two previous chapters, we have proposed a method for estimating conta-
gion and systemic risk based on the knowledge of the entire matrix of bilateral
exposures. However, in practice, bilateral exposures are most often not disclosed.
Reconstructing bilateral exposures given only aggregate balance sheet data, such
as the total assets and total liabilities of each institution, then becomes a question
of interest.
A practical framework to address this problem is to model the financial network
as a directed weighted graph with n nodes representing the financial institutions
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in the network, and weighted links representing their bilateral exposures which are
summarized in a matrix x. xij is an exposure of node i to node j, or in other
words a liability of node j to node i. ai =
∑n
j=1 xij represents the total assets
of institution i, and lj =
∑n
i=1 xij represents the total liabilities of institution j.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the exposures are normalized so that∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 xij = 1. This implies that the assets and liabilities are also normalized,
that is
∑n
i=1 ai = 1 and
∑n
j=1 lj = 1.
The (normalized) assets and liabilities (ai, li)i=1,...,n are observed in the accounting
data of publicly traded firms. Given these observations, we are interested in re-
constructing the bilateral exposures matrix x of the network. The reconstructed
network should replicate the observed assets and liabilities. The reconstruction
problem is then stated as follows.
Problem 1 (Reconstruction problem). Given a nonnegative vector a = (ai)i=1,...,n
of the observed (normalized) assets and a nonnegative vector l = (lj)j=1,...,n of
the observed (normalized) liabilities of the institutions in the network, determine
a nonnegative n× n matrix x such that for all (i, j) ∈ {1, ..., n}2,






xij = lj (Balance sheet constraints)
The reconstruction problem (Problem 1) involves n2−n variables and 2n−1 equa-





j=1 lj = 1). Thus, for n ≥ 3, the reconstruction problem is
ill-posed. Therefore, if a solution to the reconstruction problem exists, it will not
be unique. A possible way to ensure a unique solution is to chose a convex selec-
tion criterion and reformulate the reconstruction problem as a constrained convex
optimization problem. A common choice for the selection criterion is the relative
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entropy, also called Kullback-Leibler divergence, that measures the distance of the









Similar problems have been studied in other fields of application under the name
of Matrix Balancing problems (Schneider and Zenios, 1990). Given a matrix x0,
the problem is to find a matrix x that is as close as possible to x0 and is balanced
meaning that the row and column sums equal prespecified values (balancing con-
straints). The RAS algorithm (Schneider and Zenios, 1990) has been proposed to
solve iteratively such problems. It has been shown that, if the balancing constraints
are feasible, the RAS algorithm converges to the solution of the minimization of the
relative entropy with respect to x0 subject to the balancing constraints (Schneider
and Zenios, 1990; McDougall, 1999).
Empirical studies on systemic risk in financial networks (Sheldon and Maurer, 1998;
Upper and Worms, 2004; Wells, 2004; Elsinger et al., 2006a,b; Mistrulli, 2007; Toiva-
nen, 2009) have proposed reconstruction methods by minimizing the relative en-
tropy with respect to the non-informative (uniform) prior (ailj)i,j=1,...,n, subject to
the constraints on the row and column sums. Most of them have used the RAS
algorithm to solve this optimization. The choice of the non-informative prior is to
reflect the lack of a priori information on the structure of the network. This leads
to a reconstructed network where institutions are exposed as evenly as possible to
each other. The reconstructed network is thus a complete graph that fails to ex-
hibit the scale-free degree distributions observed in real-world interbank networks.
Moreover, it has been noted that reconstructing bilateral exposures using the rel-
ative entropy with respect to the non-informative prior tends to introduce a bias
when measuring systemic risk (Mistrulli, 2007). Upper (2011) suggests combining
balance sheet data with other sources of data such as some information on the
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structure of the network (positions of the zeros, tiering, etc.) if available to reduce
the bias.
A possible way to obtain a scale-free degree distribution for the reconstructed net-
work is to minimize the relative entropy with respect to a sparse prior matrix that
reflects our belief on the scale-free structure of the network. However, an arbitrary
choice of such a prior matrix would lead to an arbitrary network where the existence
or not of an exposure between two institutions is subjectively imposed by the prior.
Thus, instead of considering a specific matrix x0 as prior, we assume in this chapter
that the a priori knowledge about the network structure is given in the form of a
distribution, such as the power law distributions of the in-degree and out-degree
or the Pareto distribution of the exposures observed in the empirical studies of
interbank networks (see Boss et al. (2004) for the Austrian network and chapter 2
for the Brazilian network). To incorporate the knowledge of these distributions,




0 (set of beliefs), drawn from
the prior distribution on the network. Then, instead of finding a point estima-







of bilateral exposures matrices.
In section 5.2, we present a first approach to tackle this problem. We consider a
prior distribution on the adjacency matrix y = 1x>0 of the network, from which we
simulate a set of independent samples y(1), ...,y(M) of adjacency matrices. Then,
for each sample y(k) we find the matrix x(k) that solves the reconstruction problem
stated in Problem 1. This leads to sample bilateral exposures matrices x(1), ...,x(M)
each of them recovering the observed assets and liabilities. However, the existence
of a solution to the reconstruction problem is not guaranteed in this case due to
the sparse nature of the prior matrices. We propose then, in section 5.3, a second
approach that is always feasible, in which we simulate a set of independent samples
x(1), ...,x(M) of bilateral exposures matrices from a prior distribution on the bilateral
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exposures, and we weight them with probabilities (weights) p1, ..., pM in such a way
that the balance sheet constraints are satisfied in the mean, when averaging across
all the sample bilateral exposures matrices. This is analogous to the Weighted
Monte Carlo method introduced in Avellaneda et al. (2001) which is used to build
and calibrate asset-pricing models for financial derivatives.
In section 5.4, we explain how to use this method to estimate a measure of sys-
temic importance, such as the Contagion Index, when only aggregate levels of assets,
liabilities and capital levels are known. In particular, we define the posterior distri-
bution of the Contagion Index and its posterior mean. The posterior distribution
of the Contagion Index allows to examine the impact of the network structure on
the extent of contagion in the system.
Finally, in section 5.5, we assess the performance of this methodology in detecting
systemically important institutions, vis a` vis a ranking which segregates institutions
solely in terms of their balance sheet size.
5.2 First approach: matching the balance sheet
constraints sample by sample
5.2.1 Description of the method
In the first approach, we consider a prior distribution for the adjacency matrix y of
the network. This prior distribution is chosen to reproduce the in- and out- degree
distributions of real-world interbank networks. A possible choice is the preferential
attachment model presented in section 2.4. We simulate M independent samples
y(1), ...,y(M) of y from the assumed prior distribution.
We propose to build M independent samples x(1), ...,x(M) of bilateral exposures
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matrices that verify the constraints
x
(k)
ij = 0 if y
(k)
ij = 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ {1, ..., n}2 (5.2)
which guarantees that the matrix x(k) has the same (scale-free) in-degree and out-
degree distribution as the matrix y(k), and solve the reconstruction problem stated
in Problem 1. The latter guarantees that the matrix x(k) recovers the observed
balance sheet assets and liabilities.
For each k ∈ {1, ...,M}, the problem of estimating the bilateral exposures matrix
x(k) of the network with adjacency matrix y(k) involves n2 − nk variables, where
nk = card({(i, j) ∈ {1, ..., n}2; y(k)ij > 0}), and 2n−1 equations. If nk < n2−2n+1,
the problem is ill-posed.
To ensure uniqueness of a solution, when at least one exists, we use the relative
entropy as a selection criterion (Csiszar, 1975; Egger and Engl, 2005). We reformu-
late the problem as a constrained convex optimization problem which is, for each
k ∈ {1, ...,M}, find the matrix x(k) that minimizes the relative entropy with re-







subject to the constraints 5.2
and the balance sheet constraints (Problem 1). The non-informative prior matrix
reflects the lack of a priori knowledge on the distribution of bilateral exposures.

















xij = ai, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} (5.4)










= 0, ∀(1, j) ∈ {1, ..., n}2 (5.6)
whereM+ =
{




j=1 xij = 1
}
.
5.2.2 Solution to the optimization problem 2
To solve the constrained convex optimization problem 2, we introduce the La-
grangian:


















for x ∈M+, and Lagrange multipliers λ ∈ Rn−1 and µ ∈ Rn−1.
Problem 2 is then equivalent to the primal problem





Lk(x, λ, µ) (5.7)
We give a solution to the primal problem by using convex duality. The associated
dual problem is





Lk(x, λ, µ) (5.8)
Proposition 3 (Condition for equivalence of primal and dual problems). If the









xij = lj, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}
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admits a positive solution, then the dual problem 4 admits a unique solution, which
is also the unique solution of the primal problem 3.
Proof. Since Lk(x, λ, µ) is strictly convex, and the constraints 5.24 and 5.25 are
linear functions of λ, µ, Slater’s condition applies (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004).
That is, the primal and dual problems admit a same unique solution if there exists
a λ, µ that satisfy the constraints 5.24 and 5.25.
Proposition 4 (Solution to the dual problem 4). For fixed Lagrange multipliers

















ailj exp(λi + µj) (5.10)
infx Lk(x, λ, µ) is a convex function of λ and µ so its supremum can be found by
gradient descent.




















ailj exp(λi + µj) (5.12)
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aslj exp(λs + µj)



















− λi − µj
]
(5.13)
Since Lk(x, λ, µ) is strictly convex, infx Lk(x, λ, µ) is attained if and only if
∂
∂
Lk(x + g, λ, µ)|=0 = 0. (5.14)










is orthogonal to the
hyperplane
Gk =






in the space Rcard(ij;y
(k)
ij >0).




− λi − µj = 1
Zk(λ, µ)
, i.e. xij =














ailj exp(λi + µj) (5.17)
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It is easy to verify that
inf
x∈M+







5.2.3 Pros and cons
This method builds on the ideas proposed in the previous studies on reconstructing
interbank networks (Sheldon and Maurer, 1998; Upper and Worms, 2004; Wells,
2004; Elsinger et al., 2006a,b; Mistrulli, 2007; Toivanen, 2009) but improves them
in various aspects:
• These studies failed to reproduce the degree heterogeneity of interbank net-
works by estimating a bilateral exposures matrix that verifies the balance
sheet constraints stated in Problem 1 and is as close as possible to a complete
graph (ailj)i,j=1,..,n that reflects the lack of a priori knowledge of the network
structure. Our study, on the contrary, assumes a scale-free priori distribu-
tion on the network structure inspired from the empirical studies interbank
network. Then, instead of computing a point estimator of the bilateral ex-
posures matrix, we derive sample bilateral exposures matrices x(1), ...,x(M)
each satisfying the balance sheet constraints and representing a network with
scale-free in-degree and out-degree distributions.
• From the perspective of assessing systemic risk, which is the initial motiva-
tion of this study, this approach allows to compute any indicator of systemic
importance –for example the Contagion Index introduced in chapter 3– in
each of the estimated samples of the network. Thus, we can (1)-compute
the sample mean as a point estimator of the Contagion Index and (2)-study
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the distribution of the Contagion Index across the different sample bilateral
exposures matrices. Since all the samples recover the observed assets and
liabilities, this allows to isolate the impact of the balance sheet size and the
impact of the network structure on the extent of contagion.
However, this method suffers from some drawbacks:
• The existence of a solution to the reconstruction problem is not always guar-
anteed due to the sparse nature of the prior matrices. As an example, consider
two institutions A and B with A having larger total liabilities lA then the to-
tal assets aB of institution B, that is lA > aB. If a sample adjacency matrix
y(k) attributes an out-degree of 1 to node A with a liability towards node
B, then there is no way that node A recovers the observed liability lA. This
comes from the fact that since a liability of A towards B is an asset node B
holds in A, aB should be at least equal to lA. We could handle this by keeping
simulating samples y(k) for which the constraints are feasible until having M
of them (Accept-Reject method).
• This method involves M optimizations of dimension 2n− 2 each which might
be prone to numerical issues.








for k = 1, ...,M , this method fails to reproduce the
Pareto distribution of exposures observed in real-world interbank networks.
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5.3 Second approach: matching the balance sheet
constraints in the mean
5.3.1 Description of the method
The method we proposed in the previous section is not always feasible since in many
cases, particulary those involving sparse sample adjacency matrices y(1), ...,y(M),
there is no solution for the reconstruction problem. Thus, we propose in this section
a method that is always feasible. The idea of this method is similar to the Weighted
Monte Carlo method introduced by Avellaneda et al. (2001). It involves two steps:
1. First, we simulate M independent samples x(1),x(2), ...,x(M) of bilateral expo-
sures matrices, drawn from a relevant prior distribution on the network, such
as a scale-free random network with power law distributions for the in-degree
and out-degree and Pareto distribution for the exposures sizes. A possible
way to generate these samples is for example by the preferential attachment
model described in section 2.4.
2. Since these sample matrices do not achieve the balance sheet constraints, we
weight them with probabilities (weights) p1, ..., pM in such a way that the
balance sheet constraints are achieved in the mean defined as follows.






























ij = lj (5.20)
The problem of finding the weights (p1, ..., pM) ∈ R+M that verify the balance
sheet constraints in the mean involves M variables and 2n − 2 equations. Thus,
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for M > 2n − 2, the problem is ill-posed. To ensure uniqueness of a solution
we introduce a selection criterion that consists in minimizing the relative entropy




subject to the balancing
constraints in the mean. The choice of the uniform prior distribution is to reflect
the lack of a priori knowledge on the network structure.
The reconstruction problem in this approach is then formulated as the following
constrained convex optimization problem,







subject to the constraints 5.19 and 5.20.













ij − lj for j = 1..n− 1 (5.23)
The balance sheet constraints are then given by
Ci(k) = 0 for i = 1..n− 1 (5.24)
Dj(k) = 0 for j = 1..n− 1 (5.25)




pkCi(k) = 0 for i = 1..n− 1 (5.26)




pkDj(k) = 0 for j = 1..n− 1 (5.27)
Proposition 5 (Posterior mean of the bilateral exposures matrix). The posterior
mean x̂ of the bilateral exposures matrix x,





satisfies the balance sheet constraints of the reconstruction problem.
The matrix x̂ would be a natural candidate for a point estimator of the bilateral
exposures matrix. However, it might fail to represent a network with power law in-
degree and out-degree distributions, but would represent a complete graph. Thus,
x̂ suffers from the same drawback as the previous studies (Sheldon and Maurer,
1998; Upper and Worms, 2004; Wells, 2004; Elsinger et al., 2006a,b; Mistrulli, 2007;
Toivanen, 2009). Our contribution is, on the contrary, to provide a distribution of
bilateral exposures matrices as opposed to a point estimator.
5.3.2 Solution to the optimization problem 5
To solve the constrained convex optimization problem 5 we introduce the La-
grangian







for p ∈ RM+ , and Lagrange multipliers λ ∈ Rn−1 and µ ∈ Rn−1.
We give a solution to the primal problem by using convex duality. The associated
dual problem is
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Problem 6 (Dual problem).
sup(λ,µ)∈Rn−1×Rn−1 inf
p∈RM+
L(p, λ, µ) (5.29)
Proposition 6 (Condition for existence of a solution and equivalence of primal
and dual problems). If the (2n − 2) × 1 null vector is in the convex envelop of
(C1(k), ..., Cn−1(k), D1(k), ..., Dn−1(k))k=1,...,M then the dual problem 6 admits a
unique solution, which is also the unique solution of the primal problem 5.
Proof. Since H(p) is a strictly convex function, and the constraints 5.19 and 5.20
are linear functions of p, Slater’s condition applies (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004).
That is, the primal and dual problems admit a same unique solution if there exists
a vector p that satisfies the constraints 5.19 and 5.20, i.e. the (2n − 2) × 1 null
vector is in the convex envelop of the samples of the constraints.
Proposition 7 (Solution to the dual problem 6). For fixed Lagrange multipliers


















infp∈RM+ L(p, λ, µ) is a convex function of λ and µ so its supremum can be found
using classical convex optimization methods.
The Jacobian of logZ(λ, µ) is given by
∂
∂λi
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And its Hessian matrix
∂2
∂λi∂λj


































Proof. We introduce a perturbation q that verifies
∑M
k=1 qk = 0.
∂
∂







































L(p˜, λ, µ) = − logZ(λ, µ) (5.37)
5.3.3 Pros and cons
This method is always feasible as long as the number M of simulated sample bi-
lateral exposures matrices is chosen sufficiently large so that the (2n− 2)× 1 null
vector is in the convex envelop of (C1(k), ..., Cn−1(k), D1(k), ..., Dn−1(k))k=1,...,M .
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This method guarantees that the constraints are satisfied in the mean, that is
by averaging across all samples of the bilateral exposures matrix. Moreover, the
networks associated to the sample bilateral exposures matrices exhibit heavy-tailed
degree and exposures distributions as observed in real-world interbank networks.
On the computational side, this method requires only one optimization of dimension
2n− 2 to estimate the a posteriori weights.
Therefore, we recommend this approach as an estimation method of the posterior
distribution of the bilateral exposures matrix.
5.4 Application: computing the Contagion Index
Several measures of systemic importance requiring the knowledge of the entire net-
work structure have been proposed in the literature on default contagion and sys-
temic risk in financial networks. We explain in this section how the estimation
methodology we presented above could be used to compute these indicators when
only the total assets, total liabilities and capital level of each institution in the
network are known. As an example, we consider the Contagion Index introduced
in chapter 3.








of the bilateral ex-
posures matrix according to the estimation procedure described in section 5.3.
The posterior distribution of the Contagion Index of an institution i in the network
is defined as follows.
Definition 16 (Posterior distribution of the Contagion Index). The posterior dis-
tribution of the Contagion Index of an institution i in the network with known assets
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where (x(1), p1), ..., (x
(1), pM) is the posterior distribution of the bilateral exposures
matrix determined according to the estimation method proposed in section 5.3, and
CI(i, c,x(k)) is the Contagion Index of institution i in the network with bilateral
exposures matrix x(k) and capital levels c.
A natural estimator ĈI of the Contagion Index is its posterior mean, defined as
Definition 17 (Posterior mean of the Contagion Index). The posterior mean of the
Contagion Index of an institution i in the network with known assets a, liabilities
l, and capital levels c is













is the posterior distribution of the
Contagion Index of institution i.
The posterior distribution helps studying the effect of the network structure on
the extent of contagion in the system, as well as identifying “worse-case” scenarios
of network structures that lead to an increase of the risk of contagion. This is an
important exercise for regulators to control the architecture of the financial network
in such a way to limit contagion and systemic risk.
5.5 Detecting systemically important institutions
To illustrate this method, we consider a directed-scale free network of 20 nodes
and average degree of 6, simulated according to the preferential attachment model
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presented in section 2.4, with power law (Zipf’s law) distributions of the in-degree,
out degree and Pareto distribution of exposures with respective tail exponents 2.1,
3, and 1.9. The graph illustrating this network is presented in figure 5.1. Then,
we suppose that only the total assets, total liabilities and capital level of each
institution in the network are known and we derive the posterior distribution of
the bilateral exposures matrix given only these observations. We simulate M =
5000 independent sample bilateral matrices , and find their posterior distribution
(x(1), p1), ..., (x
(1), pM) in such a way to recover the total assets and liabilities in the
mean. A zoom on the 200 largest posterior probabilities is presented in figure 5.2.
To check the success of the method in recovering the assets and liabilities in the
mean, we compare the posterior mean of the total assets of each institution in the
reconstructed network, to its total assets in the real network. We find a very good
fit of the balance sheet assets and liabilities in the mean as shown in figure 5.3.
In the following sections we derive the posterior distribution of the Contagion In-
dex. We examine the examples of a network in which there is no room for much
contagion, and the example of a network where contagion can have a significant
extent. This will allow us to study the effect of both the balance sheet size and the
network structure on the Contagion Index.
Example 1
We first consider a network in which institutions have a capital ratio of 11%. We
derive the posterior distribution of the Contagion Index and its posterior mean. We
find that the Contagion Index can significantly exceed the liabilities (see figure 5.4)
indicating the existence of contagion in the network.
We also find that the posterior mean of the Contagion Index does not estimate very
well the Contagion Index of the real network (see table 5.1). However, it has the
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Figure 5.1: Scale-free graph of 20 nodes and average degree of 6.
same ranking as the Contagion Index of the real network. Therefore, the posterior
mean could be used to detect systemically important institutions in the network by
looking at their ranking in terms of the posterior mean of the Contagion Index. It is
interesting to note that the posterior mean tends to underestimate the Contagion
Index for the most systemic institutions, however, it is a good estimator of the
Contagion Index of the least systemic ones. This is due to the fact that the least
systemic institutions do not trigger in general additional rounds of default when
they fail. Thus, the loss they transmit to the network is limited to their balance
sheet liabilities. Since the reconstruction method recovers the interbank liabilities in
the mean, the posterior mean of the Contagion Index is a good estimator of its true
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Figure 5.2: Bar plot of the 200 largest a posteriori probabilities, the realizations being labeled
by their decreasing rank in the a posteriori probability.






































































Figure 5.3: Goodness of fit: assets and liabilities in the real network versus assets and liabilities
in the reconstructed network.
value. However, the most systemic institutions trigger additional rounds of defaults,
thus the loss they transmit to the network exceeds their balance sheet liabilities
and propagates across the network in a domino fashion. Thus, it depends on the
interconnectedness or specific structure of the network. Then the posterior mean
may not be a good estimator of the Contagion Index in this case. This highlights
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the significant effect of the network structure on the extent of contagion. In fact,
we can observe this effect by examining the posterior distribution of the Contagion
Index. Figure 5.5 presents the posterior distribution of the Contagion Index for the
two most and two least systemic institutions. We find that the Contagion Index of
the two most systemic institutions exhibits a larger variance than the Contagion
Index of the two least systemic ones, which confirms the previous observations.
Finally, it is interesting to note that for the systemically important institutions the
posterior mean of Contagion Index follows the same ranking as the Contagion Index
of the real network, but does not follow the same ranking as the liabilities, which
indicates that estimating the Contagion Index according to the methodology we
presented in the previous sections provides additional information than the balance
sheet size to detect systemically important institutions.






















Figure 5.4: Evidence for contagion: interbank liabilities versus Contagion Index.
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Node 1 2 3 4 5 6
Liability (%) 11.28 10.25 9.41 11.78 9.10 8.37
CI from true data (%) 27.64 26.78 26.64 26.01 9.58 8.60
Posterior mean ĈI (%) 14.03 13.98 12.70 12.79 12.63 11.42
Standard error (%) 3.94 3.91 3.52 4.43 3.52 4.38
Node 15 16 17 18 19 20
Liability (%) 2.20 1.80 1.49 1.14 0.87 0.68
CI from true data (%) 2.00 1.71 1.34 1.08 0.78 0.72
Posterior mean ĈI (%) 2.80 2.30 2.19 1.27 0.98 0.65
Standard error (%) 2.25 1.34 1.34 0.77 0.84 0.16
Table 5.1: Posterior mean of the Contagion Index of the six most and six least systemic nodes.
The nodes are labeled by decreasing ranking in terms of their Contagion Index in the real network.










































































Figure 5.5: Posterior distribution of the Contagion Index of the two most and two least systemic
nodes (in terms of their ranking in the real network).
Example 2
We consider now the case of a network in which institutions have a capital ratio of
30%. We do a similar analysis as in the previous example. We find in this case that
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the posterior mean is a very good estimator of the Contagion Index. This could
be due to the fact that there is few contagion in the network (see figure 5.6), the
Contagion Index is almost equal to the liabilities meaning that there is no additional
rounds of defaults in the network. Since the liabilities are recovered in the mean,
it is not so surprising that the posterior mean is a good estimator of the Contagion
Index in this case.


































Figure 5.6: Evidence for lack of contagion: interbank liabilities versus Contagion Index.
Node 1 2 3 4 5 6
Liability (%) 11.78 11.28 10.25 9.41 9.10 8.37
CI from true data (%) 12.05 10.37 9.40 8.63 8.30 7.58
Posterior mean ĈI (%) 12.18 11.46 10.89 9.93 9.07 8.08
Standard error (%) 3.33 2.12 2.63 2.39 2.12 1.75
Node 15 16 17 18 19 20
Liability (%) 1.80 1.49 1.14 0.87 0.68 0.63
CI from true data (%) 1.69 1.36 1.10 0.78 0.67 0.57
Posterior mean ĈI (%) 1.93 1.75 1.07 0.80 0.63 0.58
Standard error (%) 0.93 1.03 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.01
Table 5.2: Posterior mean of the Contagion Index of the six most and six least systemic nodes.
The nodes are labeled by decreasing ranking in terms of their Contagion Index in the real network.
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5.6 Conclusion
This study leads to several observations:
In networks that are prone to contagion, the posterior mean of the Contagion Index
does not estimate well the Contagion Index of the real network. This implies that a
knowledge of aggregate levels of assets, liabilities, and capital levels does not suffice
to accurately estimate the Contagion Index. Therefore, there is a need to disclose
large bilateral exposures in order to have an accurate assessment of contagion and
systemic risk.
Nevertheless, the posterior mean of the Contagion Index is found to follow the
same ranking as the Contagion Index of the real network while the size of liabilities
does not follow this ranking. Thus, the reconstruction methodology we presented in
this study could provide regulators with a tool for detecting systemically important
institutions given only aggregate information on their balance sheet assets, liabilities
and capital levels. This methodology could perform better, particularly in networks
where contagion may have a significant extent, than a ranking based on balance
sheet size which does not account for the interconnectedness of the financial system.
We refer the interested reader to chapters 3 and 4 for a statistical analysis of the
sensitivity of contagion and systemic risk to the network structure.
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Chapter 6
A Closer Look at Credit Ratings
of CDO Tranches
This chapter is based on the paper “A Closer Look at Credit Ratings of CDO
Tranches” (Cont and Moussa, 2010a), which is a joint work with Professor Rama
Cont.
6.1 Introduction
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) are structured credit products referenc-
ing a portfolio of fixed income securities. The originator of the portfolio creates a
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) that acquires the portfolio and issues notes to the
investors in the form of tranches. An investor in a CDO tranche receives regular
premium payments and must pay in return the losses generated by that tranche
when default occurs in the reference portfolio. Each tranche has priorities con-
cerning payments and losses: the more senior the tranche, the higher the priority
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on receiving payments and the lower the priority on incurring losses. Thus, more
senior tranches are safer investments, as a result they receive smaller premium pay-
ments. The Equity tranche, also known as First-Loss tranche, is the first to absorb
the losses of the portfolio and the last to receive premium payments, followed by
Mezzanine then Senior tranches. The latest may be affected only when the more
junior tranches are completely lost. This prioritization of losses and payments, also
called subordination, is a form of internal credit enhancement of the issued notes.
More subordinated tranches serve as protective layers to the more senior tranches.
The level of subordination, also called attachment level or credit enhancement level,
is the determinant of the seniority of the tranche.
Various types of CDOs have been issued in the past decade, differing by the nature
(vintage) of the assets pooled in their reference portfolio: loans, bonds, credit
derivatives, structured finance products such as residential mortgages, and even
other asset backed securities (ABS) such as residential mortgage backed securities
(RMBS) or credit default swaps (CDS) or even CDO tranches.
CDOs have gained in popularity for a variety of reasons. For CDO issuers, tranch-
ing allows to create classes of securities whose rating is higher than the average
rating of the underlying assets, through credit enhancement. This allows issuers
to pay smaller spreads than they would pay if they had to sell the underlying as-
sets individually. Furthermore, selling part of their assets to the SPV allows them
to free their balance sheets which leads to lower capital requirements and enables
them to acquire new assets. CDOs play also the role of risk transfer instruments
that transfer credit and market risks from the issuer to the investor. For CDO
investors, the “tranching” permits satisfaction for different risk appetites: investors
seeking high payoff may leverage their credit risk and returns by investing in the
Equity tranches while risk-averse investors seeking a lower risk profile may invest in
the Mezzanine and Senior tranches. Moreover, the pooling of well-diversified assets
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reduces idiosyncratic risk which can be appealing to investors.
However, the massive downgrades witnessed in the 2007-2009 crisis have shed light
on the complexity of the risk embedded in CDO tranches. The relationship between
individual default events in the underlying pool of assets and the nominal loss of a
given CDO tranche is complex due to both the complexity of the collateral and the
prioritization of payments. CDO tranches exhibit a risk profile that sensibly differs
from those of other categories of defaultable fixed-income assets. They have been
nevertheless rated by the main rating agencies on a scale similar to the one used
for corporate bonds, which can be misleading to the uninformed investor who could
tend to believe that a similar rating for a CDO tranche and a corporate bond would
indicate a similar risk profile. The complex structure of CDOs cautions against any
simple interpretation of their ratings. Accordingly, different rating scales should be
used for CDOs and corporate bonds.
Credit ratings are labels issued by the rating agencies as an indication of the credit
risk of debt securities. For example Standard & Poor’s issues the labels AAA, AA+,
AA, AA-, A+ , etc. and Moody’s issues the labels Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, A1, etc.
Securities rated above BBB- (S&P) or Baa1 (Moody’s) are called investment grade
securities and those rated below BBB- or Baa1 are called speculative or high yield
or junk securities. Securities with very deteriorated credit quality are not rated
(NR category). Rating agencies use different measures of risk to produce their
ratings. Ratings issued by Standard & Poor’s and Fitch measure the probability
that the tranche incurs a loss -sometimes referred to as default probability1- and
depends only on the subordination level of the CDO tranche, while ratings issued
by Moody’s measure the expected loss. This measure is compared to given cut-
1This can be confusing since this is a measure of the probability of the tranche incuring a loss
and not the probability of the tranche being completely lost. In the case of Bonds, incurring a
loss is a default event so the term default probability is accurate, however it is not in the case of
structured finance securities.
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offs (also called rating quantiles) according to which a rating category (label) is
attributed. Until 2007 the cut-offs used for CDO tranches were the same as the
one used for corporate bonds that were determined from historical data. Since
the onset of the crisis in 2007, rating agencies defined cut-offs specifically for CDO
tranches based on both historical data and a quantitative and qualitative analysis
(de Servigny and Jobst, 2007).
This study aims at clarifying some misconceptions related to CDO ratings, their
interpretation and their use. We first describe the rating approaches used by major
agencies for CDOs and other structured credit products. Most rating agencies have
been using static factor models which are slight variations on the Gaussian copula
model allowing for intersector and intrasector correlations. Using this framework,
we explore the particularities of credit rating methodologies when applied to struc-
tured products such as CDO tranches and CDOs of ABS.
6.1.1 Summary of main results
Our study leads to several interesting insights on the dynamics of credit ratings for
CDO tranches.
• Given the leveraged nature of CDOs, the downgrade risk of a CDO tranche
can be quite different from a bond with same initial rating. Therefore, a
simple labeling via default probability or expected loss does not discriminate
sufficiently their downgrade risk.
• The interaction between the rating threshold and the structuring procedure
can cause new issues to have tranches structured “at the limit” of rating
categories and thus a high probability of downgrading.
• Migration probabilities for tranches with similar rating can vary from struc-
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ture to structure even for the same underlying debt portfolio: two tranches
with the same rating can have completely different transition probabilities.
• We show that migration probabilities for CDO tranches are path-dependent
and non-homogeneous in time.
• While default probability is an adequate representation of the default risk of
a corporate bond with known recovery rate, we show that the probability to
be hit by default fails to account for the risk carried by CDO tranches and
can not differentiate between tranches with different risk profiles, while a risk
measure applied to the loss distribution can. Based on these findings, we
suggest that different rating scales should be used for corporate bonds and
CDO tranches as the latter carry a more complex default risk.
• As a solution to some of the drawback of the current rating methodologies,
we propose a risk-based rating system, based on a risk measure applied to
the loss distribution of the tranche. We show that such a risk-based approach
can lead to quite different ratings for CDO tranches.
• Estimating default probabilities of CDO tranches requires a statistical model
for the co-dependence structure of the default times. The rating of a CDO
arbitrarily assumes a given model, unlike the rating of a corporate bond which
is determined by the accounting data of the issuing company. We show in
particular that a change in the correlation assumption can lead to multiple
downgrades of senior tranches.
• The Gaussian copula commonly used to model the joint distribution of the
underlying assets default times fails to generate scenarios with default clus-
ters. Other copulae, such as the Cauchy, can model scenarios with default
clustering, thus leading to additional credit enhancement than required with
the Gaussian copula. This improves the stability of credit ratings.
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In light of these findings, we present a set of recommendations for the design,
interpretation and use of credit ratings for CDOs and other structured products.
6.1.2 Relation to the literature
Credit ratings assigned by rating agencies to structured credit products have played
an important role in the development of the structured credit market, which has
been cast into the limelight by the recent credit crisis. Several critics of rating
methodologies have focused on the drawbacks of the Gaussian copula used to
model the dependence structure between the assets default times (Donnelly and
Embrechts, 2010). However, very few studies have examined the issues that do
not arise from the use of the Gaussian copula model but are related to the specific
characteristics of structured products.
We study in this chapter the particularities of credit rating methodologies when
applied to structured products such as CDO tranches and CDOs of ABS. Using the
Gaussian copula framework, we explore several issues related to ratings of CDO
tranches.
Credit ratings have been attributed by major rating agencies to structured credit
products based on the criterion of default probability or expected loss of these
instruments (Standard & Poor’s, 2007). These metrics are very poor indicators of
the credit risk of such complex instruments which leads to situations of “rating
arbitrage” where high ratings can be attributed to “high-yield” instruments which
carry in fact a lot of risk (Cont and Jessen, 2011).
We show that the default probability fails to segregate tranches with different risk
profiles. Since a rating based on default probability depends solely on the subor-
dination level of the tranche, two tranches with completely different risk profiles
can nevertheless have the same rating. For example, default probability can not
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differentiate between a tranche 6% − 7% and a tranche 6% − 100% while the loss
of the latter is always smaller relatively to the initial notional of the tranche. We
propose instead a risk-based rating procedure, based on a risk measure applied to
the loss distribution of the tranche.
We show that the downgrade risk of a CDO tranche can be quite different from a
bond with same initial rating. CDO tranches are levered products, meaning that
a slight deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying obligors can lead to
downgrades of several notches at the level of a CDO tranche. We also show, that
credit ratings of CDO tranches are non Markov processes and non-homogeneous
processes. Nevertheless, rating agencies still assume until today that ratings tran-
sitions are Markov and homogeneous, suggesting to compute transition probabilities
by raising the annual transition matrix to the iterative powers (de Servigny and
Jobst, 2007). Therefore, a simple labeling via default probability or expected loss
does not discriminate sufficiently their downgrade risk. We propose to supplement
ratings with indicators of downgrade risk.
Finally, we also examine the model risk to which credit ratings are exposed. In line
with previous studies on the sensitivity of credit ratings of CDO tranches to mod-
eling assumptions (Fender and Kiff, 2004; Meng and Sengupta, 2009; Wojtowicz,
2011), this study shows that credit ratings of CDO tranches are extremely sensi-
tive to the correlation, recovery, and assets default rates parameters used to model
the joint distribution of default times. The Gaussian copula has been criticized
in the recent crisis for its failure to generate scenarios with default clusters (Don-
nelly and Embrechts, 2010). Several alternatives to the factor Gaussian copula
model have been proposed in the literature, but always the context of pricing CDO
tranches (Donnelly and Embrechts, 2010; Azizpour et al., 2010; Kalemanova et al.,
2005; Duffie et al., 2009; Peng and Kou, 2009). We examine the effect of using
a copula with tail dependence, such as the Cauchy copula, for tranching and rat-
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ing CDO tranches. We find that this leads to much higher credit enhancement
than required by the Gaussian copula, hence a smaller migration volatility of credit
ratings.
6.1.3 Outline
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 6.2, we briefly review the perfor-
mance of CDO tranches by vintage category in the 2007-2009 crisis. In section 6.3,
we present the rating methodology of CDO tranches referencing bonds and loans,
and the one for CDO tranches referencing asset backed securities, emphasizing the
complexity of the loss distribution of the latter products. In section 6.4, we study
the impact on the tranching procedure of a change in rating criteria such as chang-
ing rating cut-offs or requiring additional stress-tests. In section 6.5, we examine
the leverage carried in CDO tranches with respect to a change in the underlying
assets credit worthiness, and the sensitivity of CDO and CDO-squared tranches to
the correlation and dependence structure of the underlying assets. In section 6.6,
we study the dynamics of credit ratings, in particular their path-dependence, non-
homogeneity and dependence on the specific structure of the CDO tranche. In
section 6.7, we investigate the use of tail-related risk measures in the rating pro-
cedure. Finally, in section 6.8, we explore the effects of using a copula with tail
dependence on credit ratings of CDO tranches.
6.2 An empirical look at CDO ratings
CDO tranches have been the most attractive instruments of the past decade, pro-
viding satisfaction for both issuers and investors as discussed in the introduction.
Their volume has grown significantly in the 2001-2006 period (see figure 6.1), reach-
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ing more than $500 billion of new issuances in 2006, way above the $78.5 billion
issued in 2001 (SIFMA, 2010). Moreover, the 2001-2006 period has witnessed a
major increase in the complexity of the assets composing the underlying collateral.
In 2001, about 40% of the collateral of issued CDO tranches is composed of invest-
ment grade bonds and only 1% of structured finance securities. In 2006, the picture
is reversed. Only 4% of the collateral is composed of investment grade bonds while
60% is composed of structured finance securities (SIFMA, 2010). However, since
the onset of the credit crisis in 2007, the volume of CDOs has dramatically shrunk:
about $61.8 billion of new issuances in 2008, $4.3 billion in 2009 and $8 billion in
2010 (see figure 6.1). Also, the proportion of structured finance securities has been
decreasing in favor of investment grade bonds. In 2010, 60% of the collateral of
issued CDO tranches is composed of investment grade bonds and only 20% of struc-
tured finance securities. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show respectively the global issuance
of CDOs by type of collateral respectively in the pre- and post-crisis periods.



















Figure 6.1: Global CDO issuance. Source: SIFMA (2010).
This shift has been mainly triggered by the rising delinquencies on the subprime
residential mortgage backed securities, and the widening spreads of investment














CDO issuance by collateral in 2006












CDO issuance by collateral in 2010
Figure 6.3: CDO issuance by type of collateral in the crisis and post-crisis period 2007-2010.
Source: SIFMA (2010).
grade CDO tranches. The deterioration in the credit quality of subprime residential
mortgage backed securities has induced a dramatic decline in the credit quality
of CDO tranches backed by RMBS. Even AAA (Aaa)-rated tranches, which are
designed to be safe and high yield investments, have incurred severe losses. The
rating categories Aaa and AAA are the highest one issued by the corresponding
rating agencies Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s and should reflect a very good
credit quality. In fact, according to Moody’s “Obligations rated Aaa are judged to
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be of the highest quality, with minimal credit risk” and according to Standard &
Poor’s “An obligor rated AAA has extremely strong capacity to meet its financial
commitments”. Nonetheless, in 2007 35.3% of outstanding CDO tranches have been
downgraded by Moody’s. Specifically, 47.8% of Aaa tranches across all vintages
have experienced downgrades, with 86.4% in the ABS vintage (Newman et al.,
2008). On average, a CDO tranche was downgraded of 5.5 notches with 13 notches
for ABS CDOs (Newman et al., 2008). By the end of 2008, more than 90% of both
Aaa and Baa CDO tranches were downgraded. In total, $564 billion worth of CDOs
have been downgraded since January 2007 (FCIC, 2010). Overall, rating agencies
downgraded $1.9 trillion of mortgage backed securities. These observations suggest
that credit ratings fail to accurately assess the credit risk of structured finance
securities.
An example: the Abacus 2007-AC1 synthetic CDO
Abacus 2007-AC1 is a $2 billion notional synthetic CDO issued by the SPV ABA-
CUS 2007-AC1, Ltd. and backed by a portfolio of 90 Baa2-rated midprime and
subprime RMBS each with a notional amount of $22.22 million and a 4.2-year av-
erage life, selected by ACA Management, LLC. Class A to class D notes (tranches)
are issued with a projected average life of 3.9 to 4.9 years. Their capital structure
is presented in tables 6.1 and 6.2. Goldman Sachs Capital Markets, an affiliate of
Goldman, Sachs & Co., enters into a CDS with the issuer to buy protection on the
reference portfolio losses related to the class A through class D notes. An obligor
in the reference portfolio defaults in case of a writedown (book value overvalued
compared to the market value) or a failure to pay principal. Figure 6.4 presents a
diagram of the structure of the the Abacus 2007-AC1 deal. We refer the reader to
Goldman Sachs (2007) for more details.
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Figure 6.4: The Abacus 2007-AC1 deal. Source: Goldman Sachs (2007).
Although according to Moody’s “Obligations rated Baa are subject to moderate
credit risk”, 83% of the RMBS in the ABACUS 2007-AC1 portfolio had been down-
graded by October 24, 2007, and 17% were on negative watch. By January 29, 2008,
99% of the portfolio had been downgraded generating losses over $1 billion (Reisner
et al., 2010). The Class A1 and A2 notes, initially rated Aaa by Moody’s and AAA
by Standard & Poor’s, were nearly worthless within few months (see figures 6.5 and
6.6 for their rating history).
A closer look on the credit ratings of structured finance products, in particular























































1100 N/A N/A 55 45 100 3.9 2037
Class A 480 Aaa AAA 24 21 45 4.4 2037
Class B 60 Aa2 AA 3 18 21 4.6 2037
Class C 100 Aa3 AA- 5 13 18 4.7 2037
Class D 60 A2 A 3 10 13 4.9 2037
First loss 200 N/A N/A 10 0 10 5.2 2037




















Class A1 50 200 Aaa AAA 1.347 4.0
Class A2 142 280 Aaa AAA 1.357 4.2
Table 6.2: Capital structure of the class A1 and A2 of Abacus 2007-AC1. Source: Goldman Sachs (2007).
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Abacus 2007-AC1 class A1 Moody's rating














Abacus 2007-AC1 class A1 S&P rating
Figure 6.5: Rating history of the class A1 of Abacus 2007-AC1. Source: Bloomberg.












Abacus 2007-AC1 class A2 Moody's rating









Abacus 2007-AC1 class A2 S&P rating
Figure 6.6: Rating history of the class A2 of Abacus 2007-AC1. Source: Bloomberg.
6.3 Rating methods for structured credit prod-
ucts
6.3.1 Credit ratings of CDO tranches referencing loans and
bonds
Each CDO tranche is rated on the basis of an ordinal measure of the credit risk
such as the probability that a tranche is hit by loss (Fitch and Standard & Poor’s)
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or the expected loss of the tranche (Moody’s). In order to assign a rating, this
measure is compared to a defined cut-off. For example, according to Standard &
Poor’s cut-offs (Standard & Poor’s, 2009), if the probability that a CDO tranche
maturing in 7 years absorbs losses is between 0.144% and 1.069%, then this tranche
is rated AA, and if this probability is between 1.069% and 2.780% then the tranche
is rated A. Rating agencies often adjust these cut-offs to allow “more severe” or
“more easy” rating scales.
We consider a hypothetical CDO with k tranches, with respective attachments
a1, a2, ..., ak and detachments a2, a3, ..., ak, 100%, on a homogenous portfolio of n
assets (bonds or loans) each with unit notional amount, horizon T , recovery rate
R, loss given default l, and random default times τ1, τ2, ..., τn. That is, at time τi,
the default of asset i generates a loss of (1−R) in the reference portfolio.
The portfolio total loss at time t -expressed in percentage of the total notional of the
portfolio- is simply the sum of all losses generated by the defaults of the individual







The CDO tranche aj−aj+1 is affected only when the portfolio total loss L(t) exceeds
its attachment level aj, and is completely lost if the loss exceeds its detachment
level aj+1. Thus, the loss absorbed by the tranche aj − aj+1 in proportion to its
notional is at time t,
Mj(t) =
(L(t)− aj)+ − (L(t)− aj+1)+
aj+1 − aj (6.2)
This is the payoff of a Call Spread option on the total portfolio loss (see figure 6.7),
which underlines the complex nature of the losses of CDO tranches and the high
leverage they carry.
The credit rating of the tranche aj − aj+1 at a time t is determined by compar-
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Figure 6.7: Tranche loss as a function of total default losses in portfolio. We recognize the
nonlinear profile of a Call Spread.
ing a measure of the credit risk based on the distribution of Mj(t) to given rating
categories cut-offs. For example, Standard & Poor’s ratings are based on the prob-
ability of the tranche having incurred a loss by time t, P(Mj(t) > 0), also called
default probability, and Moody’s ratings are based on the expected loss, E[Mj(t)].
We shall focus in the following sections on the rating methodology based on the
probability of incurring a loss as measure of credit risk.
Factor models for portfolio default losses
Since the default times are random, the losses of the reference portfolio are also
random. The rating procedure requires then a statistical model to simulate the
losses. The choice of the model has of course an impact on the outcomes of the
rating procedure and there is an important model risk related to the agencies’ as-
sumptions of correlation, recovery rate, and assets default rates.
The dependence structure between the default times is specified as a copula
C(u1, ..., un) defined as the joint cumulative distribution of F1(τ1), ..., Fn(τn) where
F1, ..., Fn are the respective cumulative marginal distributions of τ1, ..., τn. One
example of copula that has been extensively used in the financial industry is the
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Gaussian copula introduced by Li (2000),
CGρ (u1, ..., un) = ΦR(Φ
−1(u1), ...,Φ−1(un)), (6.3)
where ΦR is the joint cumulative density function of an n-dimensional Gaussian
vector with correlation matrix R, and Φ is the cumulative density function of a
standard Gaussian.
Currently most agencies have been using factor Gaussian copula models which are
slight variations of the general Gaussian copula introduced by Li (2000) allowing for
inter-and intra-sector correlations. The dependence structure between the assets
in the reference portfolio is then driven by their common dependence to Gaussian
systemic factors.
Default times are generally assumed identically distributed from an Exponential
distribution with intensity λ. That is, the instantaneous conditional default rate
(hazard rate) is a constant (equal to λ). The marginal distribution of the default
times is then “memoryless”.
One factor Gaussian copula model
The one factor Gaussian copula has been a market standard in risk management







Where F is the cumulative density function of an exponential with intensity λ.
S is a standard Gaussian systemic factor and the Z ′is are independent standard
Gaussian idiosyncratic factors independent of S.
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The probability that the ith asset defaults before the horizon t conditional on S is,
p(S, t) = P(τi ≤ t|S) = φ(
φ−1(F (t))−√ρS√
1− ρ ) (6.5)
Given S, the τ ′is are independent. Thus, conditional on S, the number of defaults
follow a Binomial distribution, and the conditional probability that tranche aj−aj+1
incurs a loss is then,
P(L(t) > aj|S) =
∑
i>aj/l








p(S, t)n(1− p(S, t))n−i (6.7)
Therefore, the unconditional probability that tranche aj − aj+1 incurs a loss is,










p(s, T )i(1− p(s, t))n−i)φ(s)ds (6.8)
When the number of obligors is large, the loss distribution can be approximated
using a conditional law of large numbers. Conditionally on the factor S, the random
variables 1τi≤t, ..., 1τn≤t are independent and identically distributed so by the strong
law of large number, conditionally on the factor S,
L(t)
n





≤ lx) = P(p(S, t) ≤ x) ' Φ(
√
1− ρΦ−1(x)− Φ−1(F (t))√
ρ
) (6.10)
Example 1 (Rating of a senior tranche). We consider a 7-years senior x%-100%
tranche of an reference portfolio of 1000 BB rated obligors with average annual
default probability p = 6.639% (according to S&P asset default rates), which cor-
responds to an intensity λ = − 1
T
log(1 − p) = 0.98%. We choose as a statistical
framework a one-factor Gaussian copula model with default correlation ρ = 30%
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and recovery rate R = 40%. The above computations yield that probability of losing
34% of portfolio in 7 years is less than 0.144%. S&P gives 7-years default probabil-
ity thresholds for AAA tranches as 0.144%. Therefore, if we fix x=34% the senior
tranche will be AAA.
Multifactor Gaussian copula model
One major drawback of the one factor Gaussian copula model is that it assumes an
equal correlation ρ between all assets in the reference portfolio. However, in prac-
tice, assets that belong to a common industrial sector tend to be more correlated
than assets in different sectors. This has motivated the extension of the one factor
Gaussian copula model to the multifactor case.
We consider k + 1 common factors S0, S1, S2, ..., Sk where S0 is a global systemic
factor representing for example the global economy and S1, S2, ..., Sk are factors
representing different industrial sectors. We assume that n1 assets of the reference
portfolio operate in sector S1, n2 in sector S2, ..., nk in sector Sk.





ρq − ρ0Sq +
√
1− ρqZi, (6.11)
for all assets i in the sector Sq.
The correlation between two assets in the same sector Sq is ρq while the correlation
between two assets in different sectors is ρ0.
The probability that asset i in the sector Sq defaults before the horizon T , condi-
tionally on the factors S0 and Sq is,
p(S0, Sq, T ) = P(τi ≤ T |S0, Sq) = Φ(
Φ−1(F (T ))−√ρ0S0 −√ρq − ρ0Sq√
1− ρq
) (6.12)
The probability that tranche aj − aj+1 incurs a loss conditionally to the factors
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S0, S1, S2, ..., Sk is, ∑
i>aj/l
P(i assets default|S0, S1, S2, ..., Sk) (6.13)
which is equal by independence of the τ ′is conditionally to the factors S0, S1, S2, ..., Sk














mq(1− p(S0, Sq, t))nq−mq (6.15)
Therefore, the unconditional probability that the jth tranche incurs a loss is










6.3.2 Credit ratings of CDO tranches referencing asset backed
securities
The hypothetical CDO structure described above illustrates in fact a generic mech-
anism for enhancement by subordination (tranching) which has been repeatedly
applied to various portfolios, leading to a zoology of structured products depending
on the type of asset underlying the structure: loans (CLO), mortgages (CMO),
etc. An important and widespread example is the one where the subordination
mechanism is applied to a portfolio itself composed of senior tranches of other debt
portfolios (called inner CDOs), giving rise to a so-called CDO-squared structure.
Rating a CDO referencing a portfolio of asset backed securities (ABS CDO) is a
more complex exercise than rating a CDO of bonds or loans due to the higher
complexity in the loss distribution of the reference portfolio. We shall describe the
Chapter 6. A Closer Look at Credit Ratings of CDO Tranches 165
loss mechanism in the example of a CDO-squared, the other types of ABS CDOs
follow a similar mechanism.
We consider a hypothetical CDO-squared with k tranches with respective attach-
ments a1, ..., ak referencing a portfolio of h inner senior CDO tranches with respec-
tive attachments b1, b2, ..., bh and detachments c1, c2, ..., ch. The inner CDO tranches
are themselves backed by homogenous portfolios of bonds. The tranche aj−aj+1 of
the outer CDO incurs a loss Kj(t) at time t when the total loss H(t) of the reference
portfolio of inner CDO tranches exceeds the attachment level aj. The tranche is
completely lost when the loss exceeds its detachment level aj+1. That is,
Kj(t) =
(H(t)− aj)+ − (H(t)− aj+1)+
aj+1 − aj (6.18)
The total loss H(t) of the portfolio underlying the outer CDO is then the sum of
the losses incurred by each of the inner CDO tranches when default occurs in the







The loss distribution Mr(t) of the inner CDO tranches is the same as the one de-
scribed in section 6.3.1 (equation 6.2). There is no closed formula for the probability
that tranche aj − aj+1 in the outer CDO is hit by loss. The rating is then done by
nested Monte Carlo simulation (Lee, 2009).
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6.4 Influence of rating criteria on the tranching
procedure
6.4.1 Rating cut-offs
Ratings are assigned to the tranches of a CDO by comparing the probability that
they are hit by loss to the cut-offs defined by the rating agency. Therefore, a change
in the rating cut-offs may lead to a change in the ratings of CDO tranches. For
example, upon the release of the new CDO criteria in October 2009, Standard &
Poor’s placed more than half a trillion dollars of outstanding CDO securities under
review for possible downgrade (Adelson, 2010).
New issuances will have then to adjust their capital structure to the new cut-offs.
A CDO issuer concerned in paying the lowest spreads to investors would issue the
best possible rated tranches, starting from issuing the thickest tranche possible with
a rating AAA, then BBB, BB, etc. Specifically, the attachment aAAA of the senior
AAA tranche is fixed in such a way that it is the lowest attachment a for which
the probability of incurring a loss of the tranche a− 100% is smaller than the AAA
cut-off pAAA,T for the corresponding horizon T , that is,
aAAA = inf
a∈[0,1]
P(L(t) > a) < pAAA,T , (6.20)
More generally, considering a range of ratings g1, g2, ..., gk ordered by increasing
credit worthiness with respective cut-offs pg1,T , pg2,T , ..., pgk,T for the horizon T , the
attachment of the tranche aj − aj+1 rated gj at time t is then fixed in such a way
that it is the lowest attachment a for which the probability of incurring a loss of
the tranche a− aj+1 is smaller than the cut-off pgj ,T for the horizon T , that is
aj = inf
a∈[0,1]
P(L(t) > a) < pgj ,T (6.21)
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As an illustration, we compare the capital structure of the hypothetical CDO in-
troduced in example 1 -issued in a way to maximize tranches credit ratings- when
using the rating cut-offs of S&P CDO Evaluator versions 3.0 and 4.1. We note
that the change in the rating cut-offs leads to different CDO structures (see tables
6.3 and 6.4). The AAA tranche structured according to the version 4.1 criteria
has a larger credit enhancement (higher attachment) and consequently a smaller
probability of incurring a loss. This change in rating criteria renders AAA tranches
more resilient to defaults in the reference portfolio2.
Attachment (%) Rating Default probability (%) Rating cut-off (%)
34 AAA 0.134 0.144
24 AA 0.922 1.069
17 A 3.096 3.476
11 BBB 8.633 9.959
6 BB 21.496 24.709
3 B 40.545 43.347
2 CCC 52.055 67.529
Table 6.3: Capital structure of CDO tranches issued to maximize credit ratings using S&P CDO
Evaluator version 4.1 rating cut-offs.
Attachment (%) Rating Default probability (%) Rating cut-off (%)
31 AAA 0.250 0.285
26 AA 0.646 0.701
22 A 1.320 1.368
15 BBB 4.331 4.443
8 BB 14.765 15.110
4 B 32.686 32.903
1 CCC 69.292 73.396
Table 6.4: Capital structure of CDO tranches issued to maximize credit ratings using S&P CDO
Evaluator version 3.0 rating cut-offs.
Definition 18 (Stylized CDO). In the following sections we call Stylized CDO the
one with tranches defined by their attachment-detachment levels 2%-3%, 3%-6%,
2In fact, according to Adelson (2010), “the (Standard & Poor’s) updated CDO criteria produces
a AAA credit enhancement of roughly 42% for a typical nine-year collateralized loan obligation
backed by a well-diversified pool of B-rated credits, which is substantially higher than under the
prior criteria”
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6%-11%, 11%-17%, 17%-24%, 24%-34%, 34%-100%, with horizon 7 years, and
referencing a portfolio of 1000 BB assets with default probability p = 6.639% and
recovery rate R = 40%.
6.4.2 Stress tests
The massive downgrades of AAA CDO and RMBS tranches observed at the end
of 2008 have led rating agencies to adjust their rating criteria to avoid such sce-
narios. Aside from revising their rating cut-offs, Standard & Poor’s has introduced
supplemental stress tests to assess whether CDO tranches have sufficient credit en-
hancement to withstand simultaneous defaults in the reference portfolio (Standard
& Poor’s, 2009). Under the largest obligor default test a AAA rated tranche should
have sufficient credit enhancement to, assuming a recovery rate of 5%, survive the
defaults of each of the following combinations of underlying assets: the two largest
obligors rated between AAA and CCC-, the three largest obligors rated between
AA+ and CCC-, the four largest obligors rated between A+ and CCC-, the six
largest obligors rated between BBB+ and CCC-, the eight largest obligors rated
between BB+ and CCC-, the 10 largest obligors rated between B+ and CCC- and
the 12 largest obligors rated between CCC+ and CCC-.
Then, the AAA tranche of the Sylized CDO (definition 18) should have sufficient
credit enhancement to withstand the default of eight obligors with a 5% recovery
rate. The loss generated by this default scenario is of 0.76%, which means that the
attachment of the AAA tranche should exceed 0.76%. This is a trivial requirement
in the simplistic example of a homogeneous reference portfolio, however it could
imply significant credit enhancement when the reference portfolio is constituted of
assets with heterogeneous notionals. As an example, consider a portfolio of BB
rated obligors with the eight largest accounting for 40% of the total notional and
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the remaining accounting for 60%. Then the largest obligor default test requires
the AAA tranche to survive a loss of 38%, thus leading to an additional 4% credit
enhancement to the 34% attachment level of the AAA tranche.
6.5 Leverage effects and sensitivity to modeling
assumptions
6.5.1 Leverage effects
Since the onset of the subprime crisis in 2007, credit risk models used by rating
agencies and banks have been repeatedly criticized as having underestimated the
default probability of many obligors. For instance, in the case of residential mort-
gage backed securities, most models failed to incorporate scenarios where housing
prices -which represent the common factor affecting residential mortgages- would
decline. Model coefficients were estimated using historical data which did not con-
tain any scenario even remotely similar to the crisis we have witnessed in 2007-2009.
In hindsight, this seems to have led to a serious underestimation of default risk for
many categories of RMBS backed securities.
In fact, since the loss of a CDO tranche is a Call Spread on the total loss of the
reference pool of assets, it should exhibit a high leverage effect compared to a
portfolio of bonds or loans. Call Spread strategies are highly leveraged compared
to direct investments in the underlying in the world of stocks or futures. Thus, a
slight increase in the credit risk of the underlying obligors, due to the tension in
the credit market, tends to be amplified by the CDO structure and could imply
serious downgrades of the tranches. Figure 6.8 illustrates this phenomenon on the
Stylized CDO: a slight decrease in the credit worthiness of the underlying assets
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(increase in their default probability) while maintaining their BB rating can imply
a downgrade of the AAA-rated senior tranche of three notches. The other tranches
are also downgraded of several notches.



















Figure 6.8: Sensitivity to a change in asset default rates: a decrease in the credit worthiness of
the underlying assets while maintaining their BB rating can imply a downgrade of CDO tranches
of several notches.
The leverage can be even more expressed in CDOs of asset backed securities, such
as a CDO-squared. As an illustration, we consider a stylized CDO-squared ref-
erencing ten underlying inner A-rated CDO tranches each with attachment 17%
and detachment 60%. The portfolio of bonds underlying the pool of inner CDOs
is composed of 1000 BB-rated bonds belonging to five different industrial sectors.
Each inner CDO is backed by two hundred bonds: five inner CDOs contain each
two hundred bonds from the same sector, and the other five contain one hundred
bonds from one sector and one hundred from another sector such that each bond is
contained in two different inner CDOs. The capital structure of the CDO-squared
issued to maximize credit ratings using S&P CDO Evaluator version 4.1 rating
cut-offs, assuming a one factor copula model with correlation 30%, is presented
in table 6.5. It is interesting to note the “little” credit enhancement needed to
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issue investment grade CDO-squared tranches, which made them be very popular
products in the past decade.
Attachment (%) Rating Default probability (%) Rating cut-off (%)
40 AAA 0.139 0.144
16 AA 0.951 1.069
2 A 3.086 3.476
0 BBB 4.948 9.959
Table 6.5: Capital structure of CDO-squared issued to maximize credit ratings using S&P CDO
Evaluator version 4.1 rating cut-offs, assuming a one factor copula model with correlation 30%.
We change the credit quality of the inner tranches by varying their detachment
level while maintaining constant their attachment level. That is, we change the
“thickess” of the tranches without changing their credit rating since the latter
depends only on the attachment level. We observe in figure 6.9 that this leads
the outer tranches of the CDO-squared to downgrade. In fact, the “thickness”
of the inner CDO tranches is a very important factor to examine when assessing
the risk of CDO-squared structures. Contrarily to a bond, which can maximum
lose the unrecovered portion 1 − R of its notional, an inner CDO tranche can be
entirely wiped out. Thus, the “thinner” is the tranche, the larger is the proportion
of notional lost at default.
6.5.2 Sensitivity to the dependence structure
Structured credit ratings are more sensitive to modeling assumptions than bonds
and loans since they depend also on assumptions regarding default correlation or,
more precisely, the co-dependence of default times. Yet such parameters are not
directly observable and cannot be reliably estimated from historical data given that
they pertain to rare events.
In the Gaussian copula framework detailed in section 6.3, the co-dependence struc-
ture is specified by a correlation. The higher the correlation between the obligors,
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Figure 6.9: Sensitivity of three CDO-squared tranches to a change in the inner CDOs credit
quality: a decrease in the thickness of the inner tranches while maintaining their A rating can
imply a downgrade of the outer CDO tranches of several notches.
the more likely they are to default together or to survive together, and hence the
more likely senior tranches are hit by default. It is reasonable to think that in a
period of global crisis, rating agencies could revise their rating with a higher de-
fault correlation, since the most likely driver of default is the shared global market
exposure. Such a statistical model revision can also drive multiple downgrades, as
shown in figure 6.10 for the tranches of the Stylized CDO. It is interesting to note
that senior tranches credit ratings have a negative sensitivity to correlation (“short
correlation” by analogy with the pricing terminology) and the Equity tranche credit
rating has a positive sensitivity to correlation (“long correlation” by analogy with
the pricing terminology): when correlation increases, the assets in the underlying
portfolio are more likely to default together, which increases the probability that
the total portfolio loss exceeds the senior tranche attachment level; the assets are
also more likely to survive together, which increases the probability of zero default
i.e. the Equity tranche not hit by loss.
Since rating agencies use a multifactor Gaussian copula model to allow a greater
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Figure 6.10: Sensitivity to a change in correlation: an increase in the correlation between the
underlying assets can imply a downgrade of the senior tranche of several notches, and an upgrade
of the equity tranche.
correlation between two pier firms in the same industrial sector, we consider an
reference portfolio of 1000 BB assets belonging to five different sectors (200 assets in
each sector) with average annual default probability p = 6.639%, R = 40% recovery
and unit notional. We choose the inter-sector correlation equal to 13.4% and the
intra-sector correlation equal to 80% so that the average correlation is still 30%. We
rate the Stylized CDO tranches in the six factors (one global common factor and
five sectors) Gaussian copula framework with the above correlation parameters. We
observe (see figure 6.11) that several tranches are downgraded when changing the
dependence structure from the one factor to the multifactor case while maintaining
the average correlation constant.
The impact of the correlation structure on credit ratings con be more revealed with
more complex structured products such as CDOs-squared. Their two-layers struc-
ture is extremely sensitive to the correlation between the obligors in the portfolio
underlying the inner CDO tranches: if the obligors are equally correlated (homoge-
neous correlation), the loss generated by a default event will be evenly distributed
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Figure 6.11: One factor versus multifactor copula model: a change in the dependence structure
can have a significant impact on tranche ratings.
across the inner CDOs and most probably will not exceed their subordination level.
In this case the loss will not affect the CDO-squared. However, if the obligors un-
derlying each inner CDO are highly correlated and the cross correlation is low,
the loss will concentrate on one inner CDO exceeding its subordination level and
therefore the loss will flow into the outer CDO portfolio. Figure 6.12 illustrates this
phenomenon.
Figure 6.12: Default scenario of a CDO-squared backed by an reference portfolio with homoge-
neous versus heterogenous intra- and inter-sector correlation.
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We consider the stylized CDO-squared introduced in the previous section. A change
in the dependence structure from the one factor to the six factors model leads almost
all tranches to downgrade (see figure 6.13).
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Figure 6.13: One factor versus multifactor copula model: a change in the dependence structure
can have a significant impact on CDO-squared tranche ratings.
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Figure 6.14: Sensitivity to a change in correlation: an increase in the correlation between the
underlying assets can imply a downgrade of the outer CDO tranches.
Chapter 6. A Closer Look at Credit Ratings of CDO Tranches 176
6.6 Dynamics of credit ratings
6.6.1 Non-Markov dynamics of rating transitions
The loss distribution of a structured finance product, specifically a CDO tranche,
varies with time and market conditions. Thus, credit ratings only reflect the credit
worthiness perceived at a specific time. Factors influencing the loss distribution
are the passage of time, the change of the credit quality of the underlying obligors,
the change of the co-dependence structure of their default times, and the change in
credit enhancement (attachment level). Since such products live for several years,
it is necessary to update periodically their ratings during their lifetime. Rating
agencies publish annual transition matrices to provide investors with a measure
of the likelihood of possible downgrade or upgrade from a given rating category
to another one. Specifically, they assume that the rating transitions follow a ho-
mogeneous Markov chain, so the cumulative transition probabilities are derived
by raising the one-year transition matrix to iterative powers (Standard & Poor’s,
2009).
To check this assumption, we calculate the 0-2 years and 2-4 years transition proba-
bilities between the different rating categories by pooling all tranches of the Stylized
CDO and averaging the proportion of tranches transiting from one rating category
to the other. We describe as follows the algorithm to compute the probability of
transition from a rating category g1 at time t1 to a rating category g2 at time t2
by nested Monte Carlo method with Importance Sampling. Since defaults are are
events, Importance Sampling is necessary to reduce the variance of the Monte Carlo
estimator3. Then, the Monte Carlo estimator of the probability of transition from
3In the case of a Gaussian copula: instead of simulating the common factor s of the Gaussian
copula from a Standard Gaussian, we simulate it from a Gaussian distribution with shifted mean
−x to increase the probability of defaults. The weight of the Importance Sampling (Radon-
Nikodym derivative for the change of measure from the shifted Gaussian to the standard Gaussian
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where M is the number of Monte Carlo simulations, N ig1,t1→g2,t2 is the number of
transitions from the rating category g1 at time t1 to the rating category g2 at time
t2 in the i
th simulation, N ig1,t1 is the number of tranches rated g1 at time t1 and wi
is the weight of the Importance Sampling.
In each simulation τ i1, ..., τ
i
n of the default times, N
i
g1,t1
and N ig1,t1→g2,t2 are computed
as follows:
1. Rate the CDO tranches at time t1: count the number k1 of defaults occurring
before t1 , then compute the default probabilities for each tranche using the
outstanding subordination level a1 =
a−k1l
1−k1l , horizon T − t1 and outstanding
number of obligors n− k1. Count the number of tranches N ig1,t1 in the rating
category g1 at time t1.
2. Rate the CDO tranches at time t2: count the number k2 of defaults occurring
before t2 , then compute the default probabilities for each tranche using the
outstanding subordination level a2 =
a−k2l
1−k2l , horizon T − t2 and outstanding
number of obligors n−k2. Count the number of tranches N ig1,t1→g2,t2 transiting
from the rating category g1 at time t1 to the rating category g2 at time t2.
The two transition matrices are very different (see tables 6.6 and 6.7) which means
that the transition probabilities do not depend only on the horizon but also on the
current date. This violates the assumption of a homogeneous Markov chain. In fact,
we find that rating transitions are path-dependent. The probability of downgrade
distribution) is exp(xs− x2/2).
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from the AA category between years 2 and 4 is of 5.28%, which is different from the
probability (2.34%) of downgrade from the category AA between years 2 and 4 given
that the current rating is AAA, which is also different from the probability (6.28%)
of downgrade from the category AA between years 2 and 4 given that the current
rating is AA. It is interesting to remark that these conditional probabilities disagree
with the natural intuition that, since the obligors are correlated, we would expect to
have a greater probability of downgrading if the tranche has already downgraded.
The fact that we obtained the opposite phenomenon could be explained by the
way the CDO is structured: when a tranche is downgraded from AAA to AA,
the attachment point could be far from the cut-off of the AA rating category and
therefore a default event may not provoke a downgrade from AA, however if the
tranche is rated AA and remains AA, the attachment point is still near the cut-off
of the AA rating category and so a single default event may provoke a downgrade.
Transition matrix 0-2 years
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC NR D
AAA 62.64 36.98 0.29 0.04 0.01 0.00 0 0 0.00
AA 0 82.32 16.45 0.95 0.15 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.05
A 0 0 80.39 17.66 1.18 0.39 0.14 0.01 0.19
BBB 0 0 0 79.13 16.89 2.24 0.67 0.12 0.91
BB 0 0 0 0 54.11 37.22 4.26 0.68 3.72
B 0 0 0 0 0 54.11 32.25 2.97 10.65
CCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 77.72 5.14 17.13
NR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Table 6.6: Transition matrix for the period 0-2 years, computed with the one factor Gaussian
copula model with ρ = 30%.
6.6.2 Is AAA=AAA?
CDO tranches with different attachment levels can have the same rating but dif-
ferent downgrade transitions. A tranche with a larger credit enhancement is less
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Transition matrix 2-4 years
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC NR D
AAA 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AA 14.25 80.46 5.28 0 0 0 0 0 0
A 0 0.04 97.89 1.92 0.13 0 0 0 0
BBB 0 0 2.22 73.41 23.75 0.45 0.12 0.00 0.01
BB 0 0 0 0 90.85 5.36 2.84 0.27 0.67
B 0 0 0 0 6.37 56.31 31.45 1.49 4.35
CCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 65.24 10.07 24.67
NR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Table 6.7: Transition matrix for the period 2-4 years, computed with the one factor Gaussian
copula model with ρ = 30%.
vulnerable to losses in the reference portfolio than a tranche with the same rat-
ing category but a smaller credit enhancement. To illustrate this, we compare the
one-year rating transitions of the senior tranche 34%-100% of the Stylized CDO to
the one-year rating transitions of the tranche 40%-100% backed by the same refer-
ence portfolio. We find that, although both tranches have a current AAA rating,
the tranche 40%-100% has a much greater likelihood (99.70%) of conserving the
rating AAA at year 1 than the tranche 34%-100% (79.28%). Thus, the same rat-
ing category could reflect completely different future credit worthiness for different
tranches.





















Rating at year 1
One year transition probabilities of tranche 34%-100%





















Rating at year 1
One year transition probabilities of tranche 40%-100%
Figure 6.15: One year transition probabilities of the tranches 34%-100% and 40%-100%, both
with current AAA rating category.
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6.6.3 Tranche-based rating transitions
Since the transition probabilities depend considerably on the structure of the CDO
and its rating history and not only on the current ratings, one can not merge
time series of rating transitions from different tranches to construct a global “CDO
rating transition matrix” and transition probabilities should be simulated for each
particular tranche. In this new representation, transition probabilities can not
be historical since the matrices are specific to this particular CDO structure and
historical data are therefore not available. Hence, transition probabilities should be
simulated. As an example, we simulate as follows the 2-4 years transition matrices
for the tranches 34%-100% and 24%-34% of the Stylized CDO (see tables 6.8 and
6.9). It is interesting to observe that the transition probability from AA to AA
between years 2 and 4 is 50.61% for the tranche 34%-100% while it is 94.01% for
the tranche 24%-34%.
Transition matrix 2-4 years for the tranche 34%-100%
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC NR D
AAA 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AA 47.16 50.61 2.22 00.01 0 0 0 0 0
A 0 0 21.65 55.96 22.39 0 0 0 0
BBB 0 0 0 0 10.43 29.36 28.51 4.71 26.98
BB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
CCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
NR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Table 6.8: Transition matrix for the tranche 34%−100% of the Stylized CDO for the period 2-4
years, computed with the one factor Gaussian copula model with ρ = 30%.
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Transition matrix 2-4 years for the tranche 24%-34%
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC NR D
AAA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AA 0 94.01 5.99 0 0 0 0 0 0
A 0 0.05 91.40 08.07 0.48 0 0 0 0
BBB 0 0 0 3.04 72.92 12.40 10.99 0 0.66
BB 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.42 5.85 86.72
B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
CCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
NR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Table 6.9: Transition matrix for the tranche 24%− 34% of the Stylized CDO for the period 2-4
years, computed with the one factor Gaussian copula model with ρ = 30%.
6.7 Towards a risk-based rating methodology
Default probability does not perfectly reflect the credit risk of a financial security
since it does not account for the whole distribution of the loss but only for the lower
tail of the loss distribution (probability that the loss exceeds a certain threshold).
The probability of loosing $1 could be equal to the probability of losing $1 million
but it is clear that given default, the impact of the second default scenario is
significantly greater than the first one. With corporate bonds, default scenarios
have all the same impact since the loss is always equal to nominal×(1-recovery),
then the default probability is a good risk measure. More precisely, since the default
probability describes entirely the loss distribution of a bond with known recovery
rate, any risk measure will be equivalent to the default probability and therefore the
question of adequate choice of risk measure does not arise. However in the case of
a CDO, default scenarios can be very different and the losses can be very different
so that the default probability can not be sufficient to translate credit risk. For
example, since default probability depends only on the subordination level, it can
not differentiate between a tranche 6%−7% and a tranche 6%−100% while the loss
of the latter is always smaller relatively to the initial notional of the tranche. If the
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total loss of the portfolio is 7%, an investor in the tranche 6%−7% loses the totality
of his investment while an investor in the tranche 6%− 100% loses only about 1%
of his investment. Other risk measures could therefore be more informative.
6.7.1 Measures of downside risk
We present in this section some of most commonly used risk measures and discuss
their possible use as measures of credit risk in the rating procedure.
Value-at-Risk
VaRjα: Value-at-Risk at level α defined as the right-tail α-quantile of the loss dis-
tribution of the corresponding tranche aj − aj+1:
V aRjα = inf{l ∈ R;P(Mj(t) > l) ≤ 1− α} (6.23)
While Value-at-Risk has broad applications in Risk Management, it seems to be
unappropriate in the context of CDO ratings since it may fail to account for the
severity of losses beyond the quantile threshold. Moreover, its threshold-based
nature leads to awkward results:
• Value-at-Risk of all tranches whose detachment point is lower than the right-
tail α−quantile χα of the distribution of the portfolio total loss is equal to
one. Suppose aj+1 < χα, then
P(Mj(t) > 1) = 0 (6.24)
P(Mj(t) = 1) = P(L(t) > aj+1) > 1− α, (6.25)
Hence the Value-at-Risk V aRjα of the tranche aj − aj+1 is equal to 1.
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• Value-at-Risk of all tranches whose attachment point is larger than the right-
tail α−quantile of the distribution of the total loss is equal to zero. Suppose
aj > χα, then
P(Mj(t) > 0) = P(L(t) > aj) ≤ 1− α, (6.26)
Hence the Value-at-Risk V aRjα of the tranche aj − aj+1 is equal to 0.
Thus, Value-at-Risk does not differentiate between tranches of different credit risk
quality and can not be used as a measure of the risk quality of the tranches of a
CDO.
Expected Shortfall
ESjα: Expected Shortfall at level α –also called Conditional Value-at-Risk or Tail
Conditional Expectation– defined as the expected loss incurred by tranche aj−aj+1
given that the loss exceeds the right-tail α-quantile of the loss distribution that is
the Value-at-Risk at level α:
ESjα(t) = E[Mj(t)|Mj(t) > V aRjα] (6.27)
Expected Shortfall suffers from a similar problem as the VaRjα since it gives the
value one for all tranches whose detachment point is lower than the right-tail α−
quantile of the distribution of the portfolio total loss. If α is large enough then
this problem has a limited impact because in this case the right-tail α− quantile is
small enough so that the tranches with ESα = 1 are the non-rated tranches.
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Minvar
Another example is the so-called Minvar, introduced by Cherny and Madan (2006),
defined as the expected maximum of N independent copies of the loss:
MinvarjN(t) = E[max{M1j (t),M2j (t), ...,MNj (t)}]
This can be interpreted as the expected worst loss for the investor in N independent
scenarios.
The expected loss criterion used by Moody’s is a particular example of Minvar with
only one loss scenario (N=1). Thus, it fails to properly assess the impact of rare but
extreme events. Instead, the MinvarN with N sufficiently large is able to capture
the entire loss distribution including extreme values. Also, it is able to differentiate
between tranches of different risk quality: the higher the risk of the tranche the
higher the Minvar. Minvar appears then to be a more suitable measure of the credit
worthiness of CDO tranches.
6.7.2 A risk-based rating method
We consider as an example a rating method based on the Minvar criterion. Rating
cut-offs are subjective parameters decided by each rating agency and reflects in a
certain way its “severeness”. We convert the S&P cut-offs into Minvar so that they
will give the same rating if applied to a corporate bond with recovery rate R = 40%.
For such a Bond the loss is 0 with probability 1 − p and 1 − R with probability
p, hence the expected maximum of N independent copies of the loss is 1− R if at
least one of the losses is equal to 1−R and 0 otherwise; which leads to:
MinvarN(t) = (1−R)(1− (1− p)N) (6.28)
The cut-offs obtained are presented in table 6.10. Using these cut-offs and the
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Minvar rating criterion, we rate the Stylized CDO (see figure 6.16) in the one
factor Gaussian copula framework with correlation ρ = 30%. We observe that the
24% − 34% tranche originally rated AA with the default probability criterion is
downgraded by 2 notches, and all other more junior tranches are downgraded to
the NR category. The Minvar is a much more conservative measure of credit risk
than the probability of incurring a loss.








Table 6.10: Equivalent Minvar20 rating cut-offs.
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Figure 6.16: The impact of using the Minvar as a risk measure for credit ratings: almost
all tranches originally rated with the default probability criteria are downgraded when using
Minvar20.
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6.8 Modeling default clustering
6.8.1 Modeling default clustering using copulae
The Gaussian copula model has been extensively criticized in the past few years
mainly for its inability to generate scenarios with simultaneous defaults or default
clusters. We refer the reader to appendix A for an overview of copulae. Several
alternatives to the Gaussian copula have been suggested in the financial literature.
Examples are the Gumbel, Clayton, Cauchy or t-copula models. A common char-
acteristic of these models is that they allow a dependence in the lower tail of the
distribution of default times. That is, the occurrence of one default increases the
probability of occurrence of other defaults in the reference portfolio. We recall the
definition of the coefficient of lower tail dependence defined in Embrechts et al.
(2001):
Definition 19 (Coefficient of lower tail dependence). Let X1 and X2 be two con-
tinuous random variables with cumulative marginal distributions F1 and F2. Then,
the coefficient of lower tail dependence between X1 and X2 is,
λl(X1, X2) = lim
q↘0
P(X2 ≤ F−12 (q)|X1 ≤ F−11 (q)) (6.29)
If λl(X1, X2) > 0 then X1 and X2 are said to show lower tail dependence. If
λl(X1, X2) = 0 then X1 and X2 are said to be asymptotically independent in the
lower tail.
Embrechts et al. (2001) show that the Gaussian copula does not present lower
tail dependence (λU(X, Y ) = 0) while the Student copula does. The lower tail
dependence coefficient of the Student copula with ν degrees of freedom and with
homogeneous correlation ρ is,
λl = 2
(
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where Fν+1 is the cumulative distribution function of a Student distribution with
ν + 1 degrees of freedom.
The Cauchy copula is a particular case of the Student copula with one degree of
freedom (ν = 1). For example, the coefficient lower tail dependence of a Cauchy
copula with correlation ρ = 30% is λl = 0.4084. This lower tail dependence is illus-
trated in figure 6.17 where we observe a clear upper-right and lower-left quadrant
tail of the bivariate distribution of X1 and X2 when the dependence is modeled by a
Cauchy copula (in both cases of Gaussian and Exponential marginal distributions).
The interested reader is referred to Embrechts et al. (2001) for a broad overview
on copulas.
Figure 6.17: Tail dependence in the Gaussian and Cauchy copulae
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6.8.2 Impact of using a Cauchy copula in rating outstand-
ing CDO tranches
We study the impact of using a one factor Cauchy copula model -instead of the one
factor Gaussian copula- for the joint default times on the credit ratings of CDO
tranches:
G−1(F (τi)) = ρS + (1− ρ)Zi, (6.31)
where S,Z1, ..., Zn are IID standard Cauchy random variables, G is the cumulative
distribution function of a standard Cauchy, and F the cumulative distribution
function of an Exponential with parameter λ.
We rate the tranches of the Stylized CDO using this model with dependence param-
eter ρ = 30%. We note (see figure 6.18) that the use of the Cauchy copula implies a
downgrade of the senior tranches (originally rated with the Gaussian copula model
with correlation parameter ρ = 30%). In fact, since the Cauchy copula exhibits
an lower tail dependence, it allows more scenarios with extreme events than the
Gaussian copula, which explains the more severe rating of the senior tranches. For
example, considering two obligors in the reference portfolio with respective default
times τ1 and τ2 , the probability P(τ2 < 7|τ1 < 7) that the second obligor defaults
before the 7 years horizon given that the first has defaulted is 29.94% when using
a Cauchy copula with dependence parameter ρ = 30% and 18.30% when using a
Gaussian copula with correlation parameter ρ = 30%.
6.8.3 Impact of using a Cauchy copula in tranching a port-
folio
The choice of the statistical model of the dependence between default times has
also an influence on the tranching of the portfolio of underlying assets. We compare
Chapter 6. A Closer Look at Credit Ratings of CDO Tranches 189
34-100 24-34 17-24 11-17 6-11  3-6   0-3   
























Figure 6.18: The impact of using a Cauchy copula for the joint default times.
the attachment levels obtained to maximize credit ratings when using the Cauchy
copula versus the Gaussian copula. We observe (see table 6.11) that the Cauchy
copula requires much more credit enhancement for the senior tranches than the
Gaussian copula.
Gaussian copula Cauchy copula








Table 6.11: Influence of statistical model of the default times on the CDO structure: the Cauchy
copula model requires additional credit enhancement for the senior tranches than the Gaussian
copula.
The one-year transition probabilities of the tranche 60%-100% computed using
the Cauchy copula model with dependence parameter ρ = 30% are displayed in
figure 6.19. The tranche remains in one year in the AAA category with probability
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99.78%.
Thus, the use in the tranching procedure of the Cauchy copula as statistical model
of the dependence structure between default times allows defining senior CDO
tranches with additional credit enhancement leading to a stability of credit ratings
across time.





















Rating at year 1
One year transition probabilities of tranche 60%-100%
Figure 6.19: One-year transition probabilities of the AAA tranche 60%-100% computed using
the Cauchy copula model with dependence parameter ρ = 30%. The tranche remains in one year
in the AAA category with probability 99.78%.
Copula models with lower tail dependence such as the Cauchy copula described
above are able to capture default clustering in the sense that they increase the
probability of future defaults given that one asset has already defaulted in the
reference portfolio. However, factor models with continuous joint distributions of
the default times fail to model simultaneous failures. Nonetheless, the 2007-2009
have underlined the importance of accounting for the possibility of simultaneous
defaults, arising from a common exposure to market factors or from contagion
effects through mutual exposures between the underlying assets. Other models
have incorporated default clustering and contagion effects in the intensity of the
default event (Peng and Kou, 2009; Duffie et al., 2009; Azizpour et al., 2010), as
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apposed to assuming a constant intensity.
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Appendix A
A brief introduction to copulae
We present in this appendix a brief review of copulae. We refer the reader to Nelsen
(1999); Embrechts et al. (2001); Schmidt (2008).
A.1 Definition and properties
Definition 20 (Copula). A copula C(u1, ..., un) is the multivariate joint distribu-
tion of random variables U1,...,Un defined on the cube [0, 1]
n with standard uniform
marginal distributions.
Property 1 (General properties). If C is a copula, then it satisfies the following
properties:
1. C(u1, ..., un) is increasing in each of the components.
2. C(u1, ..., ui, ..., un) = ui for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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3. Rectangle inequality: ∑
(i1,...,in)∈{1,2}n
(−1)i1+...+inC(u1,i1 , ..., un,in) ≥ 0
where,
ai ≤ bi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n uj,1 = aj uj,2 = bj
The reverse is also true: if a multivariate function C defined on the cube [0, 1]n
satisfies the above properties then it is copula.
The main purpose of a copula is to separate the dependence structure of a random
vector from its marginals.
Theorem 1 (Sklar’s theorem). Consider a n-dimensional cumulative distribution
F with marginals F1, ..., Fn. There exists a copula C, such that
F (x1, ..., xn) = C(F1(x1), ..., Fn(xn)) ∀xi ∈ [−∞,∞], i = 1, ..., n (A.1)
If Fi is continuous for all i = 1, ..., n then C is unique,
C(x1, ..., xn) = F (F
−1
1 (x1), ..., F
−1
n (xn)) (A.2)
Conversely, consider a copula C and univariate cumulative distributions F1, ..., Fn,
then F defined as in equation A.1 is a multivariate cumulative distribution with
marginals F1, ..., Fn.
Property 2 (Invariance under transformation). Consider a sequence of real-valued
strictly increasing transformations T1, ..., Tn defined on [−∞,∞], then the random
variables X1, ..., Xn and T1(X1), ..., Tn(Xn) have the same copula.





ui + 1− n, 0) ≤ C(u1, ..., un) ≤ min(u1, ..., un) (A.3)
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A.2 Important examples of copulae
Definition 21 (Gaussian copula). For a n×n-correlation matrix Γ, the n-dimensional
Gaussian copula is defined as
CΓ(u1, ..., un) = ΦΓ(Φ
−1(u1), ...,Φ−1(un)), (A.4)
where ΦΓ is the n-dimensional Gaussian distribution with correlation matrix Γ, and
Φ is the univariate standard Gaussian cumulative distribution.
Definition 22 (Student copula). For a n × n-correlation matrix Γ and ν degrees
of freedom, the n-dimensional Student (or t) copula is defined as
Cν,Γ(u1, ..., un) = tν,Γ(t
−1
ν (u1), ..., t
−1
ν (un)), (A.5)
where tν,Γ is the n-dimensional Student distribution with ν degrees of freedom and
correlation matrix Γ, and tν is the univariate Student distribution with ν degrees of
freedom.
Remark 2. The Gaussian and Cauchy distributions are extreme cases of a Student
distribution with respective degrees of freedom ν =∞ and ν = 1.
Definition 23 (α-stable distribution). A real-valued random variable X is said
to be strictly α-stable if for any n independent copies X1, ..., Xn of X and con-






Example 2. (Important examples of α-stable distributions)
1. The Gaussian distribution is 2-stable.
2. The Cauchy distribution is 1-stable.
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A.3 Tail Dependence
Definition 24 (Coefficient of upper tail dependence). Let X1 and X2 be two con-
tinuous random variables with cumulative marginal distributions F1 and F2 and
copula C. Then, the coefficient of upper tail dependence between X1 and X2 is,
λu(X1, X2) = lim
q↗1
P(X2 > F−12 (q)|X1 > F−11 (q)) (A.6)
If λu(X1, X2) > 0 then X1 and X2 are said to show upper tail dependence. If
λu(X1, X2) = 0 then X1 and X2 are said to be asymptotically independent in the
upper tail.
Definition 25 (Coefficient of lower tail dependence). Let X1 and X2 be two contin-
uous random variables with cumulative marginal distributions F1 and F2 and copula
C. Then, the coefficient of lower tail dependence between X1 and X2 is,
λl(X1, X2) = lim
q↘0
P(X2 ≤ F−12 (q)|X1 ≤ F−11 (q)) (A.7)
If λl(X1, X2) > 0 then X1 and X2 are said to show lower tail dependence. If
λl(X1, X2) = 0 then X1 and X2 are said to be asymptotically independent in the
upper lower tail.
Proposition 8 (Tail dependence for Gaussian copula). A Gaussian copula has no
tail dependence if the correlation is not equal to 1 or -1.
Proposition 9 (Tail dependence for Student copula). The bivariate Student dis-
tribution with ν degrees of freedom and correlation ρ has tail dependence provided
that ρ > −1.
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Appendix B
Power law
We present in this appendix a brief introduction to power law distributions. We
refer the reader to Clauset et al. (2009) and Clementi et al. (2006) for an overview
of power law distributions and their use to fit empirical data.
B.1 Definition and properties
Definition 26 (Regularly varying distribution). A regularly varying distribution is
a distribution whose density (or probability mass) function is of the form
p(x) = cL(x)x−1−α, (B.1)





= 1 ∀t ∈ [−∞,∞] (B.2)
The form of L controls the shape and finite extent of the lower tail.
Definition 27 (Continuous power law distribution). If p is continuous, L(x) is the
constant function and there is a lower bound xmin from which the law holds, the
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for x ≥ xmin (B.3)
In this case, the distribution is called Pareto distribution.
Proposition 10 (First and second moments for the Pareto distribution). The
expected value of a random variable X following a Pareto distribution with α > 1












The variance is undefined for α ≤ 2.
Definition 28 (Discrete power law distribution). If p is defined on the integers,
L(x) is the constant function and there is a lower bound xmin from which the law




for x ≥ xmin (B.6)
where ζ(α, xmin) is the generalized or Hurwitz zeta function.
In this case, the distribution is called Zipf ’s law or zeta-distribution.
Definition 29 (Generalized Pareto distribution). The generalized Pareto distri-
bution with shape parameter ξ 6= 0, scale parameter σ and location parameter µ,











for x > µ when ξ > 0, or for µ < x < −σ
ξ
when ξ < 0.
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Proposition 11. If ξ = 0 and µ = 0, the generalized Pareto distribution is equiv-
alent to the exponential distribution. If ξ > 0 and µ = σ
ξ
, the generalized Pareto







B.2 Maximum likelihood estimation of the tail
exponent
Proposition 12 (Maximum likelihood estimator for α in the continuous case).
Consider a sample x1, ..., xn from a Pareto distribution with parameter α and lower















Proposition 13 (Maximum likelihood estimator for α in the discrete case). Con-
sider a sample x1, ..., xn from a Zipf ’s law with parameter α and lower bound xmin.
Assuming xmin known, the maximum likelihood estimator for α is the one that
maximized the log-likelihood
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B.3 Fitting a power law to empirical data
Consider a data set y1, ..., yn. A log-log plot of the empirical cumulative distribution
of y1, ..., yn shows a linear decay in the tail.
We propose then to fit the tail with a power law distribution (Pareto if the y’s are
continuous real numbers and Zipf’s law if the y’s can only take discrete values).
That is, we aim to estimate the lower bound ymin and tail exponent α of the power
law.
A heuristic method to determine the lower bound is by visually identifying the
threshold ymin above which the log-log plot of the empirical cumulative distribution
exhibits a linear trend. Then, the parameter α is estimated by maximum likelihood
using ymin as lower bound. This approach is clearly subjective and sensitive to the
heuristic choice of the lower bound.
A more objective approach is proposed in Clauset et al. (2009), who suggest to select
the lower bound ymin that maximizes a measure of goodness fit of the empirical
cumulative distribution of the data set by a power law with parameter ymin and
tail exponent α̂(ymin) which is the maximum likelihood estimator of α using ymin
as lower bound.
The goodness of fit is measured by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic, which
is the maximum between the empirical cumulative distribution of the data and the





where F̂ymin(y) is the empirical cumulative distribution of the observations with
value of at least ymin and Fα̂(ymin),ymin(y) is the cumulative distribution of the power
law with parameter α̂(ymin) and lower bound ymin.
The estimate of the lower bound is then the value ymin that minimizes KS.
This method is based on the idea that a choice ymin below the true value would
imply a poor fit of the tail since the lower end of the tail would not follow a power
law, and a choice ymin above the true value would lead to a fit not as good as the
one obtained when using ymin as a lower bound since the sample size would be
smaller.
Then, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we check the goodness of fit by testing
the hypothesis that the power law with parameter α̂(ymin) and lower bound ymin
generates the observed empirical cumulative distribution of the observations with
value of at least ymin, that is
H0 : F̂ymin(y) = Fα̂(ymin),ymin(y) versus H1 : F̂ymin(y) 6= Fα̂(ymin),ymin(y) (B.15)
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Appendix C
Capital requirements under Basel
2
We present in this appendix the framework proposed by Basel 2 accords for as-
sessing the total capital ratio required for each banking institution in the financial
system. We refer the reader to BIS (2001) and Duellmann (2006) for more details.
The total capital ratio (TCR) is defined in Basel 2 accords as
TCR =
TC −RDCrD −Ded
RWACrD + 12.5V aRMkR + 12.5V aROpR
(C.1)
where:
• TC: total capital consisting of Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 capital. Besides the
8% minimum for the TCR, banks also need to set a minimum of 4% for their
Tier 1 ratio.
• RDCrD: regulatory difference between expected loss and provisions for credit
risk.
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• Ded: deductions.
• RWACrD: risk-weighted assets for credit risk.
• V aRMkR: value at risk for market risk.
• V aROpR: value at risk for operational risk.
The cushion for market risk is estimated as the 99% 10 days value-at-risk of the
total net exposure:










where SD denotes the Standard Deviation.
The cushion for credit risk is calculated as the risk-weighted-assets to absorb the





The losses caused by default fluctuate depending on the severity of default events.
Financial institutions never know in advance the losses that they will experience but
they can forecast the expected loss by estimating the proportion of institutions that
might default within a given time horizon, multiplied by the outstanding exposure
at default when assuming zero recovery rate. The expected loss (ELi) of institution





where pj is the marginal default probability of institution j in the network.
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Whereas the expected loss (EL) is the mean of the loss distribution, the unexpected
loss (UL) is defined as the difference between an adverse 99.9%-percentile of the
portfolio loss distribution and EL. Therefore, the evaluation of the unexpected
loss requires a statistical model on the default of the portfolio. Basel 2 accords
propose to use the asymptotic single risk factor model (ASRF) according to which
the variation ∆Eij of the asset value Eij that institution i holds in institution j
depends on a systemic (common) risk factor S and an idiosyncratic (specific) risk






Default occurs if the variation of Eij falls below a default threshold κi. Assuming
S to be distributed as a standard gaussian and the Zi are iid standard gaussian
random variables independent of S, the default probability conditional on S is then
given by:
PDi(S) = P(∆Eij < κi|S) = Φ(
κi −√ρS√
1− ρ ) (C.6)
where Φ(x) is a standard normal cumulative density function.
The unexpected loss is computed as the difference between the conditional default
probability given the 99.9%-percentile adverse movement of systematic risk factor







1− ρ )− pj] (C.7)
BIBLIOGRAPHY 204
Bibliography
Acharya, V., Pedersen, L., Philippon, T., and Richardson, M. (2010). Measuring
systemic risk. Working paper.
Adelson, M. (2010). Big changes in Standard & Poor’s rating criteria. Technical
report, Standard & Poor’s.
Adrian, T. and Brunnermeier, M. K. (2008). CoVaR. Staff Report 348, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.
A´gnes Lublo´y (2006). Topology of the Hungarian large-value transfer system. Oc-
casional Papers 57, Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Budapest.
Allen, F. and Gale, D. (2000). Financial contagion. Journal of Political Economy,
108:1–33.
Amini, H., Cont, R., and Minca, A. (2010). Resilience to contagion in financial
networks. Working paper.
Amini, H., Cont, R., and Minca, A. (2011). Stress testing the resilience of financial
networks. International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance, 14.
Avellaneda, M., Buff, R., Friedman, C., Grandchamp, N., Kruk, L., and Newman,
J. (2001). Weighted monte carlo: A new technique for calibrating asset-pricing
models. International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance, 4:1–29.
Azizpour, S., Giesecke, K., and Schwenkler, G. (2010). Exploring the sources of
default clustering.
Babus, A. (2006). The formation of financial networks. Tinbergen institute discus-
sion papers, Tinbergen Institute.
Barabasi, A.-L. and Albert, R. (2002). Emergence of scaling in random networks.
Science, (286):509–512.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 205
Battiston, S., Gatti, D. D., Gallegati, M., Greenwald, B. C., and Stiglitz, J. E.
(2009). Liaisons dangereuses: Increasing connectivity, risk sharing, and systemic
risk. Working Paper 15611, National Bureau of Economic Research.
BCB (2000a). Resolution 2,723, Brazilian Central Bank, Brazil. May 31th.
BCB (2000b). Resolution 2,743, Brazilian Central Bank, Brazil. June 28th.
BCB (2007a). Resolution 3,444, Brazilian Central Bank, Brazil. February 28th.
BCB (2007b). Resolution 3,490, Brazilian Central Bank, Brazil. August 29th.
Bernanke, B. S. (2009). Financial reform to address systemic risk. speech delivered
at the at the council on foreign relations, Washington DC.
BIS (2001). Overview of the new basel capital accord. Consultative document,
Bank for International Settlements.
Bolloba´s, B., Borgs, C., Chayes, J., and Riordan, O. (2003). Directed scale-free
graphs. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
Boss, M., Elsinger, H., Lehar, A., and Summer, M. (2004). The network topology
of the interbank market. Quantitative Finance, 4:677 – 684.
Boyd, S. and Vandenberghe, L. (2004). Convex Optimization. Cambridge University
Press.
Cherny, A. and Madan, D. (2006). On measuring the degree of market efficiency.
Technical report.
Clauset, A., Shalizi, C. R., and Newman, M. E. J. (2009). Power-law distributions
in empirical data. Working Paper.
Clementi, F., Di Matteo, T., and Gallegati, M. (2006). The power-law tail exponent
of income distributions. Physica A, 370:49.
Cohen, R., Havlin, S., and ben Avraham, D. (2003). Efficient immunization strate-
gies for computer networks and populations. Phys. Rev. Lett., 91(24):247901.
Cont, R. and Jessen, C. (2011). Constant proportion debt obligations (cpdos):
modeling and risk analysis. Quantitative Finance.
Cont, R. and Moussa, A. (2010a). A closer look at credit ratings of CDO tranches.
Financial engineering report, Columbia University.
Cont, R. and Moussa, A. (2010b). Reconstruction of interbank networks. Financial
engineering report, Columbia University.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 206
Cont, R. and Moussa, A. (2010c). Too interconnected to fail: contagion and sys-
temic risk in financial networks. Financial engineering report, Columbia Univer-
sity.
Cont, R., Moussa, A., and e Santos, E. B. (2010). Network structure and systemic
risk in banking systems.
Cont, R. and Tanimura, E. (2008). Small world graphs: characterization and alter-
native constructions. Advances in Applied Probability, 40(4):939–965.
Csiszar, I. (1975). I-divergence geometry of probability distributions and minimiza-
tion problems. The Annals of Probability, 3(1):146–158.
De Bandt, O. and Hartmann, P. (2000). Systemic risk: A survey. Working Paper 35,
European Central Bank, Frankfurt, Germany.
de Servigny, A. and Jobst, N. (2007). The Handbook of Structured Finance.
McGraw-Hill.
Degryse, H. and Nguyen, G. (2007). Interbank exposures: An empirical examination
of contagion risk in the belgian banking system. International Journal of Central
Banking, pages 123–171.
Donnelly, C. and Embrechts, P. (2010). The devil is in the tails: actuarial mathe-
matics and the subprime mortgage crisis. ASTIN Bulletin, 40(1):1–3.
Duellmann, K. (2006). Regulatory capital and basel II. Technical report, Deutsche
Bundesbank.
Duffie, D., Eckner, A., Horel, G., and Saita, L. (2009). Frailty correlated default.
The Journal of Finance, 64(5):2089–2123.
Egger, H. and Engl, H. W. (2005). Tikhonov regularization applied to the inverse
problem of option pricing: convergence analysis and rates. Inverse Problems,
3(21):1027–1045.
Eisenberg, L. and Noe, T. H. (2001). Systemic risk in financial systems. Manage-
ment Science, 47(2):236–249.
Elsinger, H., Lehar, A., and Summer, M. (2006a). Risk assessment for banking
systems. Management Science, 52(9):1301–1314.
Elsinger, H., Lehar, A., and Summer, M. (2006b). Systemically important banks:
an analysis for the european banking system. International Economics and Eco-
nomic Policy, 3(1):73–89.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 207
Embrechts, P., Lindskog, F., and McNeil, A. (2001). Modelling dependence with
copulas and applications to risk management.
FCIC (2010). Credit ratings and the financial crisis. Technical report, Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission.
FDIC (2009). Appendix D to Part 225-Capital Adequacy Guidelines for Bank
Holding Companies: Tier 1 Leverage Measure. Technical report, FDIC.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2011). Failed bank list. Technical report,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Fender, I. and Kiff, J. (2004). CDO rating methodology: Some thoughts on model
risk and its implications. BIS Working Papers 163, Bank for International Set-
tlements.
Freixas, X., Parigi, M., and Rochet, J. (2000). Systemic risk, interbank relations and
liquidity provision by the central bank. Journal of Money Credit and Banking,
32(3):611–638.
Furfine, C. H. (2003). Interbank exposures: Quantifying the risk of contagion.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 35(1):111–128.
Goldman Sachs (2007). ABACUS 2007-AC1. Technical report.
Gup, B. E. (2004). Too Big to Fail: Policies and Practices in Government Bailouts.
Praeger.
Huang, X.-L., Zou, F.-T., and Ma, F.-Y. (2007). Targeted local immunization in
scale-free peer-to-peer networks. J. Comput. Sci. Technol., 22(3):457–468.
Kalemanova, A., Schmidt, B., and Werner, R. (2005). The normal inverse gaussian
distribution for synthetic CDO pricing.
Lee, Y. T. (2009). Impact of CDO tranches on economic capital of credit portfolios.
Li, D. (2000). On default correlation: A copula function approach.
Lowenstein, R. (2000). When genius failed: The rise and fall of long-term capital
management.
Madar, N., Kalisky, T., Cohen, R., Ben-avraham, D., and Havlin, S. (2004). Im-
munization and epidemic dynamics in complex networks. The European Physical
Journal B, 38:4269–276.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 208
McDougall, R. (1999). Entropy theory and ras are friends. GTAP Working Papers
300, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Department of Agricultural Economics,
Purdue University.
Meng, C. and Sengupta, A. N. (2009). CDO tranche sensivitivities in the gaussian
copula model.
Mistrulli, P. E. (2007). Assessing financial contagion in the interbank market:
Maximum entropy versus observed interbank lending patterns. Bank of Italy Re-
search Paper Series - Temi di Discussione 641, Bank of Italy, Economic Research
Department, Rome, Italy.
Mu¨ller, J. (2006). Interbank credit lines as a channel of contagion. Journal of
Financial Services Research, 29(1):37–60.
Nelsen, R. B. (1999). An introduction to copulas, volume 139 of Lecture Notes in
Statistics. Springer-Verlag.
Newman, D., Fabozzi, F. J. ., Lucas, D. J. ., and Goodman, L. S. . (2008). Empirical
evidence on CDO performance. The journal of fixed income, 18(2):32–40.
Nier, E., Yang, J., Yorulmazer, T., and Alentorn, A. (2007). Network models and
financial stability. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31:2033–2060.
Parkinson, P. M. (1999). Hedge funds, leverage, and the lessons of long-term capital
management. Technical report, The Federal Reserve Board.
Peng, X. and Kou, S. (2009). Default clustering and valuation of collateralized debt
obligations.
Reisner, L. L., Lench, K. R., and Muoio, R. A. (2010). Sec charges goldman sachs
with fraud in structuring and marketing of CDO tied to subprime mortgages.
Technical report, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Schmidt, T. (2008). Copulas and dependence measurement.
Schneider, M. H. and Zenios, S. A. (1990). A comparative study of algorithms for
matrix balancing. Opererations Research, 38:439–455.
Sheldon, G. and Maurer, M. (1998). Interbank lending and systemic risk: An
empirical analysis for switzerland. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics,
134(IV):685–704.
Shtatland, E., Kleinman, K., and Cain, E. (2002). One more time about r2 measures
of fit in logistic regression. NESUG 15 Proceedings, pages 222–226.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 209
SIFMA (2010). Global CDO market issuance data. Technical report, Securities
Industry and financial Markets association.
Standard & Poor’s (2007). CDOs: An introduction to CDOs and Standard & Poor’s
global CDO ratings. Technical report, Standard & Poor’s.
Standard & Poor’s (2008). 73 ratings lowered on 18 u.s. cdos of abs and 2 synthetic
deals; $13.413 billion in issuance affected. Technical report, Standard & Poor’s.
Standard & Poor’s (2009). Update to global methodologies and assumptions for
corporate cash flow and synthetic CDOs. Technical report, Standard & Poor’s.
Toivanen, M. (2009). Financial interlinkages and risk of contagion in the finnish
interbank market. Research discussion papers, Bank of Finland.
Upper, C. (2011). Simulation methods to assess the danger of contagion in interbank
markets. Journal of Financial Stability, forthcoming.
Upper, C. and Worms, A. (2004). Estimating bilateral exposures in the german
interbank market: Is there a danger of contagion? European Economic Review,
48(4):827–849.
van Lelyveld, I. and Liedorp, F. (2006). Interbank contagion in the dutch banking
sector: A sensitivity analysis. International Journal of Central Banking.
Watts, D. J. and Strogatz, S. H. (1998). Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’
networks. Nature, 393(4):440–442.
Wells, S. (2004). Financial interlinkages in the united kingdom’s interbank market
and the risk of contagion. Working Paper 230, Bank of England, London.
Wojtowicz, M. (2011). CDOs and the financial crisis: Credit ratings and fair premia.
